Robert Dixon Herman
Judge Herman no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Herman decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Herman looked to the purpose of federal labor law and persuasive district authority when controlling appellate precedent had reserved the precise individual-liability question.
“We believe that the legislative intent behind section 301 was not to insulate individual employees of a company from liability for disruptions they cause by improper work stoppages.”
Procedural preferences
When jurisdiction over individual defendants depended on undeveloped notice facts, he allowed discovery before inviting renewed dismissal motions.
“the motion to dismiss the claims against these Defendants will be denied at this time so that Plaintiff will have the opportunity to develop jurisdictional facts through discovery.”
He enforced a contractual limitations clause when the ticket conspicuously directed the passenger to the incorporated terms, even though the passenger had not read them.
“It is no defense that the passenger did not read the ticket.”
Cautions
He would not use dismissal or compelled answers to make invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege costly in civil discovery.
“Since we conclude that the matters into which Defendant seeks to probe are privileged we will not order Plaintiff to answer these questions, and it follows that we will not then dismiss Plaintiff’s action for his failure to answer.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“we find that controversies under the National Flood Insurance Act may be litigated only in the federal courts, and we will deny plaintiffs’ motion for remand.”
“The court ordered that the motion to dismiss the action against individual union members must be denied”
“Thus, NCL is entitled to summary judgment in this case because the plaintiffs failed to file their suit within the one-year limitation for which the contract of passage provided.”
“because counsel has already been compensated for his services before us under the EAJA, we do not find a further award for district court services to be justified. As to counsel’s activities before the Secretary, counsel seeks reimbursement for 25.4 hours, at $75.00 per hour, in addition to $250.00 for an expert fee. First, the plain wording of the statute permits the entry of a judgment for a reasonable fee for representation. We see no provision for an additional award of costs or expenses and, thus, we will not award them. From our review of counsel’s time claims, we find the hours expended in preparation and activity before the agency to be reasonable. Having already found counsel’s hourly rate to be reasonable, we will award a fee of $1,905.00 (25.4 hours X $75.00 per hour).”
“We see no provision for an additional award of costs or expenses and, thus, we will not award them.”
“For the foregoing reasons the motions of both Defendants for summary judgment will be granted.”
“The matter before the Court is the Commonwealth’s Motion For Remand which will be granted.”
“The motion for summary judgment will be denied.”
“the motion to dismiss the claims against these Defendants will be denied at this time so that Plaintiff will have the opportunity to develop jurisdictional facts through discovery.”
“since the complaint was filed more than two years after the last alleged discriminatory act, these claims are time barred and will be dismissed.”
“The allegation that Plaintiff was fired for speaking out on a matter of public concern and that the Authority ratified the firing is clearly sufficient to state a claim of constitutional deprivation. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Count II of the complaint also seeks to assert a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. One element of a claim under § 1985 is that the constitutional deprivation complained of be. motivated by racial or other class-based animus. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 28 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975). The complaint alleges no such class-based motivation and therefore states no claim under § 1985.”
“An appropriate order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be entered.”
“The City’s motion to dismiss will therefore be denied.”
“Plaintiffs are unable to state a cause of action against Krout and Ruppert, and will dismiss the claims against these Defendants.”
“we will grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 730.5 days (N = 10).
The twenty enumerated historical cases included eight prisoner civil-rights matters, four habeas petitions, two other statutory actions, two contract cases, one employment civil-rights case, one disability appeal, one foreclosure, and one unlabeled case. All twenty were terminated. This archival slice does not establish Herman's full caseload mix.
A historical record
Judge Herman no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.