Robert W. Lovegreen
How Judge Lovegreen rules, drawn from 20 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Lovegreen no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Lovegreen decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a maritime discovery dispute, Lovegreen separated discoverability from ultimate admissibility when the requested financial information was relevant to a pleaded punitive-damages claim.
“Discovery is based on relevance, not admissibility.”
Lovegreen required practical necessity and lack of another source before compelling disclosure of factual consultant material over a work-product objection.
“Defendant is entitled to this information as it is essential and crucial to the outcome of this matter. It is also unavailable to defendant from any other source at this time.”
When evaluating disqualification, Lovegreen resolved uncertainty in favor of protecting former-client confidences after finding counsel had obtained material confidential information.
“[a]ny doubt must be resolved in favor of disqualification.”
Procedural preferences
Lovegreen declined the case-ending discovery sanction where the record did not establish the willful or bad-faith noncompliance required for dismissal.
“Dismissal is too severe a sanction under these circumstances.”
Lovegreen treated objections to a non-self-executing administrative subpoena as premature until the agency sought judicial enforcement.
“One of the most firmly established principles of administrative law is that courts cannot entertain pre-enforcement challenges to administrative subpoenas.”
In a nominal-damages civil-rights case, Lovegreen applied the Supreme Court's prevailing-party framework to deny fees for a victory he found purely technical.
“Consequently, plaintiffs request for attorney’s fees is denied.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“I recommend that defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction be denied.”
“I recommend that plaintiffs motion to remand be granted.”
“I recommend that the Credit Store and First National’s motion to dismiss, stay, or transfer the case to the Northern District of Illinois be denied”
“where Citizens’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should also be decided.”
“I recommend defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ RICO claim for failing to state a claim be granted.”
“I recommend that the appellee’s motion to dismiss be granted.”
“I recommend that defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted as to the claim for *71negligent infliction of emotional distress and denied as to the claim for loss of parental society and companionship.”
“I recommend defendant MAR’s motion for summary judgment be granted as to Counts I, II and III (claim for maintenance and cure). I recommend defendant MAR’s motion for summary judgment be denied as to Count III (claim for punitive damages).”
“Consequently, plaintiffs request for attorney’s fees is denied.”
“Consequently, plaintiffs motion for disqualification is granted.”
“Hancock’s motion for summary judgment should be granted.”
“Plaintiffs’ motions to compel are granted but only to the extent noted above.”
“Black & Decker’s motion for contempt and for sanctions under F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) be denied”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Forty assigned matters were enumerated in two historical search windows. Five terminated matters were sampled across benefits, prisoner, statutory, and criminal categories. Their durations ranged from 125 to 4,005 days, with a median of 369 days; only the criminal-duty docket exposed a groundable motion ruling.
A historical record
Judge Lovegreen no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.