Harry Bennett Anderson

How Judge Anderson rules, drawn from 6 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Anderson no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
Position
district
Status
Deceased
Served
1926–1935
Appointed by
Calvin Coolidge (Republican)
Commissioned
1926-01-29
Education
University of Chicago, Ph.B.; Christian Brothers College, A.M.; Columbia Law School, LL.B. (1904)
Signed orders read
6

How Judge Anderson decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Anderson applied equitable estoppel when strict enforcement of a formal rule would permit the alleged fraud that the rule was designed to prevent.

“I cannot assent to the proposition that there is a fixed rule of law in Tennessee, which, as regards the statute of frauds, renders her courts of equity powerless to right wrong, and prevent the consummation of fraud.”

Procedural preferences

Anderson did not permit a new equity suit to replace an appeal after the appeal period had expired.

“This bill is an attempted substitute for an appeal, the time for which has long since expired.”

Cautions

Anderson reserved statutory penalties for defenses that lacked facial merit and declined a penalty when the insurer presented a substantial legal issue.

“Penalties should only be enforced where the defense is without merit on its face, and certainly the instant case presents a nice question of law.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

In re Stansell
· 1925-11-12
Petition to review referee order (bankruptcy trustee) Denied

“the order of the referee is in all things sustained.”

Mississippi Valley Hardwood Co. v. McClanahan
· 1934-10-08
Application for injunction (complainants) Granted

“Complainants are entitled to the injunctive relief sought against the district attorney, limited, of course, strictly to the price fixing or price protection feature of the Hardwood Code.”

Application for injunction (complainants) Denied

“The temporary injunction prayed for against the Hardwood Institute is denied.”

Van Dyke v. Mid-South Cotton Growers Association
· 1934-03-30
Motion to strike declaration (defendant) Granted

“the motion to strike the declaration is sustained, and the suit dismissed.”

International Life Insurance Co. v. Carroll
· 1928-05-30
Motion to dismiss claim (bankruptcy trustees) Granted

“The motions to dismiss as to claims listed as No. 3 are accordingly granted.”

Motion to dismiss claim (bankruptcy trustees) Granted

“The motion to dismiss the claim of Sara H. Ross as executrix, etc., is therefore granted.”

McNeil v. Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford
· 1928-01-20
Application for statutory penalty (complainant) Denied

“The prayer for the statutory penalty of 25 per cent, of the face of the policy is denied.”

Interstate Co. v. Bry-Block Mercantile Co.
· 1928-05-30
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“The motion of the defendant to dismiss the bill of complaint is denied.”

Temporary injunction (plaintiff) Granted

“The temporary injunction is granted.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The reviewed decisions predate representative electronic case-level dockets. This profile therefore makes no claim about complete caseload mix, case duration, administrative dispositions, or motion timing.

A historical record

Judge Anderson no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.