Allen Joe Fish

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas Appointed by Ronald Reagan (Republican) 9 signed orders read

How Judge Fish decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Federal summary-judgment practice: a defendant cannot file a Texas-style 'no-evidence' motion for summary judgment in federal court -- the movant must affirmatively cite record evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue, not merely assert that the opponent has no proof. A conclusory 'no-evidence' motion fails.

“A 'no-evidence motion for summary judgment . . . is a pleading that may be filed in state court, but not federal court.' ... Melton Trucking has failed to offer any evidence whatsoever that there was 'an absence of proof as to the factual issue . . .' Therefore, Melton Trucking's motion for summary judgment on the claims for [the torts] must be denied.”

Removal/remand: he construes the removal statute strictly and resolves all doubts against removal. On improper-joinder challenges to a non-diverse in-state defendant he applies a Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis under the more lenient Texas notice-pleading standard, and the removing party bears a 'heavy burden'; a possibility of recovery defeats removal.

“any doubts concerning removal must be resolved against removal and in favor of remanding the case back to state court. ... The party seeking removal bears the heavy burden of proving improper joinder. ... If the defendants cannot prove improper joinder, remand is mandated.”

Diversity jurisdiction: the citizenship of an LLC is determined by the citizenship of all its members, NOT its state of incorporation or principal place of business. A party opposing removal who points only to an LLC's headquarters location, without pleading its members' citizenship, fails to defeat diversity.

“the citizenship of a limited liability company is determined by the citizenship of all of its members. ... A limited liability company's state of incorporation and principal place of business are irrelevant for determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists.”

Motion outcomes

Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.

Motions to dismiss
N = 5
Granted: 4Moot / procedural: 1 counts only
Summary judgment
N = 2
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1 counts only
Motions to remand
N = 2
Granted: 1Denied: 1 counts only

A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Rodriguez v. State Farm Lloyds
3:13-cv-03505-G · 2014-07-14
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Granted

“For the reasons stated above, Rodriquez's motion to remand is GRANTED. This case is REMANDED to the 101st Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas.”

Parker v. Bill Melton Trucking, Inc.
3:15-cv-02528-G · 2016-12-07
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“Melton Trucking's motion for partial summary judgment on Rev. Parker's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, gross negligence, strict liability, and negligence per se is DENIED. However, Melton Trucking's motion for summary judgment on Rev. Parker's claims for spoliation and attorney's fees is GRANTED.”

Advanced Physicians, S.C. v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company
3:16-cv-02355-G · 2016-12-08
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Denied

“For the reasons stated above, the plaintiff's motion is DENIED.”

Ewing v. Rushmore Loan Management Services
3:16-cv-03022-G-BK · 2018-03-16
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Defendants' amended motion for summary judgment (docket entry 11), is GRANTED.”

Wierman v. Prestige Default Services
3:21-cv-01330-G-BH · 2021-12-27
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Baseless Claims Pursuant to Rule Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), filed June 10, 2021 (docket entry 5) is GRANTED. By separate judgment, the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants will be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim.”

Chalmers v. City of Dallas
3:22-cv-00585-G-BK · 2022-11-17
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The defendants' motions to dismiss are thus GRANTED, and the plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”

Nelson v. Moye
3:23-cv-00837-G-BH · 2023-10-24
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The motion to dismiss (docket entry 7), filed by the defendant Eric V. Moye ("Judge Moye"), is GRANTED. By separate judgment, any claims against Judge Moye in an official capacity will be DISMISSED without prejudice, and the claims against him in an individual capacity will be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”

Pamon v. United States Postal Service
3:25-cv-00539-G-BK · 2026-01-02
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“the court GRANTS the defendants' motions to dismiss (docket entries 9, 15, 28). All other pending motions are DENIED.”

Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Bolton
3:25-cv-01786-G-BN · 2025-11-10
Motions to dismiss (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“the court ACCEPTS the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (docket entry 11) and GRANTS Lakeview's motion to dismiss (docket entry 20).”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Senior-judge docket, Dallas Division. Sampled enumerations show two dominant streams: (1) 28 U.S.C. 2255 motions to vacate ('<name> v. United States') that close quickly; (2) the 2026 alien-detainee 28:2241 habeas surge ('463 Prisoner Pet/Habeas Corpus: Alien Detainee', U.S. Government Defendant, no jury), all pending and referred to magistrate judges (Horan, Toliver, McKay). Civil matters are removed diversity/federal-question suits (mortgage/foreclosure, TCPA, insurance, employment) that typically settle, remand, or transfer.