Melissa (Davis) Andrews
How Judge Andrews rules, drawn from 17 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Andrews
Melissa (Davis) Andrews has served as a judge of the Texas Business Court’s Third Division in Austin since September 2024. Governor Greg Abbott reappointed her to a new two-year term beginning September 1, 2026. Before joining the court, she was an equity partner at Holland & Knight LLP and worked for justices of the Supreme Court of Texas.
Judge Andrews's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Andrews, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
- Third Division Court Procedures ↗
- Proposed Scheduling Order ↗
- Joint Advisory of Early Legal Issues ↗
- Proposed Pretrial Order ↗
- Notice of Written Submission ↗
- Example Protective Order 1 ↗
- Example Protective Order 2 (optional governmental entity provisions) ↗
- Example Protective Order 3 ↗
Key rules
Discovery
Attach the relevant discovery request and any objection or response to Third Division motions to compel and related letters.
“Motions to compel and any related letters under BCLR 4 must attach the discovery request and any objection or response to the request”
Conferences
In the Third Division, jointly file the proposed scheduling order on the court’s form before the scheduling conference.
“The BCLR require parties to confer on and jointly file a ‘Proposed Scheduling Order’ using the form provided.”
Sealing
When filing protected information in the Third Division, first e-file a copy redacting only that information.
“The filing party must efile a redacted copy of the document(s) that redacts the Protected Information only.”
How Judge Andrews decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Enosis Investments, LLC v. Jensen, she declined to create a new fiduciary duty between parties who had structured their dealings through separate business entities.
“Texas courts do not recognize new fiduciary duties lightly, given the extraordinary burden such duties impose, and the Court sees no basis for creating a new fiduciary duty here. These sophisticated parties structured their dealings and created their business entities mindfully, and ignoring those choices after the fact is contrary to Texas policy.”
In Marathon Oil Co. v. Mercuria Energy America, LLC, Judge Andrews rejected a proposed duty to buy back a delivery obligation as a reasonable effort under a force-majeure clause because a buyback would not resume performance and would defeat the clause’s purpose.
“A buyback does not allow performance to resume; performance does not occur at all under a buyback. ... imposing a duty on a seller to buy back its delivery obligation in the context of force majeure would render the force-majeure provision meaningless: because a buy back is 'always possible,' force majeure would never excuse a failure to deliver if the seller had a duty to buy back its delivery obligation.”
In GoSecure v. CrowdStrike, Andrews granted CrowdStrike’s special appearance and dismissed the claims against it. She found that the dispute had too little connection to Texas and that interstate federalism weighed against exercising personal jurisdiction.
“Texas does not have a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy between GoSecure and CrowdStrike; there is no reason to think Texas is the most convenient forum for litigation ... and interstate federalism weighs against the exercise [of] personal jurisdiction over CrowdStrike.”
In FSTI v. PVS Minibulk, Andrews held that the contract’s negotiated pickup and freight terms controlled over copied boilerplate about monthly shipping instructions. She denied the seller summary judgment on that defense and granted the buyer’s motion against it.
“the deal-specific, negotiated provisions on page one control over the boilerplate general terms and conditions”
Procedural preferences
In Reed v. Rook TX, Andrews granted remand after Reed removed from his live petition the claims that had initially supported Business Court jurisdiction. She held that the remaining pleadings did not keep the case in that court.
“Although later events generally do not divest a court of jurisdiction once properly acquired, Reed has successfully pleaded his way out of this Court's jurisdiction by removing all such claims from his pleadings.”
In Westlake Longview v. Eastman Chemical, Andrews partly granted a protective-order motion and permitted an Attorney’s Eyes Only tier. She found the parties had not supplied enough evidence to decide which individual documents or lawyers warranted that protection.
“the parties did not present sufficient evidence to enable the Court to perform this balancing test, though they still may do so if a party chooses to challenge an AEO designation under the protective order.”
On removal timing, she holds that the 30-day clock cannot start before the lawsuit itself exists, rejecting arguments that a party's pre-suit knowledge of the underlying facts can start (and expire) a removal deadline before any 'action' is even filed.
“This Court had no jurisdiction or authority to decide this 'action' before it came into existence, which occurred when the petition was filed.”
Cautions
In C Ten 31 v. Tarbox, Andrews denied the plaintiff's request for fees incurred opposing removal. Although she rejected the defendants' jurisdictional argument, she found it had a basis in law and no evidence showed it was made to delay or increase costs.
“that argument [is] not without any basis in law ... CTen presented no evidence that Defendants asserted that argument for the purpose of causing delay or driving up costs rather than for the permissible purpose of having their case heard in this Court.”
In SafeLease Insurance Services LLC v. Storable, Inc., Judge Andrews denied reconsideration of a discovery ruling because Storable had not timely asserted or preserved a trade-secret privilege under Rule 193.3(a).
“Storable has not shown that it complied with Rule 193.3(a) or took any action to assert a trade-secret privilege before the Court's ruling on May 28, 2025 -- or even that it has satisfied Rule 193.3(a) now. Nor has it shown a valid justification. These circumstances are a sufficient basis for denial of the Motion for Reconsideration.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The MSJ is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“The pleadings do not support a joint venture because they do not allege an agreement to share profits and losses; additionally, the company agreements explicitly disclaim the existence of any joint venture and expressly supersede any prior or contemporaneous agreements.”
“While the manager of these manager-managed LLCs may owe fiduciary duties to the LLCs, a non-managing member generally does not; nor is a corporate manager's fiduciary duty passed through to its individual officers and owners absent some basis for piercing the corporate veil.”
“The Court holds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over GoSecure's claims against CrowdStrike Inc., grants CrowdStrike Inc.'s Amended Special Appearance, and dismisses all claims against CrowdStrike Inc.”
“The arguments and evidence necessary to ascertain the amount of Mercuria's actual and spot-price damages have not yet been put before the Court. Without this, the Court cannot determine whether there is an ‘unbridgeable gap' between the two that makes Section 3.2 an unenforceable penalty as applied here.”
“The Court has determined, however, that Marathon's cost-basis theory of actual damages is not the correct legal standard under the facts of this case.”
“For these reasons and the reasons articulated in Marathon's motion for partial summary judgment, the Court granted summary judgment holding (among other things) that the parties' Contract did not obligate Marathon to acquire replacement gas to satisfy its delivery obligation to Mercuria or buy back its delivery obligation from Mercuria as a prerequisite or alternative to declaring force majeure or as a ‘reasonable effort' under Section 11.2 of the Base Contract.”
“The Court holds that both parties' transaction confirmations are part of the Contract, as defined in Section 2.9, and neither party's confirmation trumps the other's; instead, the confirmations must be read together with the Base Contract as a single, integrated agreement.”
“The Court GRANTS the motion and REMANDS this action to the 353rd District Court in Travis County, Texas.”
“The Court therefore denied Storable's Motion for Reconsideration.”
“The Court has jurisdiction over this action under Section 25A.004(b)(2) and denies Reed's motion to remand.”
“On May 1, 2025, this Court granted in part and denied in part defendant Eastman Chemical Co.'s motion for protective order.”
“The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion to Reconsider, as detailed below.”
“Defendants' motion to remand is therefore DENIED.”
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