Christopher C. Conner
Judge Conner no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Conner decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a multidistrict-litigation removal dispute, he denied remand after finding the plaintiffs breached a tolling agreement and secretly refiled suit while representing to the defense they would not -- procedural gamesmanship weighed heavily against them even though the underlying 'snap removal' tactic was itself permissible.
“The only conclusion to be reached on this record is that plaintiffs engaged in Janus-faced gamesmanship, contractually representing to defendants that no lawsuit would be filed for at least another month, while preparing and filing that lawsuit just three days later.”
In an FMLA case, he found that placing an employee on continuous leave against her wishes, when she had requested and was entitled to ongoing intermittent leave, can itself be a form of interference with FMLA rights -- an employer cannot substitute one type of statutory leave for another without the employee's consent.
“By placing [the employee] on continuous FMLA leave, [the employer] necessarily denied [the employee's] concurrent request for intermittent leave. The nature of continuous leave pretermits an employee's ability to take intermittent leave.”
He credited testimony that a defendant's job title alone, without allegations of personal direction or actual knowledge of the underlying misconduct, cannot establish liability for a civil-rights violation -- a recurring theme in his prisoner Sec. 1983 rulings.
“A defendant's personal involvement in an alleged civil rights violation must be based on more than a theory of respondeat superior.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces the local unopposed-motion rule strictly: failure to file a timely brief in opposition is treated as abandonment of a claim or defense, resulting in the motion being deemed unopposed and granted, even where the underlying merits might otherwise have been contested.
“Crawford's motion to dismiss the amended complaint (Doc. 79) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is DEEMED unopposed, see L.R. 7.6, and GRANTED.”
For pro se prisoner plaintiffs whose complaints are dismissed on factual (rather than legal) pleading deficiencies, he routinely grants leave to amend rather than closing the case outright, reserving dismissal with prejudice for cases where amendment would plainly be futile.
“We will, however, grant Ortiz leave to amend his complaint... Leave to amend is appropriate here because Ortiz's complaint is factually, rather than legally, deficient.”
Motions for reconsideration face a high bar in his courtroom: he requires a clear error of law, manifest injustice, or an intervening change in law or fact, and treats reconsideration as improper for re-litigating arguments piecemeal.
“[T]he purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to 'correct a clear error of law or to prevent a manifest injustice' in the court's original ruling... such relief is reserved for 'compelling' circumstances.”
Cautions
He applies the forum-defendant / snap-removal doctrine and equitable exceptions to remand rigorously, and is willing to find waiver or estoppel when a plaintiff's own conduct (e.g., breaching a tolling agreement) undermines the request to send a case back to state court.
“[T]o remand this action would offend fundamental principles of fairness, equity, and judicial economy.”
In Sec. 2254 habeas cases he enforces procedural-default doctrine strictly, requiring petitioners to make an affirmative showing under Martinez v. Ryan before he will reach the merits of a defaulted ineffective-assistance claim.
“We decline to address the merits of these claims because Neely has not established a basis to excuse his default; accordingly, we will deny Neely's petition for habeas relief.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
IFP screening order: 'Plaintiff's application (Doc. 7) to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED... Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint...' Rule 8/20 pleading deficiencies identified; not a ruling on a party motion.
“The government's motion to dismiss the charges against defendant is GRANTED. All charges against defendant are DISMISSED.”
“Crawford's motion to dismiss the amended complaint (Doc. 79) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is DEEMED unopposed, see L.R. 7.6, and GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to TERMINATE Crawford as a named defendant.”
“Defendants' motion (Doc. 10) to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“Ryan's motion (Doc. 7) to dismiss the complaint is DENIED.”
“Ryan's motion (Doc. 7) for summary judgment is DENIED without prejudice to her right to file such motion at a more appropriate time.”
A purely procedural briefing-format order permitting plaintiffs to file a single comprehensive brief in opposition to defendants' seventeen separate summary-judgment motions; it does not rule on the merits of any motion.
“The Gerbers' motion (Doc. 33) for partial summary judgment is DENIED without prejudice.”
“U.S. Bank's motion (Doc. 38) for summary judgment is DENIED without prejudice.”
“The report of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. 111) is ADOPTED. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 83) is GRANTED.”
“The petition (Doc. 1) for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“Rodriguez-Francisco's petition (Doc. 1) for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241 is DENIED.”
“The court will deny plaintiffs' motion to remand.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Sampled dockets are dominated by pro se prisoner civil-rights suits under Sec. 1983 (conditions of confinement, COVID-19 exposure, property confiscation), interspersed with employment discrimination (Title VII, PHRA), Social Security appeals, and general civil actions -- consistent with a general-caseload district judge who, as former Chief Judge, also carried a substantial share of the court's prisoner and pro se docket. Most pro se prisoner cases in this sample were resolved on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal involvement of the named defendants, a recurring dispositive theory in this court.
A historical record
Judge Conner no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.