Mark S. Norris Sr.
How Judge Norris rules, drawn from 34 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Norris
Mark Saalfield Norris, Sr. is a judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Norris received a commission on November 8, 2018.
Judge Norris's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Norris, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Conferences
Move at least three business days before a hearing or deadline to reset or extend it, absent an emergency or extenuating circumstances.
“a party must file a motion when seeking to (1) reset a hearing, or (2) extend a deadline. The motion should be filed at least three (3) business days prior to the applicable hearing or deadline.”
Conferences
Request an in-person case-management conference by motion at least seven days beforehand.
“If parties prefer to have such conference(s) in person, they must file a motion at least seven (7) days prior to the conference.”
Conferences
Email proposed scheduling orders in Word format at least seven days before Judge Norris’s scheduling conference.
“Parties must submit their proposed scheduling orders in Word format to the ECF Inbox ([email protected]) at least seven (7) days prior to the scheduling conference.”
Conferences
Give at least two business days’ notice before presenting evidence at a hearing.
“If counsel intends to present evidence at a hearing, they must notify the Court at least two (2) business days prior to the hearing.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge Norris decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a Daubert-adjacent but non-expert claim, whether an insurance policy covers a third-party assault claim, he reads ambiguous coverage language in the insured's favor, following the Tennessee rule that ambiguity in an insurance contract is construed to provide coverage.
“When there is doubt or ambiguity as to its meaning, an insurance contract must be construed favorably to provide coverage to the insured.”
In George D. Summers v. Hendrell Remus, Judge Norris dismissed a disqualified candidate’s federal claims after finding that the requested relief could not redress a past injury, sovereign immunity barred claims against the state, and the candidate had no protected interest in the ballot decision.
“Because Plaintiff has not identified a protected property or liberty interest that he was deprived of, the Court need not address whether the process here was adequate under the due process clause.”
In United States v. Zachary Fuchs, Judge Norris denied suppression of drugs found in a vehicle because a policy based inventory search after towing would inevitably have found them, while suppressing the defendant’s handcuffed statements.
“Defendant’s vehicle would have been towed even absent the search of the vehicle because Defendant lacked a valid driver’s license, vehicular insurance, and registration, and the policy of the Gallaway Police Department was to tow vehicles under such circumstances.”
In an unopposed defamation case, the judge credited evidence of reputational harm, lost membership and income, and continuing public access to the challenged statements when granting interim relief.
“Plaintiffs have, therefore, shown that they have suffered and will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction.”
Procedural preferences
In United States v. Rodney Brooks, Judge Norris sustained a narrow objection to the magistrate judge’s analysis of an in-home arrest but independently concluded that the later station confession was admissible and denied suppression.
“The Court finds Defendant’s objection well-taken and it is thus SUSTAINED... But Defendant ultimately gains little by this acknowledgement because the Court nonetheless agrees with the Report’s proposed conclusion that the midstream Miranda warnings rendered Defendant’s station confession voluntary.”
In Smith v. Vantell, Norris denied the prisoner's request to enlarge the filing deadline for a section 2254 petition because the court could not extend the statutory limitations period. He separately directed the warden to answer the petition.
“Because the Court cannot extend the statute of limitations for filing a § 2254 Petition, the motion for enlargement of time is DENIED.”
In an FLSA collective action, Judge Norris ordered disclosure of putative class members’ names, addresses, and email addresses but denied telephone numbers, allowing the plaintiffs to renew that request if the other information proved inadequate.
“the Court recognizes that telephone numbers are uniquely private ... Plaintiffs’ request is GRANTED as to the putative class members’ names, last known physical address, last known email address, and dates of employment but is DENIED as to putative class members’ telephone numbers.”
Cautions
He rejects attempts to use summary-judgment procedure as a shortcut around the standard habeas review framework, since Rule 56's favorable-inference standard for the non-movant is incompatible with AEDPA's presumption that state-court factual findings are correct: a habeas petitioner should brief the merits within the petition itself, not via a separate summary-judgment motion.
“the summary judgment rules are generally ill-fitted to habeas cases.”
In Yanes-Benitez’s detention case, Judge Norris applied the intervening Lopez-Campos decision and ordered an individualized bond hearing within ten days, granting the habeas petition in part.
“Accordingly, based on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lopez-Campos and Respondent’s agreement that it controls here, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED IN PART, and Respondent is ORDERED to give Petitioner an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within ten (10) days of the date of this Order.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF NO. 9) is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“the Motion of Defendants Mark Goins and State of Tennessee to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 52), Defendant Hendrell Remus’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended [Complaint] Pursuant to Fed. [Rule] Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 53), and Defendant Lexie Carter’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 54) are GRANTED for Plaintiff’s claims under the United States Constitution, and those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (ECF No. 30) is DENIED.”
“To the extent the Second MSJ seeks judgment as a matter of law in Petitioner’s favor, the Second MSJ (ECF Nos. 32 & 33) is DENIED.”
“For these reasons, Ibrihim’s § 2241 Petition is DENIED.”
“Ibrihim’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 8) is DENIED because the filing fee has been paid (see ECF No. 2). There will be no further proceedings in this case, so all pending motions are DENIED as moot.”
“Because the Court cannot extend the statute of limitations for filing a § 2254 Petition, the motion for enlargement of time is DENIED.”
“the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion and CONDITIONALLY CERTIFIES the class under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).”
“For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment, DENIES Defendants’ motion for an extension of time, and GRANTS Defendants’ motion as to the issue of Plaintiff’s duty to defend.”
“The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE both Defendants’ and Plaintiff’s respective motions as to the issue whether a duty to indemnify exists.”
“DENIES Defendants’ motion for an extension of time to respond to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment”
“the Court ADOPTS the Report as to the statements made by Defendant while handcuffed, and Defendant’s motion to suppress is GRANTED as to suppression of those statements. To the extent Defendant’s motion to suppress seeks to have the physical evidence excluded, it is DENIED.”
A pro se plaintiff sued the Memphis Police Department directly for alleged constitutional violations, seeking billions of dollars in damages and to be installed as the department's chief executive. The court adopted the magistrate judge's screening recommendation and dismissed the case with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), because a municipal police department is not a suable legal entity separate from the city, and the complaint in any event failed to allege the city acted under an official policy or custom. This is a sua sponte statutory screening dismissal rather than a ruling on a party-filed dispositive motion.
“For the reasons stated, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation in its entirety. This matter shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report, and the Court GRANTS Defendant DeSoto County Justice Court’s Motion to Dismiss. Additionally, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the remainder of the Complaint and Amended Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 5 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 5 |
| Sep 2025 | 24 | 12 |
| Mar 2025 | 26 | 13 |
| Sep 2024 | 34 | 16 |
| Mar 2024 | 20 | 12 |
| Sep 2023 | 17 | 10 |
| Mar 2023 | 9 | 8 |
| Sep 2022 | 12 | 10 |
| Mar 2022 | 12 | 9 |
| Sep 2021 | 8 | 9 |
| Mar 2021 | 32 | 14 |
| Sep 2020 | 11 | 10 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, not for Judge Norris: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 893 | 8.6 months |
| Closed with no court action | 381 | 8.6 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 489 | 8.3 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 10 | 25.8 months |
| Closed during trial | 13 | 26.7 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 893 | 8.6 months |
| Sep 2024 | 737 | 9.4 months |
| Sep 2023 | 755 | 9.9 months |
| Sep 2022 | 782 | 10.3 months |
| Sep 2021 | 792 | 10 months |
| Sep 2020 | 766 | 8.7 months |
| Sep 2019 | 780 | 9.7 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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