William G. "Bill" Whitehill
How Judge Whitehill decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He enforces contractual punitive-damages waivers between sophisticated commercial parties even in a fiduciary (trustee) relationship, reading the Trust Code's mandatory protections narrowly: if the Legislature wanted to bar such waivers it would have said so, and a waiver that still leaves compensatory and equitable remedies intact does not conflict with any statute.
“the court concludes that the Trust Code, including § 114.007, does not bar enforcing the Master Indenture § 8.01(e)'s liability limitation clause.”
On whether a promissory note is a 'security' under the Texas Securities Act, he applies the federal Reves 'family resemblance' factors and treats collateralization, a personal guaranty, and detailed representations/warranties as strong evidence against security status, even when the lender's profit motive cuts the other way.
“Having multiple risk-reducing measures in place strongly suggests the Note is not a TSA security.”
On statutory construction of the Business Court's own enabling act, he holds closely to plain text and presumes the Legislature's word choices and omissions are deliberate -- he will not read in a broader grant of removal jurisdiction than the statute's actual language supports, even where a party's reading would let the new court hear a long-pending case efficiently.
“This court presumes the legislature wrote § 8 the way it did for a reason and cannot ignore its plain language.”
Procedural preferences
On designating a responsible third party under Chapter 33, he reads 'harm' broadly -- more like 'injury' than 'breach' -- so a party need not have violated the same legal duty as the named defendant to be designated; it is enough that its own conduct contributed to some injury the plaintiff is suing over, even where the named defendant's own liability theory is different (e.g., fiduciary breach) from the third party's alleged wrongdoing (e.g., contract default).
“the Legislature appears to have intended 'harm' to be somewhat synonymous with 'injury' and 'damage'”
He treats a party's litigation conduct in an earlier, related suit as binding evidence of consent to personal jurisdiction in a later Business Court case over the same dispute -- filing an answer in a virtually identical prior lawsuit consents to litigating in the state generally, not merely in that particular court, foreclosing a later special appearance.
“The court concludes that it does because the focus is on the defendants' consent to litigate the dispute in the state—not a particular court within the state.”
When multiple defendants are jointly removing a case, he does not require every defendant to separately file or formally join a removal notice to benefit from it -- one defendant's timely notice removes the whole case for all defendants under the statute as written.
“the Government Code does not require other defendants to file separate removal notices or to formally join in or consent to a removal notice to benefit from the removal”
Cautions
A sophisticated investor plaintiff cannot rely on the target company's own in-house or outside counsel's assurances to excuse its own duty to investigate red flags -- that counsel represents the entity, not the investor, so accrual and the discovery rule run against the investor once public, disinterested-third-party information puts it on inquiry notice, regardless of what company counsel told it.
“as a sophisticated entity, the court holds Riverside responsible for knowing that '[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the entity' not the individual shareholders. ... the court concludes that Riverside's reliance on True Health's counsel did not absolve it of an independent duty to investigate.”
He enforces the Business Court's enabling statute's one-year jurisdictional start date literally and without exception for efficiency or convenience: even a case that had been pending for years before the court opened, with substantial prior rulings from the original judge, must be remanded if it was filed before September 1, 2024, no matter how well-suited the dispute is to a business court's specialized docket.
“the court grants that motion because plaintiffs filed this suit on April 8, 2022, but this court does not have authority over cases filed before September 1, 2024.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Before the court is defendants' motion to remand this case. The court grants that motion because plaintiffs filed this suit on April 8, 2022, but this court does not have authority over cases filed before September 1, 2024.”
“Before the court is defendants' motion to remand this case. The court grants that motion because plaintiff filed this suit on December 30, 2019, but this court does not have authority over cases filed before September 1, 2024.”
“The court concludes that it does because the focus is on the defendants' consent to litigate the dispute in the state—not a particular court within the state.”
“Accordingly, the court denies movants' motion regarding causes of action asserted against them based on claims that (i) the Callon sale proceeds were not properly distributed according to the TAPA waterfall and (ii) the consideration was not fairly allocated between PEP and BPP. Otherwise, the court grants movants' motion and dismisses the causes of action against them as described above.”
“For these reasons, the court signed its March 21, 2025, order denying FME's Second Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction.”
“For these reasons, the court signed its April 22, 2025, order concluding at this stage that the amount in controversy exceeds $10 million and this action arises out of a qualified transaction.”
“Accordingly, the court dismisses with prejudice PEOFs' causes of action against Doyle and the Blackstone Defendants.”
“For these reasons, the court previously granted Acconcia and Blackstone's special appearances on April 28, 2025.”
“For the above reasons, the court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.”
“For these reasons, the court granted Talati's special appearances on October 16, 2025.”
“The court heard oral argument on and denied the first motion because (i) the Government Code does not require other defendants to file separate removal notices or to formally join in or consent to a removal notice to benefit from the removal and (ii) the court has independent original jurisdiction over plaintiffs' fraud causes of action.”
“The court denied the second motion without argument because § 25A.004(b)'s amount in controversy requirement applies to the case as a whole, including counterclaims.”
“In sum, as a matter of law the record negated every instance of a lack of good faith (that is, bad faith) PEOFs alleged, and PEOFs failed to adduce evidence of other facts constituting a lack of good faith. So, on March 10, 2025, the court granted in part the MSJ and on April 10, 2025, the court denied PEOFs' Motion for Reconsideration for the reasons described in this opinion.”
Put Judge Whitehill's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Whitehill actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Whitehill's own signed orders and cites them.