Julia K. Munley
How Judge Munley decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In an age-discrimination pleading challenge, the judge held that a plaintiff need not allege her replacements' exact ages, following recent Third Circuit authority that a 'sufficiently younger' allegation suffices at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
“A fair reading of plaintiff's complaint permits the inference that plaintiff, the oldest editor on staff, was replaced by sufficiently 'younger' editors who absorbed her duties when she was terminated just shy of her 65th birthday. She need not plead her replacements' exact age.”
In an ADA associational-discrimination claim, the judge drew a sharp line between a retaliation theory based on the plaintiff's own complaints about treatment and one based on a demand that the employer accommodate a disabled relative, allowing only the former to proceed.
“The ADA association provision, 42 U.S.C. Section 12112(b)(4), does not obligate employers to accommodate the schedule of an employee with a disabled relative.”
Procedural preferences
Where a pro se plaintiff neither opposed pending motions nor responded to the court's show-cause orders, the judge adopted a magistrate judge's Poulis-factors recommendation and treated the pending motions to dismiss as moot rather than reaching their merits.
“Magistrate Judge Schwab cogently applied the Poulis factors in recommending the dismissal of plaintiff's action for: 1) failure to file briefs in opposition to defendants' motions to dismiss; and 2) failure to respond to court orders relative to filing those briefs.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons set forth above, defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.”
“The R&R (Doc. 41) is ADOPTED in its entirety; Plaintiff's action is DISMISSED for failure to prosecute; Defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint (Docs. 16, 36) are DISMISSED as moot.”
“For the reasons set forth above, GCSOM's motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the motion will be granted as to plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim in Count VIII of the complaint. Count VIII will be dismissed with prejudice. Otherwise, the motion will be denied. Plaintiff will be afforded fourteen (14) days to file an amended complaint regarding the breach of contract claim in Count VII.”
“3) Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 58) is GRANTED; and 4) The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.”
“1) Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 18) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; 2) Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice with regard to: a) plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against the Borough of Girardville as part of any cause of action pursuant to Section 1983; b) plaintiff's claims for statutory and liquidated damages; c) plaintiff's Section 1981 claim against the Borough of Girardville; d) plaintiff's Section 1983 claims arising out of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; and e) plaintiff's Title VII claims against the individual defendants; 3) Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED in all other respects;”
“1) Defendants City of Scranton and Mayor Paige Cognetti's motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint (Doc. 25) is DENIED;”
“2) Defendant Local Lodge No. 2462, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO's motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint (Doc. 24) is DENIED;”
“Defendants Scranton School District and Shannon Rucker's motion to dismiss Plaintiff Brittney Lee's amended complaint (Doc. 11) is DENIED.”
“For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motion to compel arbitration and dismiss plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 10) is denied.”
“The Defendants' motion to vacate default judgment and to dismiss (Doc. 16) is granted in part. It is GRANTED in that the default judgment is hereby VACATED, and it is DENIED with regard to dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint;”
“the defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 31) is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff.”
“2) Defendant Clancy's motion to dismiss, (Doc. 22), is GRANTED and the claims asserted against her are DISMISSED with prejudice;”
“3) Defendant Muldrow's motion to dismiss, (Doc. 25), is GRANTED; 4) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment bail claim against Defendant Muldrow is DISMISSED with prejudice; 5) Plaintiff's remaining claims against Defendant Muldrow are DISMISSED without prejudice to the plaintiff filing an amended complaint so long as it complies with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and addresses the deficiencies identified in the R&R;”
“4) Plaintiff's motion for default judgment regarding Count II of the complaint (Doc. 36) is GRANTED as to Defendant Marx NJ Group, LLC and Defendant Joseph Marx; 5) Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff and against Defendants Marx NJ Group, LLC and Joseph Marx, jointly, severally, and individually, in the amount of $15,503,494.65;”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The sampled window spans prisoner civil-rights/Eighth Amendment claims, immigration and federal habeas petitions, employment discrimination, and diversity contract/insurance matters. Several sampled dockets resolved by voluntary dismissal, mootness, or settlement before a dispositive motion issued.
Put Judge Munley's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Munley actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Munley's own signed orders and cites them.