Sheryl H. Lipman
How Judge Lipman decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a motion to dismiss raising multiple constitutional theories, the judge worked through each claim and each defendant separately rather than resolving the motion on an all-or-nothing basis, letting narrower claims survive even when broader ones failed.
“The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to the official capacity claims against all Defendants. ... The Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to the Equal Protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Procedural preferences
The judge does not treat a pending motion to dismiss as a reason to delay a Rule 16 scheduling conference, and expects self-represented litigants to satisfy local-rule conferral requirements the same as represented parties.
“The Court finds that a ruling on Mr. Philipson's Motion to Dismiss is not necessary prior to conducting the scheduling conference.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
A pro se defendant asked to reschedule a case-management conference, citing his newborn son's hospital stay and his wish to have his motion to dismiss decided first. The court denied the request, holding that a scheduling conference need not wait on a pending motion to dismiss and that the defendant's own delay in conferring with opposing counsel undercut his request for more time.
“Therefore, the Court ADOPTS Judge Pham's R&R and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“Therefore, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report. Plaintiff's claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to the official capacity claims against all Defendants. ... The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to all of the First Amendment claims. The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to the claims under Substantive and Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to the Equal Protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
“Cathey's Motion to Amend and Defendants Motion to Dismiss are both GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.”
“Thus, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
“Because Plaintiffs have not identified any authority that establishes that this Court has the authority to remand a case to state court that was not initially filed there, their Motion to Remand is DENIED.”
“Therefore, the Court ADOPTS the R&R, DISMISSES the complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and finds that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.”
“The Motion to Compel (ECF No. 29) and Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 30) are DENIED AS MOOT.”
“Because Booker does not defend his FMLA claims, Delta's motion for summary judgment with respect to those two claims is GRANTED and those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“But genuine disputes of material fact exist for his remaining claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Thus, both Booker's motion for partial summary judgment and Delta's motion for summary judgment are DENIED.”
“After considering these four factors, the Court finds that, on balance, they weigh in favor of dissolving the TRO. S+N failed to meet its burden of justifying the need for continued injunctive relief on a temporary basis. Therefore, the Court finds that S+N is not entitled to continued injunctive relief and GRANTS the Motion to Dissolve the TRO.”
“Thus, Morrow's motion to remand is GRANTED. Her motion to strike and Kroger's motion to dismiss are therefore DENIED AS MOOT. This case is REMANDED back to Shelby County Chancery Court.”
“Her motion to strike and Kroger's motion to dismiss are therefore DENIED AS MOOT.”
“For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS LAI's Motion to Remand.”
“Therefore, the Motion to Stay both cases in their entirety is DENIED.”
“the Motion to Compel is GRANTED as to all requests that are not impacted by the sovereign immunity defense and DENIED as to those that are.”
“Thus, Skrmetti's motion is GRANTED IN PART. This action is STAYED until the Supreme Court issues its decision in Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton, No. 23-1122 (U.S.).”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The sampled civil caseload spans employment discrimination, personal injury, prisoner habeas and post-conviction petitions, Social Security appeals, contract, product-liability, and forfeiture matters in the Memphis division. Many early sampled cases retained only administrative entries, while one included a dispositive ruling.
Put Judge Lipman's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Lipman actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Lipman's own signed orders and cites them.