Michael Henry Sheridan
Judge Sheridan no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Sheridan decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Sheridan required disability adjudications to identify real employment opportunities rather than relying only on generalized job lists.
“‘We recognize that the use of governmental and industrial studies such as the one referred to by the Appeals Council in the present case has been permitted without objection on occasion and approved of as warranting the Secretary’s determination of what employment opportunities are available to a claimant. Having in mind the sincere, practical administration of the Act, however, we are not persuaded that such evidence moves far enough away from the realm of conjecture and theory when applied to the facts before us. It is too much akin to the employment Hodgson was supposed to be able to secure as an elevator operator. The suggestion that there is a list of “221 jobs that can be performed by persons with minimal education and that are sedentary in character or require only light exertion” is not very meaningful. There must be something more tangible establishing what employment opportunities there are for a man with his impairment. The *526failure of the Secretary to establish the existence of that kind of genuine employment opportunity is patent. * * * ’ (Footnotes omitted.)”
He treated summary judgment affidavits as capable of piercing unsupported pleadings when the opposing party failed to identify a genuine factual dispute.
“Plaintiff argues that even though it has not been able to contradict Fidelity’s affidavits, summary judgment cannot be granted because the complaint alleges a negligent inspection by Fidelity, and that this creates a fact issue regardless of whether matters outside the pleadings, which are contradictory to Fidelity’s affidavit, were presented. He relies on Reynolds Metal Co. v. Metals Disintegrating Co., 3 Cir. 1949, 176 F.2d 90, and Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Corp., 3 Cir. 1948, 169 F.2d 580. Prior to the 1963 amendment of Rule 56, this contention was the law in the Third Circuit. The rule was amended, however, to specifically provide that when a motion for summary judgment is supported by affidavits, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must respond, by affidavits or otherwise, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. It is now clear that affidavits can be used to cut through well pleaded allegations. One of the prime purposes of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings. 6 Moore, Federal Practice, Para. 56.11 [3]. ‘Stubborn reliance upon allegations and denials in the pleadings will not alone suffice, when faced with affidavits or other materials showing the absence of triable issues of material fact.’ Id. at page 2170.”
Procedural preferences
Sheridan ordinarily allowed the examining party to select oral depositions absent special circumstances supporting a protective order.
“Whether depositions on written interrogatories in lieu of oral examination will be ordered is in the discretion of the court. Jones v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., E.D.Pa. 1950, 10 F.R.D. 153. In view of the purpose of the depositions and the business relationship between the witnesses to be deposed and the defendants, written interrogatories seem inadequate. In the absence of special circumstances, the court should ordinarily allow the examining party to choose his own mode of examination. 4 Moore, Federal Practice, par. 30.08 at page 2030 (2d ed.). The defendants have not argued or produced anything to show that written interrogatories would be sufficient. The defendants’ only ground for the motion is the expense involved.”
He favored relation back when the intended defendant had timely notice and the naming error caused no prejudice.
“Here it is clear that the claim asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the same conduct or occurrence set forth in the original complaint. A cause of action based on negligence is asserted against Albert Dodson Smith. The cause of action arose on July 17, 1966, and the complaint was filed on July 12, 1967, within the period of limitations for both the Wrongful Death and Survival actions. The administratrix sought to be brought in had notice and will not be prejudiced. An uncontradicted affidavit filed by counsel for plaintiff indicates that beginning on December 9, 1966, he had conducted settlement negotiations on several occasions with the insurance carrier for Albert Dodson Smith; that on June 27, 1967, counsel for plaintiff filed a petition with the Register of Wills of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, for a rule to show cause why Genevieve Smith, wife of Albert Dodson Smith, or her nominee should not take out Letters of Administration so that plaintiff could pursue the claim against his estate; that Genevieve Smith was personally served with a copy of the petition; that prior to July 12, 1967, the date set for hearing on the petition, Genevieve Smith was requested by plaintiff’s counsel to take out Letters of Administration in her husband’s estate; that plaintiff’s counsel contacted Genevieve Smith’s personal counsel, at her suggestion, to arrange for Letters to issue to Genevieve Smith; that on July 11, 1967, Genevieve Smith petitioned the Register of Wills for Letters of Administration which were issued to her on July 12, 1967; that the petition of Genevieve Smith indicated that the ‘purpose of 1 trs is to start a lawsuit’; and that before filing the instant lawsuit plaintiff’s counsel checked to determine that the Letters of Administration had been issued.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The motion for a new trial will be denied.”
“This memorandum is in support of this court’s order of June 6, 1975, which denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the action.”
“The motions will be denied.”
“The defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be denied; the decision of the Secretary will be reversed, and judgment will be entered for the plaintiff.”
“Prior to the amendment, there were cases which held that the filing of an administrative claim was not a prerequisite to filing suit. Schlingham v. United States, S.D.Cal.1963, 229 F.Supp. 454; Whistler v. United States, N.D.Ind.1966, 252 F.Supp. 913. The amendment, which was effective in January 1967, made the filing of an administrative claim a prerequisite to a civil action under the Federal Tort Claims Act. This is abundantly clear from the legislative history of the amendment. Senate Report No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News, p. 2515 (1966). The amendment has been so construed. Beavers v. United States, S.D.Texas 1968, 291 F.Supp. 856. At the same time. Section 2401(b) was amended to provide a period of limitation for court action after the agency disposed of the claim. The action will be dismissed.”
“The petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”
“The motion to vacate the order of reference will be denied.”
“Therefore, the complaint will be dismissed as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S. C.A. § 1915(d), without issuance of process.”
“Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 577, pp. 587-590 (3 Cir., filed April 26, 1974); Weather Wise Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 5 Cir. 1972, 468 F.2d 716, cert. denied, 1973, 410 U.S. 990, 93 S.Ct. 1505, 36 L.Ed.2d 188; GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., S.D.N.Y.1971, 329 F.Supp. 823, 828, aff’d 2 Cir. 1972, 463 F.2d 752; Beverage Distributors, Inc. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 9 Cir. 1971, 440 F.2d 21, 32-33; House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 2 Cir. 1962, 298 F.2d 867. Thus, the request for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief will be denied.”
“that the refusal was in furtherance of a restraint of trade. Thus, the court denies plaintiffs’ request that the contracts be declared void as violative of Section 1.”
“Plaintiffs’ contention that the proposed base year volume for the new car wash violates the Emergency Petroleum Act of 1973 and the FEO regulations promulgated thereunder should be dismissed since the Federal Energy Office has primary jurisdiction of the issue, and since the plaintiffs brought this action solely under the Sherman Act which provides no jurisdictional basis for adjudicating such a claim.”
“This memorandum is in support of this court’s order of July 18, 1974, which denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the action.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 636 days (N = 5).
The five surviving case shells were all terminated and contain no nature-of-suit labels or docket entries. The published writings span criminal, parole, disability, labor, tax, civil-rights, discovery, and jurisdictional disputes but do not establish Sheridan's full caseload mix.
A historical record
Judge Sheridan no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.