Melissa (Davis) Andrews
How Judge Andrews decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Texas courts do not recognize new fiduciary duties lightly, and she declines to impose one on an LLC's non-managing member or on a manager's own officer/shareholder absent a veil-piercing theory -- sophisticated parties who structure their dealings through separate business entities are held to that choice rather than allowed to unwind it after a dispute arises.
“Texas courts do not recognize new fiduciary duties lightly, given the extraordinary burden such duties impose, and the Court sees no basis for creating a new fiduciary duty here. These sophisticated parties structured their dealings and created their business entities mindfully, and ignoring those choices after the fact is contrary to Texas policy.”
On a force-majeure clause's 'reasonable efforts' duty, she will not read in an obligation (like a financial buyback of a delivery obligation) that would gut the very risk-allocation purpose the clause serves, even where performing that alternative is always theoretically possible.
“A buyback does not allow performance to resume; performance does not occur at all under a buyback. ... imposing a duty on a seller to buy back its delivery obligation in the context of force majeure would render the force-majeure provision meaningless: because a buy back is 'always possible,' force majeure would never excuse a failure to deliver if the seller had a duty to buy back its delivery obligation.”
On personal jurisdiction, she treats interstate federalism as an independent limit distinct from a defendant's convenience -- a large Texas office and sales presence do not by themselves justify hearing a dispute with little genuine connection to Texas when another state has the greater interest in the controversy.
“Texas does not have a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy between GoSecure and CrowdStrike; there is no reason to think Texas is the most convenient forum for litigation ... and interstate federalism weighs against the exercise [of] personal jurisdiction over CrowdStrike.”
Procedural preferences
On removal and remand, she looks to what is actually pleaded in the live petition at the time jurisdiction is assessed, not to the case's earlier procedural history -- a plaintiff who narrows away the claims that first grounded the court's jurisdiction can plead his way back out of it, just as he pleaded his way in.
“Although later events generally do not divest a court of jurisdiction once properly acquired, Reed has successfully pleaded his way out of this Court's jurisdiction by removing all such claims from his pleadings.”
On protective-order disputes over an 'Attorney's Eyes Only' designation, she requires specific, non-conclusory evidence on both sides of the burden-shifting framework before ruling on any individual document or attorney, rather than resolving the underlying entitlement to AEO protection in the abstract.
“the parties did not present sufficient evidence to enable the Court to perform this balancing test, though they still may do so if a party chooses to challenge an AEO designation under the protective order.”
On removal timing, she holds that the 30-day clock cannot start before the lawsuit itself exists, rejecting arguments that a party's pre-suit knowledge of the underlying facts can start (and expire) a removal deadline before any 'action' is even filed.
“This Court had no jurisdiction or authority to decide this 'action' before it came into existence, which occurred when the petition was filed.”
Cautions
She denies fee-shifting or sanctions requests against a losing removal argument unless the record shows bad faith or an improper purpose -- being wrong on a jurisdictional theory is not, by itself, sanctionable.
“that argument [is] not without any basis in law ... CTen presented no evidence that Defendants asserted that argument for the purpose of causing delay or driving up costs rather than for the permissible purpose of having their case heard in this Court.”
A party that waits until after a discovery ruling to first assert a trade-secret privilege generally forfeits it -- she requires actual compliance with the evidentiary rule governing preservation of that privilege, and a belated assertion in a motion for reconsideration comes too late even though the party had ample opportunity (and unused word count under the local discovery-letter rules) to raise it the first time.
“Storable has not shown that it complied with Rule 193.3(a) or took any action to assert a trade-secret privilege before the Court's ruling on May 28, 2025 -- or even that it has satisfied Rule 193.3(a) now. Nor has it shown a valid justification. These circumstances are a sufficient basis for denial of the Motion for Reconsideration.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The MSJ is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“The pleadings do not support a joint venture because they do not allege an agreement to share profits and losses; additionally, the company agreements explicitly disclaim the existence of any joint venture and expressly supersede any prior or contemporaneous agreements.”
“While the manager of these manager-managed LLCs may owe fiduciary duties to the LLCs, a non-managing member generally does not; nor is a corporate manager's fiduciary duty passed through to its individual officers and owners absent some basis for piercing the corporate veil.”
“The Court holds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over GoSecure's claims against CrowdStrike Inc., grants CrowdStrike Inc.'s Amended Special Appearance, and dismisses all claims against CrowdStrike Inc.”
“The arguments and evidence necessary to ascertain the amount of Mercuria's actual and spot-price damages have not yet been put before the Court. Without this, the Court cannot determine whether there is an ‘unbridgeable gap' between the two that makes Section 3.2 an unenforceable penalty as applied here.”
“The Court has determined, however, that Marathon's cost-basis theory of actual damages is not the correct legal standard under the facts of this case.”
“For these reasons and the reasons articulated in Marathon's motion for partial summary judgment, the Court granted summary judgment holding (among other things) that the parties' Contract did not obligate Marathon to acquire replacement gas to satisfy its delivery obligation to Mercuria or buy back its delivery obligation from Mercuria as a prerequisite or alternative to declaring force majeure or as a ‘reasonable effort' under Section 11.2 of the Base Contract.”
“The Court holds that both parties' transaction confirmations are part of the Contract, as defined in Section 2.9, and neither party's confirmation trumps the other's; instead, the confirmations must be read together with the Base Contract as a single, integrated agreement.”
“The Court GRANTS the motion and REMANDS this action to the 353rd District Court in Travis County, Texas.”
“The Court therefore denied Storable's Motion for Reconsideration.”
“The Court has jurisdiction over this action under Section 25A.004(b)(2) and denies Reed's motion to remand.”
“On May 1, 2025, this Court granted in part and denied in part defendant Eastman Chemical Co.'s motion for protective order.”
“The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion to Reconsider, as detailed below.”
“Defendants' motion to remand is therefore DENIED.”
Put Judge Andrews's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Andrews actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Andrews's own signed orders and cites them.