Robert Allan Edgar

How Judge Edgar rules, drawn from 21 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Edgar no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
Position
district
Status
Retired 2016
Served
1985–2016
Appointed by
Ronald Reagan (Republican)
Commissioned
1985-04-16
Education
Davidson College, B.A. (1962); Duke University School of Law, LL.B. (1965)
Signed orders read
21

How Judge Edgar decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In the farm-injury ruling, Edgar treated the child's age, warnings, and observed adult behavior as fact questions that prevented summary judgment.

“There are genuine issues of fact remaining for any determination of comparative fault.”

Procedural preferences

Edgar transferred a later wage collective action when the parties, proposed classes, and central overtime issue substantially overlapped an earlier case.

“Rather, the crucial inquiry is whether the parties and issues substantially overlap.”

Cautions

In the limitations ruling, Edgar required the amended complaint itself to be filed within Tennessee's statutory grace period; circulating a proposed amendment was insufficient.

“the complaint must in fact be amended, ie., an amended complaint must actually be filed.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Schiller v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co.
· 1989-04-11

After a bench trial, Edgar awarded disability benefits for the first forty months but rejected claims for later benefits and broader declaratory relief.

United States v. Dolan
· 1988-11-22
Motion to clarify sentencing standard (defendant) Granted in part

“Therefore, the Court concludes that it is not unreasonable to place the burden of persuasion upon the *140 Government on the issue of acceptance of responsibility. (b) What is the standard of proof? The defendant here contends that the standard of proof should be ‘clear and convincing.’ The Court rejects this contention and holds instead that the standard is ‘a preponderance of the evidence.’”

Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Cleveland Mall Associates
· 1996-02-07
Motion in limine (CBL defendants) Granted

“For all these reasons, the defendants’ motions in limine (Court File Nos. 196 and 198) are hereby Granted.”

Motion in limine (Cleveland Mall defendants) Granted
La-Z-Boy Chair Co. v. Reed
· 1990-06-27

After hearing the workers' compensation dispute, Edgar found no reliable medical evidence that workplace chemical exposure caused the claimed disability.

United States v. Johnson
· 1993-09-29
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“Accordingly, the motion to dismiss by defendant Johnson, and his motion to quash the indictment and to challenge the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 both facially and as applied to his alleged violation of the statute are DENIED.”

Motion to quash indictment (defendant) Denied
Cotton v. Reynolds
· 1992-12-04
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted in part

“The plaintiff’s motion will be GRANTED IN PART and the defendants’ motion will be DENIED.”

Summary judgment (defendants) Denied
Young v. Toys R Us, Inc.
· 1997-09-29
Motions to dismiss (defendant Schütz) Granted

“Schutz’s motion to dismiss will be GRANTED.”

Jahn v. Cohutta Banking Co. (In re U.S. Insurance Group, LLC)
· 2010-05-18
Bankruptcy appeal (appellants) Denied

“The bankruptcy court’s decision will be AFFIRMED.”

Leffew v. Kugler
· 1998-02-12
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“In accordance with the accompanying memorandum opinion, the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint (Court File No. 5) is GRANTED under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with the parties to each bear their own costs of this action.”

Rooks v. Chattanooga Electric Power Board
· 1990-05-08
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“For the reasons above expressed, the EPB’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.”

United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co.
· 1992-06-25
Joint motion for approval of settlement (joint) Granted

“After due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED that the parties’ joint motion for approval of settlement is GRANTED and the Court approves the settlement agreement as the final action in this case.”

Jones Management Services, LLC v. KES, Inc.
· 2003-10-16
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Granted in part

“For the reasons expressed in the Court’s memorandum filed herewith, the motion of plaintiff, Jones Management Services, LLC (‘Jones’) to remand [Court File No. 2] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Jones’ motion is GRANTED insofar as it seeks to remand this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); and DENIED insofar as Jones seeks recovery of costs and expenses, including attorney fees, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The five sampled terminated cases were filed from 1986 through 1988 and included personal-injury, product-liability, lease, and government-defendant matters. Their electronic entry timelines were empty.

A historical record

Judge Edgar no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.