Henry Franklin Floyd

How Judge Floyd rules, drawn from 18 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Floyd no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
Position
district
Status
Elevated to a higher court
Served
2003–2011
Appointed by
George W. Bush (Republican)
Commissioned
2003-09-24
Education
Wofford College, B.A., 1970; University of South Carolina School of Law, J.D., 1973
Signed orders read
18

How Judge Floyd decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Floyd compelled trade-secret discovery after the requesting party established that the material was both relevant and necessary, while requiring a stronger protective order.

“Pechiney has demonstrated to the Court, however, the relevance and necessity of the information that it seeks.”

He remanded a benefits claim where the administrative record did not reveal how the decisionmaker treated significant new medical evidence.

“First of all, as noted in the Report, to conduct substantial evidence review, the Court needs to understand the basis for Defendant’s decision.”

Procedural preferences

Floyd declined to remand an ERISA claim for further administrative review when the existing record overwhelmingly showed an abuse of discretion.

“Moreover, although remand might be appropriate in most instances when the administrator has failed to follow ERISA’s guidelines, the evidence is so overwhelming that CIGNA abused its discretion in this case that a remand would serve no purpose other than to cause needless delay.”

In Padilla's habeas case, he treated a request to Congress as the prescribed route when the executive considered existing detention authority inadequate.

“then the President should approach Congress and request that it make proper modifications to the law.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Pechiney Plastic Packaging, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc.
· 2004-02-05
Motion to quash (nonparty Cryovac) Denied

“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Cryovac’s Motion to Quash Subpoenas shall be DENTED and Pechiney’s Motion to Compel shall be GRANTED.”

Motion to compel discovery (plaintiff Pechiney) Granted
Suber v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
· 2009-02-26
Social security appeal (plaintiff) Granted

“Therefore, it is the judgment of this Court that Defendant’s decision be REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative action.”

Anderson v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. (In re Judd)
· 2010-08-05
Bankruptcy appeal (trustee-appellant) Granted

“Wherefore, based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, it is the judgment of this Court that the Bankruptcy Court’s decision be REVERSED and this case be REMANDED to the Bankruptcy Court to consider the parties’ other contentions in the first instance.”

Long v. Ozmint
· 2008-03-31
Habeas petition (petitioner) Moot / procedural

“Therefore, it is the judgment of this Court that petition be DISMISSED without prejudice and without requiring the respondents to file a return.”

Long John Silver's Restaurants, Inc. v. Cole
· 2006-01-20
Motion to vacate arbitration award (movants) Denied

“Based on the foregoing, and after a thorough review of the record and the relevant law, the Court concludes that the motion to vacate the arbitrator’s class determination award must be, and hereby is, DENIED.”

Hicks v. Federal Bureau of Prisons
· 2009-03-16
Motions to dismiss (respondents) Granted

“Therefore, it is the judgment of this Court that Respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition is GRANTED.”

Campbell, Inc. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York
· 2004-09-27
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“In light of the foregoing discussion, it is the judgment of this Court that Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment (Document 17) must be DENIED, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Document 22) must be GRANTED, and Defendant’s supplemental motion for summary judgment (Document 24) must be GRANTED.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted
Supplemental motion for summary judgment (defendant) Granted
Cole v. Long John Silver's Restaurants, Inc.
· 2005-09-15
Motion to vacate arbitration award (respondents) Moot / procedural

“Accordingly, the Court finds that Respondents’ motion should be, and hereby is, DISMISSED.”

Smith v. School District of Greenville County
· 2004-04-14
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction shall be GRANTED.”

Al-Marri v. Hanft
· 2005-07-08
Summary judgment (petitioner) Denied

“In light of the foregoing discussion and analysis, it is the judgment of this Court that Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment on counts one and three of his petition must be DENIED.”

Al-Marri ex rel. Berman v. Wright
· 2006-08-08
Habeas petition (petitioner) Denied

“It is the judgment of this Court that this petition be, and the same is hereby, DISMISSED.”

Cobin v. Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc.
· 2008-06-02
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted in part

“Specifically, the motion is GRANTED as to all Defendants except Entercom Communications Corp. (d/b/a WORD/WYRD FM).”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The five sampled cases were all terminated matters filed at the start of Floyd's district service. They included two contract disputes, a Social Security case, a habeas petition, and a personal-injury case; their median filing-to-termination interval was 224 days. This narrow early-tenure sample does not represent his full district caseload.

A historical record

Judge Floyd no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.