Barbara M. G. Lynn
How Judge Lynn decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
ADA Title II (architectural-barrier suits): under Frame v. City of Arlington (5th Cir. 2010, en banc), sidewalks, curbs, and parking lots are 'infrastructure'/'facilities'/'gateways' -- NOT 'services, programs, or activities.' A plaintiff challenging a noncompliant ramp or parking lot states no Title II claim unless the noncompliance denies her meaningful access to an actual service, program, or activity; she must correlate the physical violation to a deprivation of access.
“the Fifth Circuit found that sidewalks, curbs, and parking lots are not services, programs, or activities within the meaning of Title II, but are, instead, 'infrastructure,' 'facilities,' or gateways to services, programs, or activities. ... no claim is stated by a suit challenging the condition of sidewalks, curbs, and parking lots, unless the condition results in a denial of access to a service, program, or activity.”
Motions for reconsideration: she applies the Lavespere rule -- a motion served within 10 days of judgment is treated under Rule 59(e), later ones under Rule 60(b); Rule 59(e) relief is appropriate when there has been an intervening change in the controlling law. She will reopen to apply new binding Fifth Circuit authority both parties concede controls.
“Relief under Rule 59(e) is appropriate when there has been an intervening change in the controlling law. ... where recent Fifth Circuit case law constitutes controlling authority which this Court earlier noted was lacking, Rule 59(e) relief is warranted.”
Government-enforcement defenses: laches is unavailable against the United States/an agency enforcing a public right (Arrow Transp.; the narrow EEOC back-pay exception does not extend), and after AMG Capital Mgmt. v. FTC (2021) the FTC cannot obtain monetary/equitable-restitution relief under FTC Act 13(b) -- only injunctive relief. She strikes such affirmative defenses on the pleadings (FTC v. Neora).
“the FTC is operating in a sovereign capacity for the protection and furtherance of public rights and interests ... the affirmative defense of laches does not apply.”
Immigration adjudication-delay suits: 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B) strips jurisdiction over Mandamus Act claims challenging USCIS's pace of adjudicating discretionary I-485 adjustment applications (Bian v. Clinton 'dispositive'), and the APA does not reach action 'committed to agency discretion by law.' Such suits are dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (without prejudice).
“Congress has expressly precluded judicial review of the USCIS's pace of adjudication when the agency acts within its discretion and pursuant to the regulations that the agency deems necessary for carrying out its statutory grant of authority.”
Employment-discrimination pleading (1981 / Title VII): she will NOT apply the summary-judgment evidentiary standard at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, and repeatedly faults defendants who cite SJ-stage cases (Alkhawaldeh, Fonteneaux) in support of dismissal. A plaintiff who alleges a White/non-protected comparator was promoted/retained under similar circumstances states a claim; applies Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty. (5th Cir. en banc 2023) for the adverse-action element.
“Defendant's Motion primarily relies upon Alkhawaldeh ..., which concerned summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss. The Court will not hold Plaintiff to the higher summary judgment standard at this phase and denies the Motion as to Plaintiff's Title VII claims.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 7 |
Granted: 3Granted in part: 3Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 5 |
Granted: 4Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Judgment on the pleadings N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for attorney fees N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to set aside default N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED ... Because the present Motion for Reconsideration was filed within ten days of entry of the Court's Order denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court treats it as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend.”
“Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the ramp and parking spaces is GRANTED ... Plaintiff's claims as to the ramp and parking spaces are DISMISSED.”
“Plaintiff's Third Motion for Summary Judgment as to the ramp and parking spaces is DENIED.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss [Doc. #7] is granted in part and denied in part. The claims of the following plaintiffs are dismissed with prejudice: Alfredo Avila; Jarrett Baker; Misti Dial; Judy Garcia; Montae Keller, Sr.; ... In all other respects, the motion is denied.”
“Defendant State Bar of Texas' ('Defendant') Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support (doc. 19, 'Motion to Dismiss') is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant are dismissed with prejudice.”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed January 6, 2012 (doc. 5), is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's complaint against it is dismissed with prejudice and without an opportunity to replead.”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Doc. #7] is GRANTED with respect to all of Plaintiffs' claims and causes of action, and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“Defendants' request for attorneys' fees is DENIED.”
“Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 9, 2020 (doc. 18) is GRANTED ... By separate judgment, the plaintiffs' claims will be DISMISSED with prejudice, and the defendant will be authorized to foreclose on its lien.”
“Plaintiff/Counter Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed October 8, 2020 (doc. 26) is DENIED.”
“Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 23, 2020 (doc. 11), is GRANTED. By separate judgment, the plaintiffs' claims will be DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the FTC's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on All Affirmative Defenses is GRANTED.”
“CureWave's Motion to Set Aside Clerk's Entry of Default (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED, but CureWave will reimburse Bellinger for his reasonable costs and fees incurred in connection with obtaining and setting aside the clerk's entry of default”
“Daniel Herbert is DISMISSED (ECF No. 25) and Daniel Herbert's Motion to Dismiss is DENIES AS MOOT (ECF No. 21).”
“The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) and DISMISSES this action WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with all costs taxed to the party incurring same.”
“Defendant Raytheon's Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Where granted, the dismissal is without prejudice to the Plaintiffs amending by April 15, 2024, unless the dismissal is stated to be with prejudice.”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ('ADA') and 42 U.S.C. 1983, ... which are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and DENIED as to Plaintiff's Title VII claims.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
ENUMERATED via assigned_judge='Barbara M. Lynn' (string resolved this deepen). Her 2020 contested-civil docket spans high-profile commercial/IP and civil-rights matters; her 2019-2021 direct docket is otherwise dominated by 28 U.S.C. 2255 'v. United States' collateral attacks (typical of a busy Chief Judge). Marquee: FTC v. Neora LLC (FTC Act MLM/pyramid enforcement) and Helmerich & Payne v. Nabors (patent), both litigated ~3 years.