Waverly David Crenshaw Jr.
How Judge Crenshaw rules, drawn from 30 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Crenshaw
Waverly David Crenshaw, Jr. is a judge of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Crenshaw received a commission on April 12, 2016.
Judge Crenshaw's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Crenshaw, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Contacting chambers
Do not send written correspondence to Crenshaw; make requests through an appropriate filing.
“Written correspondence from counsel is prohibited.”
Motions
Get Crenshaw’s permission before filing a partial summary judgment motion.
“A motion for partial summary judgment may be filed only after permission is granted by the Court.”
Motions
Move for permission to exceed local-rule page limits at least three business days before the filing deadline.
“Any request for additional pages should be made by motion at least three business days before the document is due to be filed.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge Crenshaw decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Antitrust: credits a plausibly-pleaded algorithmic price-fixing theory at the pleading stage: lessors feeding real-time commercially sensitive pricing/supply data into a common algorithm that returns shared pricing recommendations can state a Sherman Act agreement (the RealPage multifamily claims survived dismissal).
“Plaintiffs allege that Lessors submit real-time commercially sensitive pricing and supply data to be compiled into a common algorithm to produce ‘forward-looking, unit-specific pricing and supply recommendations based on [Lessors’] shared data.’ ... The Court has already credited these al[legations]”
In the RealPage rental-software antitrust litigation, Crenshaw analyzed parallel conduct alongside additional alleged factors when deciding which price-fixing conspiracy claims could proceed.
“The resounding majority of courts examining circumstantial evidence of an antitrust conspiracy hold that circumstantial evidence consists of parallel conduct plus additional factors tending to make a conspiracy plausible.”
Procedural preferences
In Mhlanga v. Hicks, he overruled the plaintiff’s objections, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, granted the defendant summary judgment, and dismissed the case.
“Plaintiffs’ Objections (Doc. No. 72) are OVERRULED and the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 71) is APPROVED AND ADOPTED. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 37) is GRANTED. This case is dismissed.”
In Lambert, he dismissed the plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims with prejudice and their Tennessee Open Records Act claims without prejudice after declining supplemental jurisdiction over the latter.
“their claims under the Tennessee Open Records Act are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE because the Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.”
In Roland Digital Media, Crenshaw allowed a class-of-one equal-protection claim to proceed at the pleading stage despite ambiguities in the alleged comparators, leaving their factual similarity for summary judgment.
“For now, Roland has sufficiently alleged the ‘relevant similarity’ required for a class of one claim.”
In the RealPage class settlement proceeding, Crenshaw considered state attorneys general objections as amici without granting them party status that could delay settlement review.
“the Court can fully consider the State AGs’ objections without granting them party status, which would potentially delay the administration of the proposed settlements.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiffs' Objections (Doc. No. 72) are OVERRULED and the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 71) is APPROVED AND ADOPTED. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 37) is GRANTED. This case is dismissed.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 21) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and their claims under the Tennessee Open Records Act are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE because the Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.”
“the Court will grant the Student Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Student Rentals First Amended Complaint”
“and will deny Multifamily Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Multifamily Rentals Second Amended Complaint.”
“For the reasons in the Memorandum Opinion, (Doc. No. 685) Thoma Bravo Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Multifamily Plaintiffs' Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (Doc. No. 570) and the Student Plaintiffs' First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (Doc. No. 572) are DENIED.”
“For the reasons in the Memorandum Opinion, (Doc. No. 686) TREV Management II LLC's Motion to Dismiss Student-Housing Plaintiffs' First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (Doc. No. 576) is GRANTED. TREV Management II LLC is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from the Student Complaint.”
“For the reasons in the Memorandum Opinion, (Doc. No. 687) the Motion to Dismiss LRO Claims for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. No. 580) is DENIED.”
“For the reasons in the Memorandum Opinion, (Doc. No. 688) Certain Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Plead Agency Liability (Doc. No. 581) is DENIED.”
“For the reasons in the Memorandum Opinion, (Doc. No. 690) Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Student Plaintiffs' First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (Doc. No. 587) is GRANTED.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Multifamily Plaintiffs' Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (Doc. No. 592) is DENIED.”
“For the reasons in the Memorandum Opinion, (Doc. No. 689) Defendants' Motion to Enforce Class Action Waivers (Doc. No. 590) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to the class action waiver of Selena Vincin and her class action claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The motion is DENIED as to the class action waivers for Brandon Watters and Jeffrey Weaver. The motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as to the class action waivers for Joshua Kabisch and Meghan Cherry.”
“For the following reasons, the Court will neither grant nor deny the Motion, and instead concludes that the interest of justice is best served by severing the contested claims and transferring them to facially proper jurisdictions... Accordingly, the Court will sever the claims in the Kabisch Complaint, and the Kabisch action will become four separate actions involving the claims against: (1) Prometheus and Sares Regis; (2) Rose; (3) CONTI; and (4) the remaining non-moving defendants... Once severed, the claims against Prometheus and Sares Regis will be transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The claims against Rose will be transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The claims against CONTI will be transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.”
“The Complaint (Doc. No. 1) alleges state law claims against the individual Defendants for aiding and abetting under the THRA and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but Plaintiff has abandoned those claims against the individual Defendants (Doc. No. 48, p.2). Therefore, all claims against the individual Defendants (Gates, Pilkington, Coddington and Ohlson) are DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“For all these reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No.38) is GRANTED as to the claims against the individual Defendants and DENIED as to the claims against FWE.”
“For the foregoing reasons, NSA's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 25) will be granted in part and denied in part. The Court will dismiss Mussaw's THRA and ADA claims, as well as her discrimination claims under Title VII and Section 1981. Mussaw's remaining retaliation claims under Title VII and Section 1981 will proceed to trial.”
“For the reasons outlined above, NES' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 33) is granted in part and denied in part.”
“Accordingly, the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 21) is DENIED.”
“Pending before the Court is Defendants' fully briefed Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 108, 109, 112, 113). For the following reasons, the motion will be denied... For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be denied. Counts I and II will proceed, and this case will be returned to the Magistrate Judge for further case management.”
“For all these reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 42) will be granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs' claims for breach of the duty of loyalty (found in Count I) will be dismissed. All of Plaintiffs' claims with regard to the initial commitment (‘locking in’) with TIAA-CREF (found in Counts I, II, III, IV and VI) are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Court will also dismiss Plaintiffs' claim that having too many options was a breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence (found in Count V); Plaintiffs' claims for Failure to Monitor Fiduciaries (Count VII); and Plaintiffs' claims regarding ‘prohibited transactions’ (Counts II, IV and VI), except as they relate to the Plan's initial agreements with VALIC, Fidelity and Vanguard, if those agreements were made within the six-year statute of limitations. The remaining claims are Count I, only as it relates to maintaining imprudent investments; Count III; Count V, except the claim for having too many options; and Counts IV and VI, solely as they relate to the Plan's initial agreements with VALIC, Fidelity and Vanguard.”
“The CoreCivic Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 204) is DENIED with respect to Bowles's Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against Moore and is GRANTED with respect to Bowles's remaining claims against CoreCivic, Beaver, Hill, Huddleston, Matthews, Mitchell, Murray, Rowe, and Smith.”
“Brun's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 246) is GRANTED.”
“Bowles's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 217) is DENIED.”
“Pursuant to Rule 4(m), Bowles's claims against Jackson and Harris are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 266 days (N = 15).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 78 days (N = 2).
The bounded 2021 filing sample includes employment and other civil-rights matters, prisoner claims, wage disputes, Social Security matters, and a Medicare-related contract dispute. All fifteen selected cases have recorded termination dates. Six new motion outcomes arise from one class settlement docket, so the motion counts do not represent the full assigned caseload.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 3 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 3 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 3 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 1 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 3 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 2 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 4 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 12 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 2 |
| Sep 2021 | 1 | 2 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 4 |
| Sep 2020 | 5 | 7 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, not for Judge Crenshaw: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 1,138 | 8.7 months |
| Closed with no court action | 576 | 7.5 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 543 | 9.4 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 9 | not reported |
| Closed during trial | 10 | 28.1 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 1,138 | 8.7 months |
| Sep 2024 | 1,262 | 7.6 months |
| Sep 2023 | 1,090 | 8.9 months |
| Sep 2022 | 987 | 11 months |
| Sep 2021 | 1,007 | 10.6 months |
| Sep 2020 | 890 | 10.3 months |
| Sep 2019 | 982 | 10.7 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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