Katherine A. Crytzer
How Judge Crytzer rules, drawn from 33 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Crytzer
Katherine Amber Crytzer is a judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Crytzer received a commission on December 22, 2020.
Judge Crytzer's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Crytzer, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Motions
If a Party files a motion for emergency relief, the filing Party should also email the motion and any documents filed in support to Chambers, copying counsel for all Parties.
“If a Party files a motion for emergency relief, the filing Party should also email the motion and any documents filed in support to Chambers, copying counsel for all Parties.”
Motions
Reasonable requests to exceed the page limitation will be considered, but the Court will deny a request unless good cause exists and is demonstrated.
“Reasonable requests to exceed the page limitation will be considered, but the Court will deny a request unless good cause exists and is demonstrated.”
Trial
In a criminal case, motions in limine must be filed at least fifteen (15) days before trial, unless the Court sets a different deadline.
“In a criminal case, motions in limine must be filed at least fifteen (15) days before trial, unless the Court sets a different deadline.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge Crytzer decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On summary judgment in a Title VII reverse-discrimination and retaliation suit, the judge scrutinized a plaintiff's temporal-proximity argument closely, finding that a 64-day gap between the plaintiff's protected complaint and the adverse hiring decision, without more, could not establish causation on its own, and rejected the plaintiff's attempt to recharacterize an earlier, non-adverse hiring-preference decision as the operative adverse action to shorten that gap.
“Plaintiff, however, fails to establish a causal connection between his letter and Defendant's decision not to interview him or hire him as CEO... That was sixty-four (64) days after Plaintiff sent his letter to the Board. This, alone, is not enough to establish causation.”
In a Section 1983 excessive-force suit, the judge applied the Heck doctrine with a close, fact-specific temporal analysis rather than a categorical bar: looking for evidence that the alleged force occurred specifically after the plaintiff was handcuffed and had stopped resisting, and found none, rather than assuming any post-arrest force was automatically actionable.
“The question is not whether a defendant used force as some indefinite point 'subsequent to' the 'resistance.' The operative question is whether 'the alleged use of force occurred after the suspect was handcuffed and subdued' when the force was no longer 'inextricably intertwined with the suspect's resistance.'”
Reviewing a post-trial motion to reduce a jury's punitive damages award, the judge applied the three constitutional due-process guideposts (reprehensibility, the compensatory-to-punitive ratio, and comparable civil penalties) with real rigor rather than deferring to the verdict, and was willing to substantially cut punitive awards, from a 12.5-to-1 ratio down near the low end of the range Tennessee case law supported, once she found the underlying conduct only slightly reprehensible.
“Given the slight degree of reprehensibility, the 12.5-to-1 ratio crosses the 'line of constitutional impropriety.' ... Defendant cites several Tennessee libel cases where the average punitive damages ratio was approximately 2-to-1 ... a punitive damages award of $40,000 for Plaintiff's libel claim properly accounts for Defendant's wrongful conduct while satisfying due process.”
Procedural preferences
In United States v. Elie, Crytzer adopted the unobjected-to portion of a magistrate judge’s report as to Smith-Wilson without de novo review, then addressed Elie’s specific objections separately. She denied the speedy-trial dismissal motion.
“the Court need not engage in de novo review of undisputed portions of the Report. See Mira, 806 F.2d at 637. Here, because Defendant Smith-Wilson did not dispute any portion of the Report and the findings and recommendations in the Report are well-founded, the Court adopts the Report in full as to him. And the Court separately addresses Defendant Elie's specific objections.”
In Johnson v. Knox County, Tennessee, Crytzer denied further amendment after finding undue delay, prejudice to the defendants, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, and futility.
“Here, undue delay and undue prejudice to Defendants, Plaintiff's repeated failure to cure deficiencies, and the futility of further amendment all counsel against granting Plaintiff leave to further amend his Amended Complaint.”
Cautions
In United States v. Flack, she denied compassionate release despite the death of the defendant's children's caregiver because the serious drug offense, short time served, and a disciplinary infraction kept the sentencing factors against reduction.
“This Court sentenced Defendant only one (1) year ago, and its analysis of the Section 3553(a) factors has not changed since then. Defendant committed a serious offense... What is more, Defendant has already incurred disciplinary sanctions while incarcerated, suggesting that she has not yet learned respect for the law.”
In Forsberg v. Knoxville Comprehensive Breast Center, PLLC, she amended a post-trial judgment to remove a duplicate false-light damages award after finding it overlapped with the libel award for the same injury.
“the Jury's awards for libel and false light are duplicative and overlapping... he must elect one legal theory... Therefore, the Court strikes the Jury's award of damages on Plaintiff's false light theory.”
In a college basketball eligibility suit, the court treated claimed lost name, image, and likeness opportunities as largely monetary harm that a later damages award might remedy when it denied preliminary relief.
“Plaintiff’s asserted harms, including loss of substantial NIL opportunities and access to the NIL market, are more monetary in nature, and a future money damages award might adequately redress them”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Court GRANTS Defendant's ‘Motion for Summary Judgment’ [Doc. 94-1] IN PART and DENIES the Motion IN PART. The only claims that remain are Plaintiff's ADA Discrimination Reasonable Accommodation claim and Rehabilitation Act Discrimination Reasonable Accommodation claim.”
“Therefore, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's Motion [Doc. 7] and VACATES its March 7, 2023 Memorandum Opinion and Order [Doc. 5] and Judgment Order [Doc. 6].”
“Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. 28] for lack of jurisdiction.”
“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Sakovich's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 16]. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Sakovich are DISMISSED.”
A pro se prisoner's Section 1983 suit over the loss of good-time credit following a disciplinary conviction, screened sua sponte under the PLRA. The court granted in forma pauperis status but dismissed the complaint on initial screening: 'Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. And the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint,' because a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement must proceed as habeas, not Section 1983, under Heck v. Humphrey. This initial-screening disposition did not resolve a party motion.
“Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant Wilson & Associates' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint [Doc. 25] as MOOT.”
“the Court ADOPTS the Report, [Doc. 122], OVERRULES Defendant Elie's objections to the relevant portions of the Report, [Doc. 128], and DENIES the ‘Motion to Dismiss for Speedy Trial Violation,’ [Doc. 89].”
“Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's ‘Motion for 'Extraordinary or Compelling Reasons' under the Compassionate Release Statu[t]e [sic] U.S.C. Sec. 3582(c)(1)(A)’ [Doc. 232].”
“The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff Systematic Power Solutions, LLC's ‘Motion for Default Judgment and For Hearing to Determine Plaintiff's Damages’ [Doc. 53]; ... The Court GRANTS Plaintiff default judgment and ADJUDGES Fullriver Battery Manufacture Co., LTD. and Fullriver Industries Co., LTD. liable for (1) counterclaim one breach of contract ... The Court DENIES Plaintiff default judgment with respect to counterclaim three trade dress dilution.”
“The Court GRANTS Plaintiff Systematic Power Solutions LLC's ‘Motion to Recover Attorneys' Fees and Costs’ [Doc. 74] and AWARDS Plaintiff $80,695.50 in attorney's fees and $396.72 in costs.”
“The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff Systematic Power Solutions LLC's ‘Motion for Permanent Injunction’ [Doc. 77] as set forth below.”
“the Court grants Petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 3] and DISMISSES the instant petition [Doc. 1] WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“For the reasons stated above the Court GRANTS Defendant Cherokee Health Systems's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 11] and DISMISSES this action.”
“the Court GRANTS the motions for summary judgment of Defendants Deputy Ochoa, Claiborne County, and Sheriff Brooks [Docs. 68; 82] IN PART.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Her general docket includes employment discrimination and retaliation, insurance-coverage and bad-faith disputes, personal-injury and products-liability removals (including a multi-plaintiff pharmaceutical products cohort), Section 1983 civil-rights and excessive-force claims, prisoner habeas corpus and Section 2255 petitions, PLRA prisoner screening cases, trademark/trade-dress and unfair-competition suits, and criminal cases, drawn primarily from the Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Greeneville divisions.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 0 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 1 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 1 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2024 | 1 | 0 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 2 |
| Mar 2023 | 7 | 6 |
| Sep 2022 | 15 | 5 |
| Mar 2022 | 26 | 3 |
| Sep 2021 | 44 | 5 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 4 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, not for Judge Crytzer: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 933 | 9.3 months |
| Closed with no court action | 139 | 7.3 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 724 | 9.1 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 59 | 20.2 months |
| Closed during trial | 11 | 32.4 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 933 | 9.3 months |
| Sep 2024 | 845 | 10.4 months |
| Sep 2023 | 762 | 10.9 months |
| Sep 2022 | 921 | 12.5 months |
| Sep 2021 | 949 | 11.6 months |
| Sep 2020 | 803 | 10 months |
| Sep 2019 | 859 | 12.1 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
Draft for Judge Crytzer with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Crytzer, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
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