William Lynn Campbell Jr.

How Judge Campbell rules, drawn from 15 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
Position
district
Appointed by
Donald Trump (Republican)
Commissioned
2018-01-12
Education
United States Naval Academy, B.S. (political science), 1991; University of Alabama School of Law, J.D., 2001 (magna cum laude; Editor-in-Chief, Alabama Law Review; Order of the Coif)
Signed orders read
15

How Judge Campbell decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

On summary judgment in employment-discrimination cases applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and will let a Title VII claim reach a jury where the employer's stated rationale shifts over time.

“An employer's changing rationale for making an adverse employment decision can be evidence of pretext. ... a reasonable jury could determine that NIRVC’s proffered reason was pretext for discrimination.”

Procedural preferences

In statutory interpretation begins with the plain language and treats a list introduced by 'may include' as illustrative and non-exhaustive (here the TN Pregnant Worker's Fairness Act reasonable-accommodation list).

“the statute provides that ‘Reasonable Accommodation may include’ the accommodations provided, demonstrating that the listed accommodations, while instructive, are not exhaustive or exclusive.”

Routinely adopts unobjected-to Magistrate Judge Reports & Recommendations after independent review; the M.D. Tenn. magistrate bench (Newbern, Frensley, Holmes) does much of the dispositive-motion screening he then adopts.

“The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 202) and concludes that it should be ADOPTED and APPROVED.”

Cautions

For a Title VII religious-discrimination claim, requires the plaintiff to identify a sincerely-held religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement AND to have informed the employer of that belief; a leave request for a medical procedure is not by itself an expression of religious belief. (Note: this particular dismissal was later vacated on reconsideration.)

“Felts’ leave request ‘is not an expression of religious belief’ and does not by itself ‘plausibly show that [Felts] informed [NIRVC] [of] her alleged religious beliefs.’”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Felts v. National Indoor RV Center (NIRVC-TN)
3:22-cv-00531
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“NIRVC’s motion will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”

West v. United States Bankruptcy Court M.D. Tenn.
3:24-cv-00067
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“DOE’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 25) is GRANTED, and the matter is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”

Nolt v. Knowles (ZK Ranches)
3:20-cv-00962
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“the ZK Ranches Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 141) is DENIED.”

Eads v. State of Tennessee
1:18-cv-00042
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Hensley, Barnett, and Mink (Doc. No. 159) is GRANTED”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“the Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Parker and Williams (Doc. No. 168) is GRANTED.”

Howard v. Byrd
3:21-cv-00119
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“the motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 44) is DENIED as moot.”

Littleton v. Sigma Advanced Solutions
3:18-cv-00590
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 24) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”

Delbridge v. State of Tennessee
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“GRANTED and this action DISMISSED”

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Tennessee Healthcare Management, Inc.
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“the motion (Doc. No. 25) is DENIED”

BMO Bank N.A. v. Noble Transportation LLC
Default judgment (plaintiff) Granted in part

“GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and the Court ORDERS as follows”

Campbell v. Mibelle USA LLC
Judgment on the pleadings (plaintiff) Denied

“motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No. 39) will be DENIED”

Pillow v. Frink
Petition for writ of habeas corpus (petitioner) Denied

“DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE”

Parish v. Braggs
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 61) is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 475 days (N = 7).

The sampled civil docket includes False Claims Act, consumer-credit, disability and employment discrimination, immigration mandamus, insurance-coverage, and prisoner civil-rights matters, alongside a substantial federal criminal docket. Many civil cases are referred to magistrate judges.

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