Brantley David Starr
How Judge Starr decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Textual reading of the controlling instrument: applies the words of a treaty/statute as written. In Firehawk he held the Hague Service Convention inapplicable straight from Article 1's text because the defendant's address was unknown.
“Article 1 of the Convention states that it "shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known." ... As a result, the Convention does not apply.”
Prefers to deny a 12(b)(6) MTD and defer contested merits questions (e.g. antitrust market definition / injury) to a fuller summary-judgment record rather than resolve them on the pleadings.
“the Court finds that the points of dispute contained therein are more appropriate for resolution at the summary-judgment stage of this case. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion.”
Procedural preferences
Strict disclosure discipline -- a plaintiff that withholds its theory of liability from the pleadings and discovery cannot raise it for the first time to defeat summary judgment; the theory is forfeited (Rule 41(b) violation an alternative basis).
“The Court cannot give Lymphedema Texas a fourth bite at the apple and encourage plaintiffs to sandbag their opponents until after discovery is over. ... It should have pled this theory. It didn't.”
Expects candor and civility; directs litigants to the Dallas court's en banc Dondi Properties decision and treats motion practice as a last resort after conferral.
“Going forward, the Court expects candor, civility, and compliance from the parties. ... The Court will not tolerate practices that "do not advance the resolution of the merits of a case." ... Motions should be a last resort.”
Cautions
Reasoning-layer mix is MTD-heavy and 4 of 5 MTD denials are non-12(b)(6)-merits (jurisdiction/sanction/service/timing) -- do NOT read the split as a 12(b)(6) grant tendency. Marquee national-attention orders (the generative-AI-certification standing order; the Southwest/ADF religious-liberty-training contempt order, later vacated by the Fifth Circuit) are standing orders / contempt sanctions, not party-motion dispositives, so they are absent from the stats; capturing a marquee merits opinion is the priority deepen. Two signer traps were caught and excluded (MJ David L. Horan; Judge Ada Brown).
“(builder caveat -- not an order quote)”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 5 |
Granted in part: 1Denied: 4 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 4 |
Granted: 3Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for sanctions N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Default judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Therefore, the Court DENIES Ramachandran's motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 133].”
“Therefore, the Court also DENIES the defendants' motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 134].”
“GRANTS IN PART Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and for a Pre-Suit Injunction. [Doc. No. 5]. The Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendants' request for a pre-suit injunction.”
“The Court DENIES Defendants' Motion for Sanctions [Doc. No. 15]”
“the Court finds that the points of dispute contained therein are more appropriate for resolution at the summary-judgment stage of this case. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion.”
“As a result, the Convention does not apply. ... Therefore, the Court DENIES Jones's motion to dismiss. (Doc. 18).”
“Jones has not shown this lawsuit constitutes retaliation nor has she demonstrated that suing someone who lacks stable housing is sanctionable conduct.”
“Finding none, the Court ACCEPTS the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge and GRANTS Garland's motion for summary judgment.”
“the Court GRANTS Blue Cross's motions for summary judgment and dismisses with prejudice the claims of Lymphedema Texas and Lymphedema America.”
EXCLUDED FROM STATS (no party motion). Sua sponte dismissal of a pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim, adopting MJ's F&R after de novo review of objections. Dismissed WITH PREJUDICE (plaintiff already filed two complaints + questionnaire -> amendment futile); IFP motion moot. Quote: 'The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE all of Jones' claims against all defendants.'
“the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the defendants' motions for summary judgment.”
“the Court DENIES I & I's motion to remand.”
“the Court GRANTS Harper's motion for default judgment and CONFIRMS the Award.”
“the Court GRANTS defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 65]. By separate judgment, the Court will DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Li's claims against the defendants.”
“the Court ACCEPTS the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge and DENIES Battle's motion for default judgment.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Caseload read from search_dockets rows (nature_of_suit/cause/jurisdiction_type), not a full IDB baseline. Referral magistrates harvested from the referred_judge field across sampled dockets (discovery angle 1).