Gerald Austin McHugh Jr.
How Judge Jr. decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On tax-status questions he treats Tax Court jurisprudence as carrying special weight (akin to a sister district court but with added deference), and resolves worker classification on the multi-factor common-law test rather than IRS guides, with degree-of-control as the crucial factor.
“I consider Tax Court opinions on this question to be persuasive authority akin to that of another district court opinion but carrying additional weight due to the Tax Court's expertise.”
At the pleading stage he reads a discrimination complaint for its substance, not the defendant's preferred narrow label -- a defendant cannot win a 12(b)(6) by recharacterizing a well-pleaded protected-class claim as a defunct 'class of one' theory.
“I see no need to address the continued validity of this theory of liability because I do not view Plaintiff's allegations against these Defendants as being so narrow in scope.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces the forum-defendant rule on removal: a defendant who is a citizen of the state where the action was filed cannot remove on diversity, and McHugh will remand for lack of jurisdiction without reaching other removal defects.
“remand is required here because Berenato is a forum defendant and he may not remove this case.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 13 |
Granted: 7Granted in part: 1Denied: 4Moot / procedural: 1 | 62% granted |
| Motions to dismiss N = 10 |
Granted: 3Granted in part: 4Denied: 3 | 70% granted |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because I conclude as a matter of law that Plaintiff was an employee under the controlling legal test, the Government's motion for summary judgment will be granted, and the taxpayer's denied.”
“the Government's motion for summary judgment will be granted, and the taxpayer's denied.”
“For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Complaint will be denied.”
“it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 12) is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED.”
“it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 14, is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.”
“The Court will grant Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, and this case will be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
“For the reasons discussed above, I will grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs are entitled to $8,169,919.01 on Count I, and $447,315.73 on Count II.”
28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) screening of a pro se IFP complaint (no party motion). FDCPA claims dismissed with prejudice; FCRA and state breach-of-contract claims dismissed without prejudice. Counts as an order read, excluded from motion stats.
“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 9) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ federal claims in the Amended Complaint (Counts I-V) are DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ state law claims (Counts VI-VIII) are DISMISSED without prejudice, permitting Plaintiffs to pursue these claims in state court.”
“it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF 13, is DENIED.”
“it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is GRANTED as to Count II of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ECF 7, regarding the RICO claim against Defendant Tracy Young which is DISMISSED without prejudice. The motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
“Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 17) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: 1. As to Declaratory Judgment (Count II), the motion is GRANTED. 2. As to Plaintiff’s allegations of Fraud (Count III), the motion is GRANTED under the theory of good faith and fair dealing and DENIED in part ... 3. As to claims under the Lanham Act (Count IV), the motion is DENIED.”
“Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 12) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part ... granted as to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim related to the denial of his opportunity to appeal his dismissal ... In all other respects Defendant’s Motion is denied.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Active district judge (Philadelphia). Diverse civil docket: personal-injury / pharmaceutical product liability (Bayer), employment / civil-rights jobs, insurance & declaratory judgment, ERISA, FDCPA consumer credit, copyright (Malibu Media / Strike 3 Doe suits), prisoner civil rights, Social Security, and IDEA/special-education. Presides over the marquee United States v. Safehouse supervised-injection-site declaratory-judgment case (2:19-cv-00519).