Aida M. Delgado-Colon
How Judge Delgado-Colon decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In an FHA housing-discrimination case, the judge held that a party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing every element and cannot rely on the opposing party's supposed silence -- pointing out that the defendants' own motion never even proposed a fact about when the plaintiff learned they were the likely source of her injury, which alone defeated the motion regardless of how the record might otherwise read.
“Dr. Guilbe proposed no material fact whatsoever related to that particular moment. The Court cannot infer from thin air when was it that plaintiffs had '[n]otice of the person who caused the injury.'”
In a wrongful-termination age-discrimination case, the judge distinguished the plaintiffs' cited precedent by contrasting an employer's genuinely shifting, inconsistent justifications (which support an inference of pretext) with an employer's single, unwavering explanation supported by objective facts (which does not) -- showing this judge looks for real inconsistency in an employer's story, not just disagreement with its wisdom.
“HP has not altered its reasons; it has not shifted paths or created incongruence... Plaintiffs have not provided any such evidence of disparate treatment or shifting of paths in HP's decisions regarding the WRP.”
Denying a post-verdict acquittal motion in a public-corruption bribery case, the judge gave weight to the ongoing, periodic pattern of the payments (both before and after the specific acts charged) rather than treating each payment in isolation, rejecting the defendant's attempt to recharacterize them as after-the-fact gratuities.
“The bribes paid by Santamaria to Perez-Otero to either regain his trust after the 2017 elections and later to ensure the award of contracts, were periodic and ongoing since late 2018 or early 2019, so isolating any one payment as after-the-fact gratuities ignores the existence of the agreement and the established pattern of conduct of periodic cash payments in exchange for benefits.”
Procedural preferences
Strictly enforces this district's English-language filing rule: even an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order will be denied outright if it depends on exhibits filed only in Spanish, regardless of whether the parties share a common language, because the court cannot evaluate the merits of undertranslated evidence.
“Plaintiff's case and request for TRO are based on the content of the documents submitted in the Spanish language. Pursuant to 48 U.S.C. Section 864, all pleadings and proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico shall be conducted in the English language.”
Strictly enforces this court's local anti-ferret rule: facts in a party's statement of material facts that are properly supported by record citations are deemed ADMITTED if the opposing party fails to controvert them, and the court will not search the record on a party's behalf.
“Facts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted... The court shall have no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced by the parties' separate statement of facts.”
Confines a reply memorandum strictly to genuinely new matters raised in the opposition, and will treat a party's attempt to raise brand-new theories for the first time on reply as waived rather than considering them on the merits.
“These arguments are waived and will not be entertained via reply... The Court's local rules strictly limit the content of a reply memorandum to new matters raised in the objection or opposing memorandum.”
Expects a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to be decided on the four corners of the complaint, not on new facts a plaintiff tries to introduce for the first time in an opposition brief -- and treats a plaintiff's failure to instead seek leave to amend as evidence the complaint was genuinely deficient.
“The fate of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) ordinarily depends on the allegations contained within the four corners of the plaintiff's complaint... plaintiffs' attempt to introduce factual allegations through their motion in response... is unavailing.”
Cautions
Sitting as the trial judge in a criminal case, will decline to consolidate the case with a co-defendant's separate proceeding for sentencing purposes, reasoning that having presided over the actual trial gives her a better vantage point for exercising sentencing discretion than a judge who did not.
“This case is ripe for sentencing and is a case in which rather than a plea, the defendant went to trial. The undersigned presided over the trial and as such is in a better position to exercise sentencing discretion. More so, the other case does not constitute relevant conduct nor presents a scenario making consolidation warranted.”
Will dismiss a pro se habeas corpus petition on the pleadings alone when the petitioner, despite repeated chances and plain instructions over two years, never supplies the basic facts (custody status, exhaustion, the state judgment at issue) needed even to evaluate the claim -- underscoring that habeas relief requires more than a bare assertion of a due-process violation.
“From the get-go, even though the Court granted plaintiff ample opportunity and time, plaintiff failed to submit even the slightest documentation to suggest the nature, status, or outcome of the state court proceedings he apparently challenges herein... it is more than evident that the petition fails to state a claim for relief and fails to set the stage for the Court to consider section 2254's criterion.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Based upon the foregoing, defendant's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiffs' federal claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs' Commonwealth of Puerto Rico law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Clerk is to enter judgment accordingly.”
“In light of the above, the Municipality's motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, ECF No. 153, is hereby DENIED.”
“For the above stated reasons, the Court hereby DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Dr. Guilbe's motion for summary judgment at ECF No. 72.”
“Based on the above, the motion to suppress is DENIED. ECF No. 559.”
“For the reasons stated above, petitioner Francisco Lopez-Negron's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 is DENIED and his claims for relief DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Judgement shall be entered forthwith.”
“The motion to withdraw the reference, at ECF No. 1-15, is DENIED. This case is hereby REMANDED to the Bankruptcy Court. Accordingly, ECF Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 are denied as Moot. ECF No. 11 is Noted. All other pending motions are hereby REMANDED as well.”
“Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss at ECF No. 15 is GRANTED. Consequently: Plaintiffs' federal claims are hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The remaining state law claims are likewise DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their reassertion in state court.”
“For all the reasons stated above, the Court hereby OVERRULES defendants' objections to the R&R at ECF Nos. 113, 117, 122, ADOPTS the R&R at ECF No. 112, and DENIES defendants' motions to dismiss the indictment at ECF Nos. 87, 88, 105.”
“For this reason, the Court DENIES Perez-Otero's motion for acquittal at ECF No. 106.”
“The motions for summary judgment at ECF Nos. 46, 47 are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART: Villalobos-Santana's claims of retaliation for the discrete acts of the seizure of his firearm and the change of his shifts are time-barred and, thus, unactionable, and hereby dismissed for liability purposes. Colon-Rodriguez's claims of retaliation related to the tow truck incident are time-barred... Colon-Rodriguez's claims of retaliation due to work on the weekends and the lack of payment for such work are dismissed. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment at ECF No. 47 is DENIED in PART as to all other claims asserted.”
“In light of all the above, the Court hereby DENIES the motion to strike at ECF No. 78.”
“In light of all the above, the Court hereby DENIES the De La Fuente defendants' motion for summary judgment at ECF No. 10. The De La Fuente defendants are granted 15 days to submit their responsive pleading.”
“After a careful review of the record and for the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS the R&R, ECF No. 125; OVERRULES defendant's objections at ECF No. 137; and, thus, DENIES defendants' motions to suppress at ECF Nos. 26, 39.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Her general docket spans insurance and reinsurance disputes (including a large post-hurricane appraisal-award docket), employment discrimination and wrongful-termination suits, personal-injury and products-liability removals, civil-rights and police-misconduct suits, habeas corpus and Section 2255 petitions, Social Security disability-benefits appeals, bankruptcy-adjacent shareholder disputes, admiralty and forfeiture matters, and a substantial criminal docket including narcotics, firearms, money-laundering, and public-corruption prosecutions, drawn primarily from the San Juan division.
Put Judge Delgado-Colon's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Delgado-Colon actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Delgado-Colon's own signed orders and cites them.