Thomas A. Varlan
How Judge Varlan decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Rule 60(b)/59(e) motions asking the court to revisit a final ruling face a high bar: the judge repeatedly holds that such relief is 'circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgments' and requires clear and convincing evidence, an intervening change in law, or truly new evidence -- not simply a litigant's disagreement with the outcome or an attempt to relitigate the merits.
“the party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) bears the burden of establishing the grounds for such relief by clear and convincing evidence.”
When a party voluntarily seeks to dismiss its own claim without prejudice but the law already dictates a result against it, the judge will dismiss with prejudice instead, reasoning that it would be unfair to expose the opposing party to renewed litigation over a claim that cannot ultimately succeed.
“when the law clearly dictates a result for the defendant, it is unfair to subject him to continued exposure to potential liability by dismissing the case without prejudice.”
On an Interstate Agreement on Detainers speedy-trial challenge, the judge distinguished procedural requirements that bind the prosecution from those that bind a defendant seeking a continuance, declining to read the statute as demanding the same rigid compliance in both directions.
“such literal compliance is primarily necessitated for continuances requested by the prosecution”
Procedural preferences
In reviewing objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the judge enforces a strict specificity requirement: objections that merely restate arguments already made to (and rejected by) the magistrate judge, or that raise a new argument for the first time, are treated as improper and given no separate consideration.
“Parties may not 'raise at the district court stage new arguments or issues that were not presented' before the magistrate judge's final R&R.”
Dispositive-motion deadlines are enforced strictly once a scheduling order lapses; the judge has repeatedly denied late-filed dispositive motions as untimely or moot rather than reach their merits, even when a party's new counsel argues the missed deadline was the fault of prior counsel.
“clients must be held accountable for the acts and omissions of their chosen counsel.”
Cautions
Pro se complaints containing fantastical or delusional allegations (e.g., claims of bodily 'cyberterrorism' or implanted tracking devices) are dismissed at the screening stage as factually frivolous, and a later reconsideration motion raising the same allegations in different words will not change that outcome.
“Plaintiff's allegations regarding 'in body cyberterrorism,' are the type of delusional and irrational allegations that fail to state a claim.”
A party's own pleadings and prior representations are used against it: where a litigant's briefing on one issue undercuts its position on another (for example, admitting new counsel was retained after a deadline passed while separately arguing the deadline was implicitly extended), the judge will flag the internal inconsistency directly.
“defendant's argument of an 'implicit extension' is one that it contradicts itself.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration [Doc. 134] is DENIED”
“defendant's motion [Doc. 63] is DENIED.”
“Petitioner's motion for reconsideration [Doc. 6] is DENIED.”
“Ms. Robinette's crossclaim is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“The motion for judgment on the pleadings, motion to strike, and motion to dismiss [Docs. 111, 114, 123] are DENIED as moot.”
“plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction and/ or temporary restraining order [Doc. 7] is hereby DENIED.”
“plaintiff's motion [Doc. 19] is DENIED.”
“DENIES defendant's motions to dismiss [Docs. 135, 138, 164] as well as defendant's motion to reconsider [Doc. 139]. Because defendant's additional motions to dismiss raise the same issues as those addressed by the R&R, defendant's additional motions to dismiss [Docs. 125, 187, 189] are also DENIED.”
“DENIES defendant's motions to dismiss [Docs. 135, 138, 164] as well as defendant's motion to reconsider [Doc. 139].”
“The Court ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the R&R [Doc. 268] and DENIES defendant's Motion to Suppress [Doc. 248] and Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 249].”
“The Court ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the R&R [Doc. 214] and DENIES defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Interstate Agreement on Detainers [Docs. 176, 199].”
“plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 12] will be denied”
“defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 14] will be granted.”
“defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorneys' Fees [Doc. 264] will be denied.”
“the Clerk is DIRECTED to TRANSFER defendant's § 2255 motion [Doc. 12] to the Sixth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.”
“Petitioner's motion for the appointment of counsel [Doc. 13] is therefore DENIED as moot.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The sampled civil docket spans contract, insurance, employment, school-board civil-rights, prisoner civil-rights, and wage-and-hour matters. Most sampled cases ended through settlement, consent judgment, or stipulated dismissal, including one that settled after summary-judgment briefing; one prisoner case produced a summary-judgment ruling.
Put Judge Varlan's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Varlan actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Varlan's own signed orders and cites them.