William W. Knox

How Judge Knox rules, drawn from 25 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Knox no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
Position
district
Status
Deceased
Served
1970–1981
Appointed by
Richard Nixon (Republican)
Commissioned
1970-10-14
Education
University of Michigan, A.B., 1932; University of Michigan Law School, J.D., 1935
Signed orders read
25

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Bolanos v. Gulf Oil Corp.
· 1980-12-15
Motions to dismiss (Gulf Oil Corporation) Granted

“We conclude, therefore, that in the interests of convenience, the effective administration of justice, and due regard for the final judgment of the court of a nation with whom we have friendly relations this action should be dismissed.”

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Greene
· 1980-08-15
Motion for more definite statement (Defendant) Granted in part

“We will enter an appropriate order requiring plaintiff to file an amended complaint setting forth approximately the dates on which the events being complained of occurred”

United States v. Walker
· 1980-08-13
Motion for discovery (Defendant) Denied

“we will deny the motion for discovery with respect to matters set forth in paragraph 3(e) of such motion with respect to expert witness’ names and reports.”

Bakery & Confectionery Union v. United Baking Co.
· 1980-07-25
Summary judgment (Union health and pension funds) Granted

“An appropriate order will be entered entering judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant for contributions due the fund in behalf of each fund.”

Jarvis v. Johnson
· 1980-05-28
Motion to amend judgment (Plaintiff) Denied

“Since it is a matter of practice and procedure and not substantive law, we decline to give this rule effect in federal court.”

Del Sandro v. United States
· 1980-01-24
Preliminary injunction (Taxpayer plaintiffs) Moot / procedural

“Since the action is dismissed, the request for preliminary injunction is moot”

Beary v. Norton-Simon, Inc.
· 1979-11-13
Summary judgment (Norton-Simon, Inc.) Granted

“we have concluded that defendant’s motion must be granted.”

International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local Union 348 v. Koski Construction Co.
· 1979-07-27
Motions to remand (International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local Union 348) Denied

“We hold that defendant properly removed this action to federal court and deny plaintiff’s motion to remand this case to the Erie County Court of Common Pleas.”

O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp.
· 1979-06-21
Summary judgment (Ferro Corporation) Denied

“defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be denied and plaintiff will be permitted to offer evidence of sales below total cost at trial.”

United States v. Bellomini
· 1978-08-01
Motion for new trial or arrest of judgment (Defendant) Denied

“For these reasons the motion for new trial and/or arrest of judgment of acquittal was denied.”

Colombo v. Republic Steel Corp.
· 1978-04-21
Motions to dismiss (Cullen Contracting Corporation) Granted in part

“Therefore, that portion of third party defendant’s motion concerning Hanley’s indemnification claim based on a contractual provision is granted and count 2 of defendant Hanley’s third party complaint is dismissed.”

Service Personnel & Employees of Dairy Industry, Teamsters Local Union No. 205 v. Carl Colteryahn Dairy, Inc.
· 1977-08-24
Summary judgment (Teamsters Local Union No. 205) Denied

“The union’s motion for summary judgment must be denied.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

No surviving assigned-case index was located for Knox's tenure. The profile therefore makes no claim about his caseload, case duration, motion base rates, or ruling speed.

A historical record

Judge Knox no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.