Charles Bruno Kornmann
How Judge Kornmann decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Jurisdiction and abstention come first: a litigant who lost in state court cannot use a federal civil-rights suit as a back-door appeal of a state judgment, and federal courts stay out of ongoing state domestic-relations matters. Rooker-Feldman bars review of final state judgments and Younger abstention bars interference with ongoing state custody proceedings.
“Lower federal courts do not sit as courts of appeal for state supreme courts deciding state law. ... This court is not a backdoor around State litigation.”
In a Section 1983 wrongful-arrest case he applies the 'arguable probable cause' qualified-immunity standard: officers prevail if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed, even mistakenly. Disruptive conduct during another arrest gives at least arguable probable cause for an obstruction charge.
“Even if this conduct is not specifically contemplated by the law, the Officers certainly had arguable probable cause to believe that it was prohibited.”
He reads the South Dakota Uniform Trade Secrets Act's preemption clause narrowly: a tort claim is NOT displaced if the alleged wrong could have occurred whether or not a trade secret was misappropriated (Paint Brush Corp. v. Neu). A defendant's UTSA-preemption argument will not knock out independent tortious-interference/unfair-competition claims at the 12(b)(6) stage, especially where the supposed 'secret' is in the public domain.
“These acts and the corresponding claims could have occurred whether or not the information at issue-trade secret or otherwise-was misappropriated. Thus, this court cannot find on the record before it that it appears beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of their claims.”
Procedural preferences
He construes pro se pleadings liberally but holds pro se litigants to substantive and procedural law, and will not consider untimely or successive responsive filings, nor treat a stray 'motion for judicial notice' as an amendment adding new claims.
“Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural law.”
On a 12(b)(6) motion he will consider video and documents 'necessarily embraced by the complaint' (referenced in it, authenticity unquestioned) without converting the motion into summary judgment, while declining to consider the movant's outside affidavits.
“The Court will consider the video evidence of the incident described in the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”
Cautions
On summary judgment in a complex multi-party case he is willing to let abuse/assault-based and ADA/504 equal-access claims go to a jury where genuine fact disputes exist, even while dismissing the constitutional and state-statutory theories -- a granted-in-part posture, not an all-or-nothing one. He is candid (sometimes bluntly so) about the litigation's burden on the court.
“This lawsuit has caused the destruction of a small forest. Hopefully, we can end this and proceed to trial.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 2Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for voluntary dismissal N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to compel N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendants' motions for summary judgment against plaintiffs E.E. and Julie Doe, docs. 87 & 92, are granted in part and denied in part.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Robert Gusinsky's Motions to Dismiss, Doc. 8, is granted.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim(Doc. 6)is granted.”
“Mr. Foxhoven's motions to eompel(Does. 11 & 19) are denied.”
“That defendants' motion, Doc. 8, to dismiss counts two and five of the complaint is denied;”
“That plaintiff's motion, Doc. 22, to dismiss count four of the complaint is granted.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Caseload sample skews heavily to recent (2026) filings and reflects current intake as an active senior judge, not a career-long mix. Most enumerated cases remain pending (no termination date).