Katherine A. Crytzer
How Judge Crytzer decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On summary judgment in a Title VII reverse-discrimination and retaliation suit, the judge scrutinized a plaintiff's temporal-proximity argument closely, finding that a 64-day gap between the plaintiff's protected complaint and the adverse hiring decision -- without more -- could not establish causation on its own, and rejected the plaintiff's attempt to recharacterize an earlier, non-adverse hiring-preference decision as the operative adverse action to shorten that gap.
“Plaintiff, however, fails to establish a causal connection between his letter and Defendant's decision not to interview him or hire him as CEO... That was sixty-four (64) days after Plaintiff sent his letter to the Board. This, alone, is not enough to establish causation.”
In a Section 1983 excessive-force suit, the judge applied the Heck doctrine with a close, fact-specific temporal analysis rather than a categorical bar -- looking for evidence that the alleged force occurred specifically after the plaintiff was handcuffed and had stopped resisting, and found none, rather than assuming any post-arrest force was automatically actionable.
“The question is not whether a defendant used force as some indefinite point 'subsequent to' the 'resistance.' The operative question is whether 'the alleged use of force occurred after the suspect was handcuffed and subdued' when the force was no longer 'inextricably intertwined with the suspect's resistance.'”
Reviewing a post-trial motion to reduce a jury's punitive damages award, the judge applied the three constitutional due-process guideposts (reprehensibility, the compensatory-to-punitive ratio, and comparable civil penalties) with real rigor rather than deferring to the verdict, and was willing to substantially cut punitive awards -- from a 12.5-to-1 ratio down near the low end of the range Tennessee case law supported -- once she found the underlying conduct only slightly reprehensible.
“Given the slight degree of reprehensibility, the 12.5-to-1 ratio crosses the 'line of constitutional impropriety.' ... Defendant cites several Tennessee libel cases where the average punitive damages ratio was approximately 2-to-1 ... a punitive damages award of $40,000 for Plaintiff's libel claim properly accounts for Defendant's wrongful conduct while satisfying due process.”
Procedural preferences
Applies the deferential 'clearly erroneous, abuse of discretion, and contrary to law' standard when reviewing a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation on undisputed portions, reserving full de novo review only for the specific parts a party actually objects to.
“the Court need not engage in de novo review of undisputed portions of the Report. See Mira, 806 F.2d at 637. Here, because Defendant Smith-Wilson did not dispute any portion of the Report and the findings and recommendations in the Report are well-founded, the Court adopts the Report in full as to him. And the Court separately addresses Defendant Elie's specific objections.”
Treats leave to further amend a complaint as a multi-factor discretionary call, not a formality -- weighing undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party from relitigating fully-briefed dispositive motions, a plaintiff's repeated failure to cure previously-flagged deficiencies, and the futility of the specific proposed new claims, all four of which must be assessed even when a plaintiff is proceeding pro se.
“Here, undue delay and undue prejudice to Defendants, Plaintiff's repeated failure to cure deficiencies, and the futility of further amendment all counsel against granting Plaintiff leave to further amend his Amended Complaint.”
Cautions
Will deny a compassionate-release motion even where the underlying humanitarian circumstance (a child's caregiver dying) is genuine, if the defendant has served only a small fraction of a sentence for a serious drug-trafficking offense and has since incurred disciplinary sanctions in custody -- treating the original Section 3553(a) balancing as still controlling absent a compelling case that it would come out differently today.
“This Court sentenced Defendant only one (1) year ago, and its analysis of the Section 3553(a) factors has not changed since then. Defendant committed a serious offense... What is more, Defendant has already incurred disciplinary sanctions while incarcerated, suggesting that she has not yet learned respect for the law.”
Will strip a jury's damages award for duplicative claims even after trial and judgment, once satisfied the verdict forms show the jury awarded separate, overlapping compensatory and punitive amounts for the same underlying injury under two different legal theories -- rejecting a plaintiff's post-verdict argument that the court should presume the jury actually intended a single combined award.
“the Jury's awards for libel and false light are duplicative and overlapping... he must elect one legal theory... Therefore, the Court strikes the Jury's award of damages on Plaintiff's false light theory.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Court GRANTS Defendant's "Motion for Summary Judgment" [Doc. 94-1] IN PART and DENIES the Motion IN PART. The only claims that remain are Plaintiff's ADA Discrimination Reasonable Accommodation claim and Rehabilitation Act Discrimination Reasonable Accommodation claim.”
“Therefore, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's Motion [Doc. 7] and VACATES its March 7, 2023 Memorandum Opinion and Order [Doc. 5] and Judgment Order [Doc. 6].”
“Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. 28] for lack of jurisdiction.”
“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Sakovich's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 16]. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Sakovich are DISMISSED.”
A pro se prisoner's Section 1983 suit over the loss of good-time credit following a disciplinary conviction, screened sua sponte under the PLRA. The court granted in forma pauperis status but dismissed the complaint on initial screening: 'Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. And the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint,' because a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement must proceed as habeas, not Section 1983, under Heck v. Humphrey. This initial-screening disposition did not resolve a party motion.
“Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant Wilson & Associates' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint [Doc. 25] as MOOT.”
“the Court ADOPTS the Report, [Doc. 122], OVERRULES Defendant Elie's objections to the relevant portions of the Report, [Doc. 128], and DENIES the "Motion to Dismiss for Speedy Trial Violation," [Doc. 89].”
“Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's "Motion for 'Extraordinary or Compelling Reasons' under the Compassionate Release Statu[t]e [sic] U.S.C. Sec. 3582(c)(1)(A)" [Doc. 232].”
“The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff Systematic Power Solutions, LLC's "Motion for Default Judgment and For Hearing to Determine Plaintiff's Damages" [Doc. 53]; ... The Court GRANTS Plaintiff default judgment and ADJUDGES Fullriver Battery Manufacture Co., LTD. and Fullriver Industries Co., LTD. liable for (1) counterclaim one breach of contract ... The Court DENIES Plaintiff default judgment with respect to counterclaim three trade dress dilution.”
“The Court GRANTS Plaintiff Systematic Power Solutions LLC's "Motion to Recover Attorneys' Fees and Costs" [Doc. 74] and AWARDS Plaintiff $80,695.50 in attorney's fees and $396.72 in costs.”
“The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff Systematic Power Solutions LLC's "Motion for Permanent Injunction" [Doc. 77] as set forth below.”
“the Court grants Petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 3] and DISMISSES the instant petition [Doc. 1] WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“For the reasons stated above the Court GRANTS Defendant Cherokee Health Systems's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 11] and DISMISSES this action.”
“the Court GRANTS the motions for summary judgment of Defendants Deputy Ochoa, Claiborne County, and Sheriff Brooks [Docs. 68; 82] IN PART.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Her general docket includes employment discrimination and retaliation, insurance-coverage and bad-faith disputes, personal-injury and products-liability removals (including a multi-plaintiff pharmaceutical products cohort), Section 1983 civil-rights and excessive-force claims, prisoner habeas corpus and Section 2255 petitions, PLRA prisoner screening cases, trademark/trade-dress and unfair-competition suits, and criminal cases, drawn primarily from the Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Greeneville divisions.
Put Judge Crytzer's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Crytzer actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Crytzer's own signed orders and cites them.