Melissa R. DuBose
How Judge DuBose decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
When an agency reverses a prior policy or exemption, a bare recital that it 'further considered' its authority does not satisfy the APA's reasoned-explanation requirement -- she looks for a contemporaneous, substantive account of the agency's reasoning, not a post-hoc rationalization offered in litigation.
“The vague phrase 'having further considered' the law governing the authority to take an action or make a decision does not come close to being a 'reasoned explanation.'”
On a Rule 8 length challenge, she works through a multi-factor test (nature of the case, number of parties, organization, prejudice, burden) rather than dismissing for sheer page count, but will still put a plaintiff on notice that a complaint is close to the line.
“Recognizing that there are some facets of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint which could, in isolation, support dismissal under Rule 8, this Court does not consider the pleading in its entirety to be in 'gross violation' of the Rule.”
On personal jurisdiction over an individual guarantor, she looks past an argument that all contacts were made 'on behalf of' an employer and asks instead whether the individual's own signature and communications reached into the forum state to form the contract.
“Madigan's contact with Contempo (and therefore Rhode Island) is as follows. The New Customer Application lists Madigan's name and contact details as Managing Partner and CFO/Controller and contact for Myndset. Madigan signed the 'Personal Guaranty of Account' section on the same date as the date provided at the top of the New Customer Application.”
Procedural preferences
For a pro se plaintiff with parallel litigation elsewhere, she will take judicial notice of the other proceedings and flag inconsistencies in the plaintiff's sworn statements across courts as relevant to how the current complaint should be read.
“This Court takes judicial notice of the proceedings in these other courts because they 'have relevance to the matters at hand.'”
In duty-to-defend insurance disputes she applies Rhode Island's strict 'four corners of the complaint' pleadings test and declines to look at extrinsic declarations or correspondence the parties want considered, even on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
“in a duty to defend case '[the pleadings] test limits this Court's review to the factual allegations contained in the underlying [] complaint.'”
In immigration-detention habeas petitions challenging an immigration judge's bond decision, she treats 8 U.S.C. 1226(e) as foreclosing review of the discretionary bond call itself and looks only for a due-process defect in how the hearing was conducted; she also expects a petitioner to have sought review from the Board of Immigration Appeals first, and is not persuaded that such review would be futile.
“This Court cannot conclude that the Respondents failed to comply with its previous judgment. ... this Court notes that Petitioner has failed to seek any review from the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). The Court disagrees with Petitioner's position that such review would be futile.”
Cautions
On a post-sentencing 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance, she checks every specific allegation against the plea and sentencing transcripts and counsel's own affidavit before crediting it, and is openly skeptical of a defendant's attempt to walk back a favorable plea bargain after benefiting from it.
“The Court views this case as one of buyer's remorse. Alabi made 'a conscious decision to accept both the benefits and burdens of a bargain,' and now that he 'has reaped the advantage from the purchase' he seeks to undo the sentence.”
In an ERISA benefits suit, she requires the complaint to identify the specific plan and plan terms at issue rather than gesture generally at 'an employee benefit plan'; a lack of access to the plan documents pre-suit is not, on its own, an excuse.
“Abira does not identify how many of its patients participated in ERISA plans (or even that any did), the terms and conditions of any ERISA plan, what benefits are allegedly due under an ERISA plan, or whether Abira exhausted administrative remedies. ... Without ERISA-specific information, Abira fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.”
On a Daubert challenge to an expert's qualifications or the material he relied on, she draws a sharp line between what makes testimony unreliable (excludable) and what merely makes it weaker (a matter for cross-examination); an expert's decades of hands-on experience in the field will generally get him past the admissibility bar even if he cannot explain the underlying formula of a report he relied on.
“There is an important difference between what is unreliable support and what a trier of fact may conclude is insufficient support for an expert's conclusion. ... Defendant's concerns about Mr. Zarek's opinions can be explored on cross-examination.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For these reasons, the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Mr. Isijola's Complaint is DISMISSED.”
“1. The States' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 43) is GRANTED;”
“The Court DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, ECF No. 98.”
“The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Counts II, III, V, VI, and a part of Count IV. The Court DENIES the motion as to Count I and a part of Count IV.”
“The Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED, except as to GPO Defendants, who for the reasons stated in footnote 8, are DISMISSED from Count I.”
“Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 29) is DENIED.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or Abstain is DENIED.”
“the Superior Court proceedings are hereby ENJOINED and Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief is GRANTED.”
“MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 25 Motion to Dismiss; granting 26 Motion to Dismiss; and denying as premature 33 Motion for Default Judgment. So Ordered by District Judge Melissa R. DuBose on 12/23/2025.”
“For the reasons stated above, defendant Madigan's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) is DENIED.”
“the Court GRANTS BCBSRI's Amended Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) in its entirety. Final Judgment shall enter in BCBSRI's favor.”
“The Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED.”
“The Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The sampled and enumerated dockets skew toward Social Security appeals, prisoner and civil-rights actions, diversity personal-injury and product-liability suits, insurance and commercial-contract disputes, qui tam/False Claims Act matters, and a smaller number of immigration and forfeiture actions, consistent with a general civil docket inherited from a predecessor judge plus new filings assigned since January 2025.
Put Judge DuBose's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge DuBose actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge DuBose's own signed orders and cites them.