Charles L. Nail Jr.
How Judge Nail rules, drawn from 23 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Nail no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Nail decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Chapter 12 feasibility required projections grounded in objective operating facts.
“their projected cash flow statements were not well grounded in objective facts”
Procedural preferences
Where delayed discovery caused no present harm, the court reopened discovery rather than impose exclusion sanctions.
“For the reasons discussed below, the Court will not impose sanctions as requested in Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and Motion in Limine, but will reopen discovery.”
Cautions
For excusable neglect, the reason for delay can outweigh other equitable factors.
“which did not overcome the principal factor of ‘the reason for the delay,’ which heavily weighed against the creditor.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“No. Of the four equitable factors to be considered in determining whether the creditor's neglect was excusable, as defined in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), one weighed against the creditor, one was neutral, and one weighed in the creditor's favor, which did not overcome the principal factor of ‘the reason for the delay,’ which heavily weighed against the creditor.”
“The chapter 7 trustee's objection to the debtor's claimed homestead exemption was denied.”
“No. The attorney failed to demonstrate his flat fee for post-petition services reflected the required services the attorney still needed to perform and the additional reasonably anticipated services this particular debtor would also need.”
“As nothing in the record demonstrated the necessity of the services of the creditor's expert, the expert's compensation and expenses, as well as the attorney fees incurred in dealing with the expert, were excluded from the creditor's award. With one small agreed-upon exception, interest and the creditor's remaining attorney fees and costs were allowed”
“No. The debtors failed to show their ability to fund their modified plan was probable, since their projected cash flow statements were not well grounded in objective facts and they failed to deal with the reality of their aging cow herd.”
“No. The debtor had forfeited his right to claim his former marital home exempt as his homestead because he did not reside in the home on the petition date and had no intention to return to it.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Plaintiff Reliabank Dakota's Motion to Strike and Motion in Limine {doc. 45) is denied.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Debtors-Defendants Scott Gene Javers and Pamela Jean Javers's Motion for Summary Judgment {doc. 31) is granted in part”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment {doc. 36) is denied.”
“No. The creditors did not identify any manifest error of law or fact in the order, did not set forth any newly discovered evidence, and advanced new legal theories that could have been raised before the evidentiary hearing on their motion to extend time.”
“Yes. When the 12 factors set forth in Foss v. Hall County Child Support Office (In re Foss), 328 B.R. 780, 783 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005), were considered, a hefty majority weighed in favor of abstention.”
“Yes. Of the five factors a court considers before dismissing a bankruptcy case under § 305(a)(1), as set forth in Pennino v. Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries (In re Pennino), 299 B.R. 536, 539 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003), four weighed heavily in favor of dismissal and the remaining factor was not applicable.”
“Since the cost to the bankruptcy estate would have been the same whether the estate professional or the chapter 7 trustee made the service, the trustee was allowed to recover the mailing expenses.”
“Five of the six challenged counts of the adversary complaint were dismissed, most because the plaintiff/case trustee's claims were time-barred and one because 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) does not require a debtor's attorney to cooperate with the case trustee. The count alleging fraud was not dismissed.”
A historical record
Judge Nail no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.