Andrea K. Bouressa
How Judge Bouressa decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On the Business Court's own jurisdictional start date, she reads 'action' in the enabling statute to mean the entire lawsuit, not individual claims -- so a party cannot remove just a favorable cross-claim or counterclaim out of an otherwise-ineligible pre-September-2024 case, and the whole suit's original filing date controls even when only part of it is removed.
“the sole reasonable interpretation of Chapter 25A with respect to actions is that an action means a lawsuit, and does not refer to each individual claim within a lawsuit.”
Where parties agree to arbitrate under the AAA Commercial Rules, she treats that as a clear delegation of both substantive and procedural arbitrability questions to the arbitrators, not the court -- and will not revisit an arbitration panel's own decision about which contractual dispute-resolution track applies, even on a claim that the panel bypassed a separate appraisal mechanism the contract seemingly required first.
“the parties' adoption of the AAA Commercial Rules removed questions of substantive arbitrability from the hands of the court and placed it squarely in the hands of the arbitrators.”
Procedural preferences
On dismissal-stage motions styled as summary judgment but really challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings, she applies Texas's fair-notice standard rather than the more demanding federal pleading standard a movant may point to from parallel federal litigation, and will require the non-movant be given a chance to replead before entering an adverse judgment.
“Texas litigants, unlike federal court litigants, must generally be allowed to replead a deficient claim before suffering an adverse judgment.”
When a disputed contract term (like an employee's obligation to 'relocate') has no objective criteria and the contract itself offers no guidance, she declines to resolve the meaning as a matter of law on summary judgment, even on a Rule 166(g) motion designed to get an early legal ruling, and sends the question to a jury instead.
“the Court finds that the contract is ambiguous. ... the appropriate time and place for this issue to be resolved is at the parties' scheduled jury trial.”
Cautions
The 30-day removal clock can start running earlier than a removing party assumes: she counts a party's own prior counterclaim, combined with the opposing side's later pleading, toward the date the $5 million jurisdictional threshold was first crossed -- so a removal that looks timely measured from a party's most recent amended pleading can retroactively be untimely once an earlier combination of filings is examined.
“the damages which Defendants contend satisfy this Court's jurisdictional requirement were facially pleaded by the combination of Plaintiff's September 8, 2025 petition with Defendants' prior August 13, 2025 counter-petition.”
She will not certify a permissive interlocutory appeal merely because the Business Court is new and has issued few opinions on a given statutory question; she requires an actual, substantial ground for disagreement among decisionmakers, not just novelty, and will note that the Business Court and its court of appeals have so far spoken with one voice.
“the Court's reading of "action" in Section 25A.004(b) is not a question of law about which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“It is undisputed that the instant action commenced before September 1, 2024. Without reaching Plaintiff's second argument, the Court holds that removal is improper and grants the motion to remand.”
“the sole reasonable interpretation of Chapter 25A with respect to actions is that an action means a lawsuit, and does not refer to each individual claim within a lawsuit. ... NCEC is correct that Chapter 25A applies only to "actions commenced on or after September 1, 2024." ... the Court finds that NCEC's motion is well-taken and must be granted.”
“Presented only with Plaintiff's unopposed motion, the Court accepts as true the parties' mutual representations that the action does not meet the jurisdictional criteria of Texas Government Code Section 25A.004(d)(1). ... IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is transferred to a district court in Potter County, Texas, for further proceedings.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Tort Claims is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's claim for business disparagement is barred as a matter of law under Section 18.2 of the Agreement, but Plaintiff's tortious interference with contract and defamation claims may proceed to the extent they seek general, direct damages arising from AT&T's post-termination conduct and not from AT&T's termination of the Agreement.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion—in its Response to AT&T Enterprises, LLC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Tort Claims—for leave to amend the live petition is DENIED.”
“Plaintiff's motion to strike certain exhibits in Defendant's motion is MOOT. The Court did not base any portion of its decision on any of the challenged exhibits.”
“Following an oral hearing on December 1, 2025, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to remand for untimeliness.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to remand is GRANTED, and this matter, including Plaintiff's pending request for sanctions, is remanded to the 14th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, for further proceedings.”
“Upon consideration of the parties' arguments, Defendants' motion is DENIED.”
“the Court declines Defendants' request for permission to file an interlocutory appeal. While there may be few and finite written opinions on Chapter 25A thus far, the Court's reading of "action" in Section 25A.004(b) is not a question of law about which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant AT&T Enterprises, LLC's Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Defamation Claim is GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that BNSF's Application to Vacate Arbitration Award is DENIED and Level 3's Counter-Application for Confirmation of Arbitration Award is GRANTED.”
“the Court holds that there are not two or more reasonable interpretations of "in perpetuity" in the Agreement. Because the Agreement is unambiguous, its plain language applies. ... the payments are to continue in perpetuity (forever) unless otherwise agreed to by the contracting parties.”
“For these reasons, Boeing's motion must be DENIED. This denial is WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Ryan Lunderby's Traditional Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dominium's Rule 166(g) Motion to Construe Lunderby's 2025 Employment Agreement is DENIED.”
Put Judge Bouressa's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Bouressa actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Bouressa's own signed orders and cites them.