Caroline M. Craven
Judge Craven no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Craven decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a suit over a prosecutor's charging decision, she found the prosecutor's affidavit from an independent former district attorney -- stating that a reasonably prudent prosecutor could have made the same charging decision on the evidence available -- was undisputed evidence of good faith sufficient to establish official immunity as a matter of law.
“The Affidavit of Tim James clearly establishes that Defendant was acting in 'good faith' and as a reasonably prudent district attorney with regard to her handling of the criminal case against Plaintiff.”
On a PLRA exhaustion defense in a prisoner-rights case, she granted summary judgment once the defendant established the absence of a fact issue on exhaustion, treating it as a threshold, case-dispositive ground rather than reaching the merits.
“Dr. Reginaldo Stanley's motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies (docket entry #51) is GRANTED and the claims against Dr. Stanley are DISMISSED with prejudice.”
Procedural preferences
On a preliminary-injunction request against prison officials, she required the movant to satisfy all four traditional elements and treated federal-court deference to prison administration as weighing heavily against an injunction absent a concrete, particularized showing of harm.
“Considerations of federalism weigh heavily against interference by federal courts through the issuance of preliminary injunctions against state agencies ... federal district courts are not to allow themselves to become 'enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations.'”
In a habeas case, a second-or-successive petition filed without prior Fifth Circuit authorization was dismissed on that procedural ground alone, without reaching the merits of the underlying claim.
“petitioner has failed to allege or demonstrate he obtained prior permission to file his petition from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the petition should be dismissed without prejudice.”
Cautions
She would not resolve a genuine credibility dispute at summary judgment: where an inmate's sworn account of an assault directly conflicted with the officers' sworn denials, she denied both sides' cross-motions and sent the case to a jury rather than weighing the competing testimony herself.
“this case simply involves a swearing match, which will have to be resolved by the trier of fact.”
In a federal-employee Title VII case, she treated the 45-day EEO-counselor contact deadline as a firm procedural bar: without a showing that equitable tolling applied, missing it was fatal even before reaching the merits, and she found further amendment would be futile.
“Plaintiff has not met his burden to demonstrate that he timely contacted an agency EEO counselor within 45 days of his effective termination. The Court finds no error in the Magistrate Judge's finding that equitable tolling does not apply in this case.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry # 29) and Defendant's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry # 35) are GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs' above-entitled and numbered cause of action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“ORDERED that the Defendants' supplemental motion for summary judgment (docket entry #42) is DENIED. It is further ORDERED that the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (docket entry #43) is DENIED.”
Sua sponte prisoner-screening dismissal under 28 U.S.C. 1915A rather than a ruling on a party motion.
“It is accordingly recommended that the Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction (docket no. 25) be denied.”
“ORDERED that the Plaintiff's motions for a default judgment (docket entry numbers 10 and 13) are DENIED.”
“ORDERED that Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. No. 8) is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that judgment of forfeiture is hereby entered in favor of the United States.”
“ORDERED that Defendant Mitsubishi Digital Electronics America, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-infringement (Docket Entry # 128), Defendant Toshiba America Consumer Products, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-infringement (Docket Entry # 129), and Defendant Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-infringement (Docket Entry # 130) are GRANTED to the extent that Defendants' accused products do not infringe the 'bonded' and 'in intimate contact with' limitations of Claims 2 and 3 of the '631 patent.”
“The Magistrate Judge recommends that the motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence be granted to the extent that the judgment imposed against movant in cause number 1:96cr54 be vacated and movant be resentenced. ... the report of the Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED.”
“ORDERED that Dr. Reginaldo Stanley's motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies (docket entry #51) is GRANTED and the claims against Dr. Stanley are DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“The denial of petitioner's state application for writ of habeas corpus was not contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. ... petitioner's objections are OVERRULED. The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the magistrate judge are correct and the report of the magistrate judge is ADOPTED as the opinion of the Court.”
“ORDERED that Motion for Default Judgment and Memorandum (Dkt. No. 5) is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that judgment is hereby entered in favor of the United States of America that it recover from Defendant, Larry B. Ballard, Jr., the principal sum of $23,157.30.”
“ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 14) is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED and DECLARED that Plaintiff United Fire & Casualty Company ... has no duty to defend and no duty to indemnify either Condeb, LP or Condeb Management, LLC.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Her 1996-2022 caseload on the public docket record spans patent and trademark infringement (the district's signature IP docket), Social Security disability appeals decided on the parties' 636(c) consent, prisoner civil-rights and habeas petitions, employment discrimination (including EEOC-brought suits), and general diversity personal-injury, contract, and medical-malpractice matters -- reflecting the Texarkana Division's mixed general-civil and border-region caseload. Since she retired, every case in the enumeration is terminated; no pending cases exist to sample.
A historical record
Judge Craven no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.