Stacy Rogers Sharp
How Judge Sharp decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In construing sophisticated commercial contracts, she gives heavy weight to the parties' freely negotiated bargain over an argument that a literal reading produces a harsh or one-sided result for one side -- if the contract's plain terms answer the question, she will enforce that bargain even where a party calls the practical effect unfair.
“sophisticated parties have broad latitude in defining the terms of their business relationship, and courts are obliged to enforce the parties' bargain according to its terms.”
She reads the Business Court's own jurisdictional-commencement rule strictly: a lawsuit's start date for the September 1, 2024 cutoff is fixed by the original petition, and a removing party cannot use a later-added claim or a partial removal to bring an otherwise-ineligible pre-existing case within the court's reach.
“the entirety of a civil action commences with the filing of the original petition, regardless of when additional parties and claims are joined. ... Chapter 25A of the Texas Government Code permits only the removal of an "action," and not the partial removal of individual claims within an action.”
Procedural preferences
On the Business Court's intellectual-property jurisdictional clause, she looks past the labels on a party's claims to their substance -- a suit need not plead a standalone trade-secret-misappropriation count to fall within the court's IP jurisdiction if the underlying allegations concern misuse of confidential business information.
“the defendant's removal notice, which pleaded more than five million dollars in controversy, satisfied the statutory jurisdictional threshold ... The petition's repeated allegations regarding misappropriation of sensitive business information invoked Section 25A.004(d)(4)'s jurisdictional clause, requiring that the suit relate to intellectual-property ownership or use, despite no standalone trade-secret misappropriation claim.”
A partial settlement that narrows a case down to a single remaining defendant will not retroactively strip the court of jurisdiction; she measures the amount-in-controversy threshold against the total claims of all originally joined parties at the suit's commencement, not against what remains after some parties settle out.
“partial disposition of this suit could not divest the court of subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the remaining claims. The court's governing statute provides that the jurisdictional "amount in controversy . . . is the total amount of all joined parties' claims."”
Cautions
A contractual notice-of-dispute clause tied to an invoice due date will be enforced as a strict condition precedent to suit; a party that misses that window loses its right to litigate the underlying billing dispute even if it later claims the other side's invoicing was itself the original wrong.
“Wink is correct that Delek cannot pursue its rights as to the oldest six disputed invoices due to failure to timely dispute them. ... the court cannot remove the conditional "if" from section 8.02.”
A last-minute nonsuit will not save a claim from a pending Rule 91a motion -- Texas's three-day filing deadline for a nonsuit or amendment to head off a ruling is enforced literally, so a plaintiff who waits until two days before the hearing gets a ruling on the merits whether she wants one or not.
“Hensarling concedes her nonsuit was not filed in time to prevent the court's ruling, and Defendants decline to waive Rule 91a's timing provision. Accordingly, the court must issue a ruling on the merits of their Motion.”
Post-execution 'course of performance' evidence -- how the parties actually behaved after signing -- cannot be used to argue for a different reading of a contract she has already found unambiguous; she will strike that evidence from the summary-judgment record rather than let it relitigate a settled construction.
“courts can't consider course-of-performance evidence to interpret an unambiguous contract.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“This opinion concludes the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a case commenced before September 1, 2024. This 2018 suit was removed to the Business Court from district court under Chapter 25A of the Texas Government Code. Though all parties consented to the removal, the court examined its jurisdiction sua sponte and concluded the legislation creating the Business Court of Texas does not grant the court jurisdiction, requiring remand.”
“This opinion concludes that, under Section 8 of House Bill 19 -- the court's enabling legislation -- the entirety of a civil action commences with the filing of the original petition, regardless of when additional parties and claims are joined. Additionally, Chapter 25A of the Texas Government Code permits only the removal of an "action," and not the partial removal of individual claims within an action. The court orders remand based on its lack of jurisdiction.”
“Denying defendant's motion for summary judgment arguing that a contract does not require it to pay royalty payments on "revenues actually received by [the defendant] for final disposal of solid waste in the sanitary landfill operated on the Property," where the disposal is in a part of the landfill that is not on the Property.”
“For these reasons, Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.”
“For the reasons above, the court retains jurisdiction of this suit.”
“For these reasons, the court denied Plaintiff Alamo Title Company's motion to remand. ... Applying the court's jurisdictional balance-shifting framework, the court holds that the defendant's removal notice, which pleaded more than five million dollars in controversy, satisfied the statutory jurisdictional threshold where plaintiff offered no rebutting evidence.”
“the Court partially GRANTS the Motion as follows and holds that the parties' Contracts are unambiguous with respect to the issues adjudicated in this Order ... In any remaining respect other than as expressly granted in this Order, Defendants' Motion is DENIED.”
“the court ORDERS that Defendants' objections to Exhibits D through N of Plaintiffs' Motion are SUSTAINED. The court strikes these exhibits from the summary-judgment record.”
“the Terminal Service Agreement, effective September 30, 2021, grants Plaintiff Delek exclusive use of two tanks at Plains Marketing, L.P.'s crude oil terminal in Midland, Texas for the storage of up to 566,000 barrels of crude oil ... In any remaining respect other than as expressly granted in this Order, the parties' motions for summary judgment are DENIED.”
“Delek's claims for breach of contract, as those claims relate to Invoice Nos. 2022-07, 2023-01, 2023-07, 2024-01, 2024-07, and 2025-01 (Exhibits F-1 through F-6 to Wink's Partial Motion for Traditional Summary Judgment), are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“Delek's motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART as described above. Delek's objections on the basis of parol evidence in paragraphs 7-14, 18-27, and 33 of Keith Legrone's declaration ... are SUSTAINED. Delek's objections to paragraphs 1-6, 15-17, and 28-32 of Legrone's declaration, along with the corresponding Exhibits B, C, F, G, and H are OVERRULED.”
“Wink's motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART as described above. Wink's objections to Figures 1-4 and the demonstratives on pages 5, 6, 9, 11, and 21-23 of Delek's Motion for Traditional Motion for Partial Summary Judgment are SUSTAINED. In all other respects, Wink's motion to strike is DENIED.”
“For these reasons, the court GRANTS Local's motion to dismiss Mclvor's counterclaims for (1) libel per se and statutory libel; and (2) tortious interference with existing and prospective contractual relationships.”
Put Judge Sharp's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Sharp actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Sharp's own signed orders and cites them.