Marshal D. Morgan
How Judge Morgan rules, drawn from 17 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Morgan decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On suppression motions involving search-warrant challenges, he requires a defendant to actually produce the warrant application and affidavit being attacked, and will not fault the government for gaps in a record the defendant himself failed to complete.
“the Court does not have before it either the application for the warrant, the warrant, nor the affidavit in support of the warrant that the Defendant seeks to challenge under Franks.”
He applies the good-faith exception readily where officers executed facially valid warrants, distinguishing between a later-found defect in the underlying justification for a search and bad faith in seeking the warrant in the first place.
“the fact that upon review during a suppression proceeding, the Court determined that the protective sweep was unjustified does not mean ipso facto that there was any bad faith in requesting the warrants in the first place.”
In reviewing Social Security appeals, he defers to an ALJ's residual-functional-capacity findings once they are supported by multiple treating or examining sources, and will note when a challenged limitation (such as a cane-use restriction) is, if anything, more favorable to the claimant than an unrestricted finding would be.
“the Plaintiff's complaints over the inclusion of a limitation providing for the use of a cane in the RFC assessment, which is more limiting than without the use of one, is arguably more favorable to plaintiff.”
In one suppression recommendation, Morgan found a confession involuntary where officers threatened to arrest the defendant's father without a legal basis and that threat exploited the defendant's close family relationship and vulnerabilities.
“the threats that were made by the agents vitiated the defendant’s consent such that his confession to ATF agents during his custodial interview is deemed involuntary.”
Procedural preferences
On requests to extend an exclusionary sanction beyond what the government itself conceded, he holds the government to its word but declines to go further, treating a concession not to use evidence in the case-in-chief as full satisfaction of the deterrence rationale absent some other, independent trustworthiness problem.
“The Court takes the government's statements at face value and will indeed hold the government to its word.”
In Social Security appeals with conflicting vocational-expert testimony, he treats any inconsistency as harmless so long as at least one occupation both experts agree the claimant can perform exists in significant numbers, rather than remanding over the conflict itself.
“Because one occupation with jobs that exist in significant numbers is sufficient, any alleged error in this regard is deemed to be harmless.”
A party seeking to prevent a deposition must support a protective-order request with particular facts; a generalized assertion that the witness has little relevant knowledge did not establish good cause.
“Here, the defendants did not meet that burden.”
Cautions
On repeat sanctionable conduct by the same counsel, he will grant a second Rule 11 motion once counsel has already been warned by an earlier ruling in the same case and pursues another unfounded claim regardless.
“Having already found that Plaintiff's counsel has demonstrated a culpable carelessness in: pursuing an unfounded claim; filing a frivolous complaint a lacking legal and factual basis, and filing a lawsuit for an improper purpose, this Court once more answers that question in the affirmative.”
In detention hearings, an extensive and violent prior criminal history, even decades old, weighs heavily toward a dangerousness finding regardless of the defendant's age or a claimed period of rehabilitation.
“the Court finds that the government has established by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant poses a danger to the community. He shall therefore be detained pending trial.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Based on the foregoing, Rodriguez Negron's Motion for Sanctions (Docket No. 39) is hereby GRANTED.”
“the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Docket 23.”
“the Court hereby RECOMMENDS that defendant's Franks Motion (Docket No. 21) be DENIED.”
“the Court sides with the government and RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion Requesting Order be DENIED.”
“the Court hereby RECOMMENDS that defendant's Franks Motion (Docket No. 21) be DENIED.”
“I RECOMMEND that the defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 44) be DENIED.”
“the Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Suppress (Docket No. 56) be Granted in Part and Denied in Part.”
The district judge had earlier adopted Morgan's Report and Recommendation denying a motion to suppress based on a confidential informant's tip; the defendant then sought reconsideration. The district judge denied reconsideration, reaffirming the adoption of Morgan's recommendation.
In a felon-in-possession prosecution arising from a search of the defendant's residence, Morgan found the government proved dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence given the defendant's two prior murder convictions and ordered pretrial detention, while finding no serious risk of flight.
“The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion (Docket No. 23) be DENIED without holding an evidentiary hearing.”
“Defendants’ urgent motion requesting dismissal of the case (Docket No. 81) is DENIED”
“Defendants’ urgent motion requesting a stay of the proceedings (Docket No. 81) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 77) is GRANTED. All claims and causes of action asserted in the present case are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“For the reasons espoused above, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Docket No. 30) be GRANTED and that the firearm evidence be suppressed together with the defendant’s custodial interview as the fruit of the illegal search.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
- Sample of his consent Social Security disability-review docket, spanning filings from 2018 through 2023: eight terminated appeals, all affirming an ALJ's denial of benefits on the merits (one judgment resolved three consolidated dockets arising from the same fraud-redetermination proceedings).
- A handful of additional consent-remand and attorney's-fee dockets were identified but could not be grounded on extractable order text.
- His much larger on-duty-magistrate caseload, search-warrant applications, initial appearances, and detention hearings, and his referral R&R docket are covered separately in the published-opinion set above.
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