Robert Foster Chapman

How Judge Chapman rules, drawn from 24 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Chapman no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina
Position
district
Status
Elevated to a higher court
Served
1971–1981
Appointed by
Richard M. Nixon (Republican)
Commissioned
1971-05-27
Education
University of South Carolina, B.S. (1945); University of South Carolina School of Law, LL.B. (1949)
Signed orders read
24

How Judge Chapman decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Allowed a fraud theory to proceed separately when the statute of frauds defeated the alleged oral contract term.

“plaintiff’s second cause of action is not a suit ‘on the contract’ but rather one alleging fraud on the part of the defendant, the statute of frauds would not be a defense to the action.”

Required production where withholding an investigative file would delay the case and impose avoidable cost without serving the civil rules' aims.

“To allow the EEOC to proceed on its present course of conduct in this case without revealing the facts to the defendant would be an injustice, would delay the disposition of the case and would result in enormous additional expenses to one of the parties.”

Procedural preferences

Declined class treatment where liability and causation required extensive individual proof for each proposed member.

“A class situation is simply not efficient when so much in the way of individual proof by each of the class members will obviously be required.”

Excused a one-day bankruptcy-appeal filing delay where rigid application would turn an efficiency rule into a trap.

“Rule 806 was intended to promote efficiency in the appeals process, it was not intended as a trap for the unwary litigant.”

Cautions

A contract could not be rescinded for mistake when the mistaken medical diagnosis was collateral and the agreement accomplished exactly what both parties intended.

“The termination agreement did what the parties intended to do: terminate the lease agreement.”

Interim trade-secret relief depended heavily on the comparative irreparable harm and the adequacy of the plaintiff's early merits showing.

“the decision to grant injunctive relief in the present case is only reinforced.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Pringle v. United States
· 1976-06-22
Motions to dismiss (United States) Granted

“this claim must be and the same is hereby dismissed.”

First South Leasing Co. v. Abrams
· 1977-01-05
Motion to dismiss appeal (lessor appellee) Denied

“the motion to dismiss the appeal should be denied.”

Petition for bankruptcy review (bankruptcy trustee) Denied

“the Order of the Bankruptcy Court of August 18, 1976 is hereby affirmed.”

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Anchor Continental, Inc.
· 1977-01-21
Motion to compel discovery (defendant employer) Granted

“the plaintiff answer each and every interrogatory that has been propounded by the defendant without reliance upon the provisions of Rule 33(c) and that the plaintiff produce all documents demanded by the defendants”

Request for attorneys fees (defendant employer) Granted

“The defendant is the prevailing party on this motion and is entitled to attorney’s fees.”

Lewis v. Finetex, Inc.
· 1977-03-08
Summary judgment (defendant employer) Granted in part

“defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to the first cause of action and denied as to the second cause of action.”

Barth v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of South Carolina
· 1977-04-12
Motions to dismiss (defendant claims administrator) Granted

“defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is granted.”

Bumgardner v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.
· 1977-06-14
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Denied

“Plaintiff’s motion to remand is, therefore, denied.”

Moore v. Supreme Court of South Carolina
· 1977-07-14
Summary judgment (state-court defendants) Granted

“the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.”

McPhatter v. Leeke
· 1978-01-12
Summary judgment (habeas petitioner) Denied

“summary judgment be entered in favor of the respondents.”

Peters v. McCalla
· 1978-01-17
Motions to dismiss (defendant hospital) Granted

“defendant GHS’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted. Plaintiffs’ complaint against defendant GHS is hereby dismissed.”

Terry v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.
· 1978-02-21
Summary judgment (defendant organization) Granted

“defendant’s motion for summary judgment be and the same is hereby granted.”

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Moore
· 1978-02-28
Summary judgment (plaintiff note holder) Granted

“this Court finds that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the FÜIC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Wilson v. Allied Loans, Inc.
· 1978-03-14

The court entered a limited consumer-credit judgment for the borrower while rejecting other disclosure theories; the published writing does not state a single motion disposition suitable for classification.

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Chapman's reported District of South Carolina decisions include contracts, insurance, banking, bankruptcy, consumer credit, civil rights, employment, trademark, products liability, habeas corpus, taxation, and federal tort matters. The reviewed publications do not support a quantified caseload estimate.

A historical record

Judge Chapman no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.