Vicki Lynn Miles-LaGrange

U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma district No longer serving Appointed by Bill Clinton (Democratic) 16 signed orders read

Judge Miles-LaGrange no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Miles-LaGrange decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

At the pleading stage she looks for concrete allegations that connect the challenged action to the asserted protected trait or association.

“The Court finds that plaintiffs alleged claim that he was terminated because of his efforts in hiring and promoting African-Americans within American Fidelity Assurance Company is sufficient to set forth a plausible race discrimination claim.”

When reviewing arbitration she focuses on whether the parties received notice and a meaningful opportunity to present evidence and argument, not simply whether one side dislikes the result.

“Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that plaintiffs were provided with a fundamentally fair arbitration proceeding in that they were provided with the opportunity to fully brief and argue various matters before the arbitration panel.”

Procedural preferences

She confines discovery to information tied to the governing claims and available remedies, requiring the requesting party to justify broader geographic reach.

“the Court finds that defendant AFA has met its burden of showing the requested information on out-of-state non-parties is outside the scope of discovery.”

She applies threshold statutory requirements before shifting the burden to the opposing party, and will end a claim when the moving party does not establish those predicates.

“Plaintiffs have simply failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the threshold requirements to state a prima facie free exercise claim under RFRA.”

Cautions

She is reluctant to expand state-law duties without clear authority or a causal link to the defendant's own product or conduct.

“Given these defendants have no relationship with plaintiffs in the instant case, the Court finds that holding defendants Wyeth and Schwarz liable under the circumstances would ‘extend the concept of duty beyond reason and good sense’ as a matter of public policy.”

In constitutional injunction cases she explicitly weighs individual rights against majoritarian and administrative interests.

“While the public has an interest in the will of the voters being carried out, for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the public has a more profound and long-term interest in upholding an individual’s constitutional rights.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Lupton v. American Fidelity Assurance Co.
· 2014-05-20
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant American Fidelity Assurance Company’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement [docket no. 8} as follows: 1. The Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs gender discrimination claim, DISMISSES without prejudice plaintiffs gender discrimination claim, and GRANTS plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint as to his gender discrimination claim. Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file an Amended Complaint, and 2. The Court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs age and racial discrimination claims.”

Metzger v. American Fidelity Assurance Co.
· 2007-10-23
Motion to compel discovery (plaintiff) Granted in part

“For reasons set forth in detail above, the Court DENIES plaintiff Metzger’s motion to compel as to Interrogatory No. 1 and Request for Production No. 1 to the extent that it relates to out-of-state claims and GRANTED as relates to in-state claims [docket no. 217], IT IS SO ORDERED.”

Metzger v. American Fidelity Assurance Co.
· 2007-07-09
Class certification (plaintiff) Denied

“For the reasons set forth in detail above, the Court hereby DENIES ‘Plaintiffs Motion For Class Certification’ [docket no. 85].”

Rocin Liquidation Estate v. Pan American Life Insurance Co. (In re Rocor International, Inc.)
· 2007-03-30
Bankruptcy appeal (appellant estate) Granted

“For the reasons set forth in detail above, the Court VACATES the Bankruptcy Court’s February 17, 2006 Order granting Pan-American’s motion for summary judgment and REMANDS this action for further proceedings consistent with this Order. On remand, the Bankruptcy Court should grant the Estate’s motion for summary judgment.”

Mize v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
· 2005-06-29
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Denied

“Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Summary Judgment, or In the Alternative Bifurcate Liberty Mutual Insurance Company [docket no. 19] should be, and now hereby is, DENIED in its entirety.”

Summary judgment (defendants) Denied
Motion to bifurcate (defendants) Denied
Legacy Trading Co., Ltd. v. Hoffman
· 2008-08-18
Petition to vacate arbitration award (plaintiffs) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award [docket no. 1] is DENIED, and defendant’s Cross-Motions to Confirm Arbitration Award [docket nos. 6 and 8] are GRANTED. Furthermore, defendant’s request for attorney fees is DENIED.”

Motion to confirm arbitration award (defendant) Granted
Request for attorney fees (defendant) Denied
Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Internet Solutions Inc.
· 1998-09-29
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [doc. no. 12] is GRANTED. This action is dismissed without prejudice.”

Branch v. Farmers Insurance Co., Inc.
· 2000-10-04
Motion for partial summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment [docket no. 29] and GRANTS defendant Farmers Insurance Company, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment [docket no 28]”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted
Crews v. Shelter General Insurance
· 2005-05-25
Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“Accordingly, the Court finds that Shelter’s Motion for Summary Judgment or In the Alternative, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [docket no. 26] should be, and now hereby is, DENIED in its entirety.”

Swanson ex rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School District No. I-1
· 1996-09-30
Motion to dismiss converted to summary judgment (defendants) Granted

“Based upon the foregoing, the Court 1) GRANTS defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Docket # 18] which the Court has converted to a motion for summary judgment in its entirety; 2) DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket # 28]; and 3) DEEMS MOOT the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Individual Defendants Based On Qualified Immunity [Docket # 38].”

Summary judgment (plaintiffs) Denied
Summary judgment (individual defendants) Moot / procedural
Kelly v. Farmers Insurance Co., Inc.
· 2003-09-12
Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“Accordingly, Farmers’ Motion for Summary Judgment [docket no. 34] must be, and hereby is, DENIED.”

Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc.
· 2009-03-11
Motions to dismiss (generic-drug defendants) Denied

“For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES defendants Pliva, Barr, Actavis and Actavis-Elizabeth’s motions to dismiss and GRANTS defendants Wyeth and Schwarz’ motion for summary judgment.”

Summary judgment (brand-name defendants) Granted

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 273.5 days (N = 10).

Median motion-to-ruling time: 83.5 days (N = 8).

The ten sampled civil cases were all filed in early 2010 and terminated between 2010 and 2012. Their median duration was about 274 days, but this small historical cohort is not a career-wide estimate.

A historical record

Judge Miles-LaGrange no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.