William Lynn Campbell Jr.
How Judge Jr. decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On summary judgment in employment-discrimination cases applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and will let a Title VII claim reach a jury where the employer's stated rationale shifts over time.
“An employer's changing rationale for making an adverse employment decision can be evidence of pretext. ... a reasonable jury could determine that NIRVC’s proffered reason was pretext for discrimination.”
Procedural preferences
In statutory interpretation begins with the plain language and treats a list introduced by 'may include' as illustrative and non-exhaustive (here the TN Pregnant Worker's Fairness Act reasonable-accommodation list).
“the statute provides that ‘Reasonable Accommodation may include’ the accommodations provided, demonstrating that the listed accommodations, while instructive, are not exhaustive or exclusive.”
Routinely adopts unobjected-to Magistrate Judge Reports & Recommendations after independent review; the M.D. Tenn. magistrate bench (Newbern, Frensley, Holmes) does much of the dispositive-motion screening he then adopts.
“The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 202) and concludes that it should be ADOPTED and APPROVED.”
Cautions
For a Title VII religious-discrimination claim, requires the plaintiff to identify a sincerely-held religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement AND to have informed the employer of that belief; a leave request for a medical procedure is not by itself an expression of religious belief. (Note: this particular dismissal was later vacated on reconsideration.)
“Felts’ leave request ‘is not an expression of religious belief’ and does not by itself ‘plausibly show that [Felts] informed [NIRVC] [of] her alleged religious beliefs.’”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 5 |
Granted: 3Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted in part: 1Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“NIRVC’s motion will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“DOE’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 25) is GRANTED, and the matter is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”
“the ZK Ranches Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 141) is DENIED.”
“The Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Hensley, Barnett, and Mink (Doc. No. 159) is GRANTED”
“the Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Parker and Williams (Doc. No. 168) is GRANTED.”
“the motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 44) is DENIED as moot.”
“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 24) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 475 days (N = 7).
Active Nashville Chief District Judge with a high-volume mixed civil + heavy federal-criminal docket. Civil sample includes False Claims Act qui tam (United States v. HCA Healthcare; v. Horn USA; v. Premise Health), FDCPA / consumer-credit (Mackowski v. Exeter Finance), ADA employment (Trombley v. Vita Group), Title VII employment (Felts v. NIRVC), immigration mandamus (Mann v. Mayorkas), insurance coverage, and prisoner sec.1983. Many cases referred to Magistrate Judges Newbern, Holmes, or Frensley. NOT a grant rate -- caseload composition only.