John Milton Younge
How Judge Younge decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
At the motion-to-dismiss stage he refuses to resolve fact-dependent affirmative defenses on the pleadings -- e.g. a collective-bargaining-agreement entitlement argument or failure-to-exhaust -- holding they belong at summary judgment where the factual record exists.
“The arguments raised by the Defendant as they pertain to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, would be more appropriately assessed during the summary judgment stage of this litigation than on a motion to dismiss which simply rests on the Plaintiff's pleadings.”
Procedural preferences
He grants leave to amend selectively and explicitly: only as to the specific without-prejudice claims of a particular plaintiff, with a fixed deadline, rather than a blanket repleading window.
“The Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended complaint limited only to those claims that were brought by Plaintiff Rahman that are dismissed without prejudice. Any amended complaint shall be filed within twenty (20) days.”
When granting summary judgment on the federal claims he declines supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice for refiling in state court rather than adjudicating them.
“Counts Eight through Eleven of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint are DISMISSED without PREJUDICE for refiling, if at all, in state court.”
Cautions
He will dismiss with prejudice and deny leave to amend outright when he finds amendment would be futile -- including on absolute/prosecutorial immunity (Wilson) and on barred contract/warranty theories (TAMKO). Read his futility findings before assuming you can replead.
“Counts II, III, and IV of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice as leave to amend would be futile.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 16 |
Granted: 10Granted in part: 1Denied: 5 | 69% granted |
| Motions to dismiss N = 11 |
Granted: 5Granted in part: 1Denied: 5 | 55% granted |
| Motions to transfer N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for judgment on pleadings N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [Dkt. No. 15] that was filed by the above-captioned Defendant is DENIED. ... The arguments raised by the Defendant as they pertain to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, would be more appropriately assessed during the summary judgment stage of this litigation than on a motion to dismiss.”
“the Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part ... The Motion to Dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity is granted, and the claims brought against the individual Defendants in their personal capacities are hereby dismissed ... Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied in all other respects and Plaintiff Rahman may proceed with his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended complaint limited only to those claims that were brought by Plaintiff Rahman that are dismissed without prejudice.”
“Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED in PART as to Counts One through Seven of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 37). Counts Eight through Eleven of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint are DISMISSED without PREJUDICE for refiling, if at all, in state court.”
“Defendants Former Assistant District Attorney David Desiderio and Former District Attorney Lynne Abraham's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 118) is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.”
“said Motion is GRANTED and Counts II, III, and IV of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice as leave to amend would be futile.”
“upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (ECF No. 19), Plaintiff's Response in Opposition thereto (ECF No. 22), and all other writings, it is hereby ORDERED that said Motion is DENIED. Parties shall comply with the Court's May 12, 2026 Trial Scheduling Order.”
“The Sterling Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 61) is GRANTED.”
“Defendant Equifax's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 64) ... is GRANTED.”
“Defendant Experian's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 69) ... is GRANTED.”
“Defendant Trans Union's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 70) are GRANTED.”
“Plaintiff Philip C. Pulley and Devra K. Pulley's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 65) is DENIED.”
“upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 51) ... it is hereby ORDERED that such Motion is GRANTED for the reasons set forth in this Court's accompanying Memorandum.”
“upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21) ... it is hereby ORDERED that said Motion is DENIED for the reasons stated in this Court's accompanying Memorandum.”
“Defendant Thomas Jefferson's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED. THIS ACTION IS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“upon consideration of the motion for summary judgment filed by the Defendant (ECF No. 27) ... it is hereby ORDERED that said Motion shall be GRANTED for the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum”
“upon consideration of the Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant (ECF No. 43) ... it is hereby ORDERED that said Motion is DENIED for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 187 days (N = 10).
Enumerated via assigned_judge='John M. Younge' over 2019-2020 filings. Civil docket is employment / civil-rights heavy (Title VII / ADA / PHRA / Section 1983), with insurance bad-faith (auto and homeowners), FDCPA, TCPA, contract, motor-vehicle PI, and state habeas (2254) matters. Referral magistrates seen: Carol Sandra Moore Wells and Lynne A. Sitarski (discovery/settlement referrals).