Jodi Marie Warmbrod Dishman
How Judge Dishman decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
At the pleading stage takes the complaint's well-pleaded allegations as true and reads them in context: rejected an FHA defendant's argument that the statute did not reach a 'project manager' because the complaint pleaded that person was a tenant, and declined to convert a 12(b)(6) motion into summary judgment under Rule 12(d) (so refused to weigh the movant's competing factual explanations on a motion to dismiss).
“The Court rejects this argument because Plaintiff clearly alleges the project manager was a tenant.”
Procedural preferences
Enforces standing and subject-matter-jurisdiction requirements rigorously, including for pro se plaintiffs (prudential standing to sue on behalf of another); dismisses jurisdictional defects without prejudice per Tenth Circuit law.
“all dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, including those for a failure to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity . . . should be without prejudice”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 25]. The Court dismisses without prejudice Mr. Horton's claims for lack of standing and subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court also dismisses without prejudice Mr. Horton's claims against Defendants Federal Personnel Records Center and National Guard Bureau.”
“For the reasons analyzed above, the Court denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.”
“Defendant James Dyer's Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Expiration of the Statute of Limitations After Withdrawal from the Conspiracy [Doc. No. 73], Defendant Blaine Dyer's Motion to Dismiss for Expiration of the Statute of Limitations and Due Process [Doc. No. 95], and James Dyer's Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Due Process and Speedy Trial Violation for Pre-Accusation Delay [Doc. No. 71] are DENIED.”
“the Court DENIES Defendant James Dyer's Motion to Dismiss the Counts Two through Eight and the Forfeiture Count of the Indictment for Vagueness [Doc. No. 74], which Defendant Blaine Dyer joins in, adopts, and incorporates on his behalf [Doc. No. 99]. Further, the Court DENIES in part and RESERVES in part Defendant James Dyer's Motion to Dismiss Counts Two through Eight of the Indictment for Defectiveness Due to Multiplicity [Doc. No. 66]”
“the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion for Bill of Particulars [Doc. Nos. 58 and 97]”
“For these reasons, and based on the parties' submissions and relevant law, the Court DENIES Defendant James Dyer's Motion to Strike and Challenge Jury Array, Jury Panel(s), and Dismiss Indictment [Doc. No. 1] for Improper Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors [Doc. No. 61], which Defendant Blaine Dyer joins in, adopts, and incorporates on his behalf [Doc. No. 99], and as supplemented at [Doc. Nos. 153 and 156].”
“The Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII claims based upon gender and ADEA claims for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies, and Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims. The Court also grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Long. The Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Rule 8. The Court also denies, under Rule 12(b)(6), Defendants' requests to dismiss Plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim and Plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims for failure to plead facts establishing adverse employment action.”
“For the reasons outlined above, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Title VII claims against Wedman with prejudice. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's claim for Title VII discrimination based upon gender, sex, or sexual orientation without prejudice but without leave to amend. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claim based upon race against Sodexo, Title VII retaliation claim against Sodexo, and defamation claim against Defendants without prejudice.”
“Therefore, the Court concludes that a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is inappropriate in this case. ... the Court rejects Young and Stewart's arguments and denies the Motion. [Doc. No. 75].”
“The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Oklahoma State Department of Health [Doc. No. 7]. The Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff Stephanie Greene's claims for Title VII hostile work environment, discrimination, and retaliation, and FMLA interference (Counts I, II, III, and V). Only Plaintiff's claim for FMLA retaliation (Count IV) survives the Motion.”
“For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the City's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's negligence claim against it. [Doc. No. 5]. The Court dismisses Plaintiff's negligence claim against the City.”
“For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant Guardian Alliance Technologies, Inc.'s Partial Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted [Doc. No. 112].”
“For the reasons outlined above, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Amended Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 6] and dismisses Plaintiffs' complaint [Doc. No. 1-1] without prejudice.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 348 days (N = 7).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 637 days (N = 2).
The sample mixes civil and criminal matters. Commercial, contract, and personal-injury cases predominate and frequently settle before a merits ruling.
Put Judge Dishman's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Dishman actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Dishman's own signed orders and cites them.