Shelley D. Rucker

How Judge Rucker rules, drawn from 19 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Rucker no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
Position
bankruptcy
Status
Retired 2024
Served
2010–2024
Commissioned
2010-04-02
Education
Texas Christian University; University of Georgia School of Law
Signed orders read
19

How Judge Rucker decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

For a flat Chapter 13 fee, the supporting explanation should connect the amount requested to a good-faith estimate of services that will be necessary and beneficial to the debtor.

“the debtor’s attorney must carry the burden of showing that his or her fee is based on a good faith estimate of reasonable services that are, and will be, necessary and beneficial to the debtor”

When a vehicle has both personal and work uses, evidence that the debtor uses it predominantly to perform job duties can overcome contractual language describing personal use.

“the court finds that the vehicle was predominantly used to perform the functions of the debtor's job”

Procedural preferences

An amendment to exemption schedules does not reopen the objection period for an unchanged exemption whose original deadline has expired.

“the new objections may go only to those exemptions affected by the amendment”

Cautions

A settlement that departs from statutory priority should identify and prove a significant bankruptcy objective served by the deviation.

“parties who seek approval of settlements that provide for a distribution in a manner contrary to the Code’s priority scheme should be prepared to prove that the settlement is not only ‘fair and equitable’”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

In re McKenzie
· 2011-04-22
Motion to clarify (Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C.) Granted

“No response was filed to the Motion within fourteen days as required by E.D.Tenn. LBR 9013 — l(i)(2), and, therefore, the court has granted GKH’s motion by separate order.”

In re McKenzie
· 2011-10-05
Application for interim compensation (Jerrold D. Farinash) Granted in part

“For the foregoing reasons, the court will allow the interim fees of $54,664.00 and the reimbursement of expenses in the amount of $3,418.49. Although the United States Trustee did not file a comment, the allowance of fees for other attorneys has been subject to a holdback of 10%. The court finds that given the expanded scope of Mr. Farinash’s employment, it is appropriate that he should be subject to the same holdback.”

Jahn v. Flemings (In re Flemings)
· 2010-07-13
Objection to discharge for fraudulent transfer (Richard P. Jahn Jr., Chapter 7 Trustee) Denied

“The court finds that the debtor provided a satisfactory explanation for her last minute disposition of assets that rebuts the trustee’s allegation of fraudulent intent toward her creditors generally”

Objection to discharge for false oath (Richard P. Jahn Jr., Chapter 7 Trustee) Granted

“Accordingly, the discharge of the debtor is denied under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) and a judgment consistent with this memorandum will be entered.”

In re McKenzie
· 2011-03-08
Motion to reconsider fourth fee application (Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C.) Denied

“The court finds that Mr. LeRoy was appointed as ‘named counsel’ for the trustee. Consequently payment to him pursuant to the Fourth Fee Application was appropriately entered for the reasons given below, and GKH’s motion is DENIED.”

Objection to retroactive employment (Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C.) Denied

“Therefore, the objection to the retroactive employment is overruled”

Motion to reconsider fifth fee application (Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C.) Granted in part

“Therefore, the objection to the retroactive employment is overruled and the motion to reconsider is GRANTED IN PART. The court will disallow the request for fees incurred from June 15, 2010, through June 30, 2010, and modify the Fifth Fee Application accordingly.”

Settles v. United States (In re Settles)
· 2011-06-10
Motion for summary judgment on tax liability (United States of America, Internal Revenue Service) Granted in part

“The court has reviewed the briefing, the applicable law, and the record and has determined that the IRS’s motion will be GRANTED as to the specific issues raised, but DENIED as to the specific amount of the tax liability.”

In re Pursley
· 2017-10-06
Objection to debtor attorney fee (Chapter 13 trustee) Denied

“Therefore; the court overrules the trustee’s objection to the fee.”

Application for debtor attorney fee (Debtor's attorney) Granted

“The administrative expense will be allowed, and the trustee’s objection is overruled.”

In re Gilliam
· 2012-09-21
Objection to vehicle exemption (Terry Gregory, Chapter 7 Trustee) Denied

“Based on the totality of the circumstances of this case, the court finds that the exemption was not claimed in bad faith and the trustee’s objection is overruled.”

In re Shields
· 2015-01-06
Motion to dismiss chapter 7 case (Travis Shields) Granted

“A separate order will enter granting the motion to dismiss on the terms proposed by the parties.”

Objection to dismissal (Vincent E. Mahalik) Denied

“The court will also overrule the only objection to the dismissal filed by Mr. Mahalik on the basis that the potential harm to him is minimal.”

In re McGinness
· 2018-03-02
Objection to chapter 13 plan (Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation) Denied

“Accordingly, the court concludes that the debtor did not acquire the vehicle for her personal use, the hanging paragraph in section 1325(a) does not apply, and section 506 may be used to determine the amount of the secured claim. The court overrules Nissan's objection to confirmation of the debtor's chapter 13 plan.”

In re Walker
· 2014-02-06
Objection to annuity exemptions (FirstBank) Denied

“The court overrules FirstBank’s objection to the exemption of the three annuities on the basis that the objection was filed after the deadline imposed by Rule 4003(b), and therefore it is not timely.”

In re Fryar
· 2017-04-25
Motion to approve compromise (The debtor) Denied

“For these reasons, the Debtor’s motion to compromise is denied.”

Motion to sell property free and clear (The debtor) Moot / procedural

“Without the compromise the buyer is unwilling to go forward with the sale, therefore the motion to sell is denied as moot.”

In re Thompson
· 2015-09-23
Motion to redeem vehicle (The debtor) Denied

“The debtor is not proposing to pay the lien holder the value of its allowed secured claim, and therefore the motion to redeem the vehicle for $2500 is denied. The debtor may redeem the vehicle for $5,225.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

All five sampled matters were terminated; retained entries supplied no text-grounded contested-motion disposition.

A historical record

Judge Rucker no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.