Mark Timothy Pittman
How Judge Pittman decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Plain-text/whole-statute interpreter: resolves statutory questions on the words Congress enacted (and statutes incorporated by reference), declining to let perceived policy goals or consequences override the text; cites Scalia & Garner's Reading Law.
“The words enacted by Congress control the outcome; Congress's perceived policy goals do not. ... Nor can other considerations, such as pragmatism or the desirability of a given outcome, override the plain meaning of the text.”
On the Railway Labor Act he applies the deferential Conrail 'arguably justified' test: if the carrier's contract reading is arguable under the CBA's express OR implied (past-practice) terms, the dispute is 'minor' and headed to arbitration -- the court does not decide who is right on the merits.
“the proper inquiry is not who is right or wrong on the merits of the contract interpretation question, but merely whether the carrier's asserted contractual position is 'arguably justified' or 'frivolous.'”
Procedural preferences
Strict on discovery disclosure and trial-setting integrity: will strike late-disclosed witnesses/declarations under Rule 37 rather than continue a trial, expressly citing the Fort Worth Division's heavy docket; new counsel inherits the case as-is and must supplement disclosures immediately.
“from the moment counsel joined the case ... they had a duty to play with the cards they were dealt. ... Blaming prior counsel for inadequate disclosures does not absolve current counsel of its failure to supplement upon discovery as required by Rule 37.”
Treats a motion for summary judgment on a pure legal question the same as a Rule 12(f) motion to strike, and will call out a litigant's frivolous argument with an explicit Rule 11 warning.
“FirstCash's argument on this point -- unlike its arguments on the bona-fide-error defense -- is frivolous. ... Attorneys who violate Rule 11(b) are subject to sanctions.”
Cautions
The reasoning layer here is ordinary civil/financial-enforcement/labor dispositives because his very long marquee national-policy opinions (student-loan HEROES Act, FDA Pfizer FOIA, MBDA/SFFA, Bruen) were not fetched this build. Do NOT read these three orders as representative of his national-policy docket; deepen with those opinions before drawing any tendency.
“(builder caveat -- not an order quote)”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 7 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 2Denied: 3 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 2 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Granted in part: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Preliminary injunction N = 2 |
Granted in part: 2 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“GRANTS in part Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and DENIES Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.”
“The Court DENIES FirstCash's 80 Motion for Summary Judgment.”
“the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Strike the Jackson and Lee Declarations from the record.”
“The Court further GRANTS Defendants' Motion and ENTERS summary judgment in Defendants' favor on Besso's defamation and ADA claims.”
“BNSF's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part to the extent that it seeks a declaratory judgment that this dispute is 'minor' under the Railway Labor Act. ... DENIED in part to the extent that it seeks injunctive relief.”
“The Court further ORDERS that SMART-TD's 30 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.”
“Thus, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25) is DENIED. And the Court DECLARES UNLAWFUL and VACATES the Program.”
“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25) is DENIED. And the Court DECLARES UNLAWFUL and VACATES the Program.”
“the Court ORDERS that the Government’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 76) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court thus DISMISSES Claims E and F.”
“the Court GRANTS in part Texas’s Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 67). Thus, the Court ORDERS that: 1. Defendants ... are hereby ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from enforcing the July 2021 and August 2021 Orders to the extent that they except unaccompanied alien children from the Title 42 procedures based solely on their status as unaccompanied alien children.”
“the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 40) and GRANTS in part Plaintiffs’ Motion (ECF No. 37). ... the Court GRANTS summary judgment on Nuziard and Bruckner’s equal protection claim. Because an injunction is better than vacatur under the circumstances, the Court DENIES their APA claim but GRANTS a permanent injunction as set forth above.”
“the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 40) and GRANTS in part Plaintiffs’ Motion (ECF No. 37).”
“the Court DISMISSES three of the Individual Plaintiffs for lack of standing, but GRANTS the motion as to the remaining Plaintiffs, awarding them declaratory relief and a permanent injunction.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Caseload read from search_dockets rows (nature_of_suit/cause/jurisdiction_type), not a full IDB baseline. No referral magistrate listed on the sampled Fort Worth dockets.