Sara E. de Jesús Kellogg
How Judge Kellogg rules, drawn from 20 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Kellogg no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Kellogg decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
A trustee could avoid a transfer where the opposing interest lacked the authenticated documentation required to be effective against third parties.
“The pledge was not perfected for the failure to establish the date of the delivery by an authenticated document.”
A compulsory payroll deduction necessary to retain public employment was treated as an employment expense rather than disposable income.
“this compulsory monthly payroll deduction is not ‘disposable income’ because it is akin to an expense necessarily expended if Mrs. Santiago Mejias is going to continue to be engaged in her normal business venture of being a teacher.”
Procedural preferences
Summary-judgment briefing had to identify admissible evidence and organized facts rather than rely on assertions embedded in briefs.
“both Motions for Summary Judgment are DENIED.”
A proposed sale or settlement required enough record detail for the court to assess fairness and the interests of all creditors.
“the parties have not met their burden of providing the Court with sufficient facts sorted out in a reasonable fashion”
An unopposed trustee abandonment completed through proper notice did not require a separate approving order.
“No court order is necessary or appropriate to authorize the proposed abandonment or disposition of property if appropriate notice is given and an opportunity for a hearing is allowed”
Cautions
A creditor seeking a late proof of claim after adequate notice had to establish excusable neglect rather than a routine filing mistake.
“The ‘error of form’ alleged as good cause for the late filing, in actual fact appears to be a mistake which does not move this Court to enlarge the period of time”
Piercing the corporate veil required strong evidence that the corporation was an alter ego or vehicle for fraud, not merely deficient corporate recordkeeping.
“the stipulated facts fail to set forth the type of robust and strong evidence required for this Court to dispense with the corporate entity”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons stated below we deny the Halvorsens’ motion for summary judgment and grant Debtors’ motion to dismiss this proceeding unless the Hal-vorsens amend the complaint.”
“Therefore, the Halvorsens are granted thirty days to amend the complaint, or Debtors’ request for dismissal is granted.”
“Under these circumstances both Motions for Summary Judgment are DENIED.”
“Wherefore, we find Trustee met his burden of proving each of the elements of an avoidable preferential transfer pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547. Defendant will turnover the $175,000.00 payment to the Trustee forthwith to be distributed by the Trustee pursuant to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”
“Wherefore, Island Finance’s objection to confirmation is DENIED.”
“For the reasons stated in this Opinion, we deny the request for summary judgment.”
“Therefore, we cannot approve the Application to Sell nor the Stipulation to compromise the differences between Debtors and Banco Nacional, because we have no way of evaluating whether the agreements are fair and equitable and in the best interest of all creditors.”
“WHEREFORE, Metropolitana’s request for attorneys’ fees is hereby DENIED.”
“Wherefore, Metmor’s request that the lifting of stay be granted for cause based on the principle of res judicata or issue preclusion, is denied.”
“Hence, Ms. Contreras’ request for an order approving said abandonment is denied.”
“WHEREFORE, the Trustee’s opposition to the payment of Folguera’s post petition fees and expenses is denied.”
“Ford Motor Credit Company has objected to the confirmation of Debtors’ Plan dated August 21, 1992. For the reasons stated in this opinion we grant the objection and deny confirmation of the August 21, 1992 Plan.”
“Wherefore, the Order entered on April 27, 1989 is vacated and set aside and Ms. Padilla’s claim filed on April 19, 1989 is disallowed as untimely.”
A historical record
Judge Kellogg no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.