Robin J. Cauthron
How Judge Cauthron decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a defense MSJ asserting qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show both a constitutional violation and a clearly established right; failing either prong, the officer prevails. Where there is no underlying constitutional violation, derivative Monell (failure-to-train/discipline) and supervisory-liability claims fail with it.
“Even if this Court were to entertain an argument that there is a material dispute of fact ... Plaintiff would fail on the second qualified immunity prong because there was no "clearly established" right at the time of Defendant Galyon's conduct.”
Procedural preferences
First Amendment public-employee speech is analyzed under the Tenth Circuit's five-step Garcetti/Pickering framework; speech made pursuant to official duties is unprotected even when the employee goes outside the normal chain of command. The first three steps are for the court.
“That she elected to go outside the chain of command and report to the OSBI rather than Defendant Jones, does not alter the fact that her speech was made within the scope of her duties. Thus, her speech is not protected by the First Amendment.”
Cautions
Strict on jurisdictional prerequisites: FTCA presentment requires actual RECEIPT by the proper agency within two years, not mailing; a claim received one day late is jurisdictionally barred, and where no amendment can cure, the dismissal is an adjudication on the merits.
“the district court was quite right to hold that mailing is not presenting; there must be receipt.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 6 |
Granted: 5Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Paul Galyon (Dkt. No. 163) is GRANTED.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Defendant Galyon (Dkt. No. 164) is DENIED.”
“Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 134) is GRANTED.”
“Defendant William Citty's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 135) is GRANTED.”
“Defendant Kay County Justice Facilities Authority's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 59) and Defendant Don Jones, in His Individual Capacity and in His Official Capacity as Director of the Kay County Justice Facilities' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 60) are GRANTED.”
“Defendant Kay County Justice Facilities Authority's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 59) and Defendant Don Jones, in His Individual Capacity and in His Official Capacity as Director of the Kay County Justice Facilities' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 60) are GRANTED.”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED. Because no amendment can cure the defect, this dismissal is an adjudication on the merits and a separate judgment will issue.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 84 days (N = 9).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 1 days (N = 2).
Senior-judge reduced docket, mostly pro-se prisoner/habeas plus a few removed diversity civil cases. referred_judge was empty on all sampled rows. Counts are sample-level, not court-wide.