Andrea K. Bouressa
How Judge Bouressa rules, drawn from 16 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Bouressa
Andrea K. Bouressa has served as a judge of the Texas Business Court’s First Division since its opening in 2024 and was reappointed in 2026. She previously served on the 471st Judicial District Court in Collin County. She earned degrees from Texas A&M University, the University of North Texas and Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law.
Judge Bouressa's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Bouressa, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Contacting chambers
Include all parties or their lawyers on communications with Judge Bouressa, except when doing so would defeat requested ex parte relief.
“Include all parties or their counsel, if represented, on court communications, except in rare circumstances where inclusion would negate requested ex parte relief.”
Motions
Set opposed motions for a hearing or submission; the movant must obtain the setting.
“Opposed motions will not be considered unless set. It is the movant’s obligation to obtain a setting.”
Discovery
Attach the written discovery request and any objection or response to a motion to compel.
“No motion to compel written discovery will be considered unless the request and any objection or response are attached to the motion.”
How Judge Bouressa decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On the Business Court's own jurisdictional start date, she reads 'action' in the enabling statute to mean the entire lawsuit, not individual claims, so a party cannot remove just a favorable cross-claim or counterclaim out of an otherwise-ineligible pre-September-2024 case, and the whole suit's original filing date controls even when only part of it is removed.
“the sole reasonable interpretation of Chapter 25A with respect to actions is that an action means a lawsuit, and does not refer to each individual claim within a lawsuit.”
In BNSF Railway v. Level 3 Communications, Bouressa held that the parties' adoption of AAA Commercial Rules delegated arbitrability to the arbitrators. She declined to revisit the panel's choice of dispute-resolution track despite the objection that a separate appraisal process should have come first.
“the parties' adoption of the AAA Commercial Rules removed questions of substantive arbitrability from the hands of the court and placed it squarely in the hands of the arbitrators.”
Procedural preferences
In Southwest Airlines Pilots Association v. The Boeing Company, Judge Bouressa applied Texas fair-notice pleading rules to a summary-judgment motion attacking the pleadings and allowed the union to replead before an adverse judgment.
“Texas litigants, unlike federal court litigants, must generally be allowed to replead a deficient claim before suffering an adverse judgment.”
In Lunderby v. Dominium Development and Acquisition, Bouressa found an employee's contractual relocation obligation ambiguous and left its meaning for the scheduled jury trial rather than resolving it on summary judgment.
“the Court finds that the contract is ambiguous. ... the appropriate time and place for this issue to be resolved is at the parties' scheduled jury trial.”
In Guillaume v. Armstrong, Bouressa applied Texas law to a shareholder’s authority to bring a derivative suit for a corporation that had reincorporated in Texas, even though the alleged conduct occurred while the corporation was incorporated in Delaware. She dismissed the action without prejudice because the shareholder had made no pre-suit demand.
“Texas law, even if the asserted claims arise under—and are subject to—the”
Cautions
The 30-day removal clock can start running earlier than a removing party assumes: she counts a party's own prior counterclaim, combined with the opposing side's later pleading, toward the date the $5 million jurisdictional threshold was first crossed, so a removal that looks timely measured from a party's most recent amended pleading can retroactively be untimely once an earlier combination of filings is examined.
“the damages which Defendants contend satisfy this Court's jurisdictional requirement were facially pleaded by the combination of Plaintiff's September 8, 2025 petition with Defendants' prior August 13, 2025 counter-petition.”
In Sun Metals Group, LLC v. Yu, Judge Bouressa declined to certify an interlocutory appeal because the statutory interpretation issue presented no substantial ground for difference of opinion.
“the Court's reading of ‘action’ in Section 25A.004(b) is not a question of law about which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.”
After permitting the pilots’ union to replead damages in an earlier Boeing ruling, she granted renewed summary judgment only as to consequential damages for which proximate cause remained inadequately pleaded; direct-damages claims continued.
“SWAPA’s claims for direct damages remain pending. This is an interlocutory order.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“It is undisputed that the instant action commenced before September 1, 2024. Without reaching Plaintiff's second argument, the Court holds that removal is improper and grants the motion to remand.”
“the sole reasonable interpretation of Chapter 25A with respect to actions is that an action means a lawsuit, and does not refer to each individual claim within a lawsuit. ... NCEC is correct that Chapter 25A applies only to ‘actions commenced on or after September 1, 2024.’ ... the Court finds that NCEC's motion is well-taken and must be granted.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is transferred to a district court in Potter County, Texas, for further proceedings.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Tort Claims is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's claim for business disparagement is barred as a matter of law under Section 18.2 of the Agreement, but Plaintiff's tortious interference with contract and defamation claims may proceed to the extent they seek general, direct damages arising from AT&T's post-termination conduct and not from AT&T's termination of the Agreement.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion—in its Response to AT&T Enterprises, LLC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Tort Claims—for leave to amend the live petition is DENIED.”
“Plaintiff's motion to strike certain exhibits in Defendant's motion is MOOT. The Court did not base any portion of its decision on any of the challenged exhibits.”
“Following an oral hearing on December 1, 2025, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to remand for untimeliness.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to remand is GRANTED, and this matter, including Plaintiff's pending request for sanctions, is remanded to the 14th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, for further proceedings.”
“Upon consideration of the parties' arguments, Defendants' motion is DENIED.”
“the Court declines Defendants' request for permission to file an interlocutory appeal. While there may be few and finite written opinions on Chapter 25A thus far, the Court's reading of ‘action’ in Section 25A.004(b) is not a question of law about which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant AT&T Enterprises, LLC's Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Defamation Claim is GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that BNSF's Application to Vacate Arbitration Award is DENIED and Level 3's Counter-Application for Confirmation of Arbitration Award is GRANTED.”
“the Court holds that there are not two or more reasonable interpretations of ‘in perpetuity’ in the Agreement. Because the Agreement is unambiguous, its plain language applies. ... the payments are to continue in perpetuity (forever) unless otherwise agreed to by the contracting parties.”
“For these reasons, Boeing's motion must be DENIED. This denial is WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Ryan Lunderby's Traditional Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dominium's Rule 166(g) Motion to Construe Lunderby's 2025 Employment Agreement is DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Cobalt Falcon’s motion for traditional summary judgment on liability for Count I is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Cobalt Falcon’s motion for summary judgment on the affirmative defenses of unconscionability, unenforceable penalty, failure to mitigate, and limitation of remedies is GRANTED.”
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