Kelley Brisbon Hodge
How Judge Hodge decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a Section 1983 state-created-danger claim at the pleading stage she applies the Third Circuit's Kneipp four-factor test favorably to the plaintiff: a victim need only plausibly allege the officers' 'awareness of a risk of violence or harm,' not that they foresaw the specific attack, and the 'affirmative use of authority' prong is met by affirmative assurances (a promise to canvass) coupled with conduct that left the plaintiff more vulnerable.
“To demonstrate that he was a foreseeable victim, Butler need only establish that the Defendants had 'awareness of a risk of violence or harm,' not that the Officers foresaw the specific circumstances of his shooting. ... Plaintiff need not prove that Defendants knew that Mayo was responsible ... nor that Mayo's actions would escalate in violence and severity.”
She will deny qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage once a constitutional violation is adequately pled and the right is clearly established: the state-created-danger right has been 'clearly established in this Circuit' since DeShaney, so no precedent directly on point is required.
“The state-created danger doctrine has been 'thoroughly explored and defined' in the thirty-five years since DeShaney ... This Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts such that 'every reasonable official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] [the right to due process].' ... Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.”
Procedural preferences
On 12(b)(6) dismissals she draws a deliberate line on prejudice: legally barred claims (sovereign/statutory immunity, age-discrimination claims here) are dismissed WITH prejudice, while merely under-pled but curable claims are dismissed WITHOUT prejudice with an explicit, deadline-bound chance to amend. She disposes of multi-count, multi-defendant motions claim-by-claim and defendant-by-defendant rather than wholesale.
“Plaintiff's race discrimination claims raised in Counts I, III, and V are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. ... Plaintiff's age discrimination claims raised in Counts VII and VIII are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. ... Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint ... on or before April 1, 2024.”
Cautions
She enforces Canton on Monell claims: a boilerplate allegation that a municipality had a 'policy or custom' of minimal investigation, without facts showing a deliberate or conscious failure-to-train/supervise decision, is insufficient and the Monell count is dismissed. She also applies the PSTCA to bar intentional-tort (IIED) and punitive-damages claims against the municipality itself.
“merely alleging in a boilerplate fashion that the Township had a policy of minimally investigating domestic disturbances is insufficient to demonstrate that the Township made a 'deliberate' or 'conscious' decision not to train or supervise. ... Thus, Plaintiff's claim fails.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 7 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 3Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 6 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1Denied: 4 | counts only |
| Daubert N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to compel N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for protective order N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“it is ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 8) is DENIED.”
“The Commonwealth Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) is DENIED for the reasons stated in the Court's accompanying Memorandum.”
“The Court grants the Motion as to Count II as to both Defendants. The Court denies the Motion as to Counts I and III as to both Defendants. As for Count VII and Plaintiff's request for punitive damages, the Court grants the Motion as to the Township Defendant and denies the Motion as to the Officer Defendants.”
“Defendant's Motion (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: 1. Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's race discrimination claims is GRANTED. Plaintiff's race discrimination claims raised in Counts I, III, and V are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 2. Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's age discrimination claims is GRANTED. Plaintiff's age discrimination claims raised in Counts VII and VIII are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 3. Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's [PHRA] claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint ... on or before April 1, 2024.”
“Defendant IMS's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall mark IMS TERMINATED from the case.”
“Defendant Leonard's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. a. The Motion to Dismiss Counts I and II is DENIED. b. Counts III and V are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. c. Count VI is DISMISSED; Plaintiff is granted leave to amend this claim within 14 days of this Order.”
“IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Amended Class Action Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court Clerk shall mark this matter as CLOSED.”
“1. Defendant Royal White Cement's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 29 and 31) is DENIED.”
“2. Plaintiff Horizon Stevedoring, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 30) is DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Five Below's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied in its entirety.”
“The Motions to Exclude Douglas Hollon are GRANTED. Testimony and opinions of Douglas Hollon are hereby excluded from trial.”
“Defendant Nelnet's Summary Judgment Motion is GRANTED.”
“Plaintiff's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment are DENIED.”
“Defendants Equifax, TransUnion, LVNV, Resurgent, and First Premier's Summary Judgment Motions are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART”
“the Court denies Wawa's Motion to Compel Claims Communications from FI Plaintiffs”
“denies FI Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order and Response in Opposition to Wawa's Motion as moot.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 817 days (N = 1).
Qualitative, NOT a census. As a December-2022 appointee her substantive civil docket is largely REASSIGNED predecessor inventory: data-breach / consumer-fraud MDL and tracks (In re Wawa, Inc. Data Security Litigation 2:19-cv-06019, filed 2019-12-20 -> terminated 2026-01-13, ~2216 days; plus Schultz/Katz/Greater Cincinnati Credit Union v. Wawa financial-institution and consumer tracks), insurance-coverage (Susan Spath Hegedus v. Chubb 2:20-cv-02832, ~1631 days), antitrust/RICO (Steamfitters Local 420 v. UnitedBioSource), commercial contract (1228 Investment Group v. Hub Group 2:21-cv-01078, filed 2021-03-05 -> terminated 2025-02-06, ~1434 days), employment civil rights (Cox v. SEPTA, Duncan-Carmona v. City of Philadelphia), and prisoner Section 1983 (Walker v. Sorber, Walker v. Sellers). Her DIRECT 2024-2026 docket is dominated by the 2026 alien-detainee 463 habeas surge plus immigration-mandamus. Case duration (docket dates): Cox v. SEPTA filed 2021-10-18 -> terminated 2024-12-26 (~1165 days).