David Lynn Russell
How Judge Russell rules, drawn from 16 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Russell decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Applies the plausibility (Twombly/Iqbal) pleading standard strictly to conclusory bad-faith and fraud allegations in insurance disputes: naming a party's alleged wrongdoing is not enough without allegations connecting the defendant's conduct to a specific standard of care or a detrimental-reliance chain.
“The Court concurs with Defendant that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support her bad faith claim. ... the paragraphs contain mere formulaic recitals of various manners in which an insurer may commit bad faith, without any specific factual allegations arising from this particular relationship.”
On a trade-secrets motion to dismiss, distinguishes plausible allegations of acquisition/use of confidential material (which he lets proceed) from merely 'guilt by association' theories against a lower-level co-defendant (which he dismisses), even in the same case and against the same broad category of claims.
“Liability by association is not enough, nor is 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'”
On detainee-medical-care summary judgment, allows supervisory and municipal claims to reach a jury when the record connects chronic staffing and monitoring failures to a known risk of delayed care, even if the evidence does not establish liability for individual line officers.
“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable juror could conclude that the jail had chronic, widespread, and grossly deficient practices regarding the monitoring of inmates.”
In False Claims Act cases, Russell expects the complaint to identify the actors, billing mechanism, and allegedly false charge with particularity; claims may proceed when those details make fraud plausible even if the pleading only narrowly clears the standard.
“Plaintiffs allegations, described above, of his claims for violations of the FCA and conspiracy to violate the FCA against Defendants Red River and Gus Bryant meet these standards, though barely so.”
Procedural preferences
Treats a motion to reconsider as a high bar: he will not revisit a summary-judgment or dismissal ruling absent clear error or manifest injustice, and expects the same standard of review the court already applied to control.
“The Court thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint, her arguments and the relevant law and concluded that the operative pleading failed to state a claim for bad faith. The Court finds no basis for reversing its prior decision.”
Keeps jurisdictional discovery focused on the removal question and rejects requests aimed at merits or credibility disputes when deciding whether a local defendant was fraudulently joined.
“State Farm’s proposed discovery goes towards merits-based and credibility issues that are not appropriate at this stage in the proceeding.”
When a statute expressly authorizes judicial enforcement and treats agency inaction as approval, Russell does not require a litigant to wait for a separate administrative appeal before seeking relief.
“The Plaintiffs action for declaratory and injunctive relief is made subject to judicial review by statute ... Thus, final agency action is not required in this instance.”
Cautions
On Section 1983 municipal-liability claims against school districts, he requires the plaintiff to identify when the district received notice sufficient to trigger a duty to retrain or increase supervision. Without a clear timeline showing that later misconduct occurred after that notice, the plaintiff cannot create a triable issue on summary judgment.
“The Court finds an absence of admissible evidence from which a jury could find that J.N.'s constitutional rights were violated after the District received notice of alleged abuse, premised largely on the murky timeline of events.”
In ADA 'essential functions' disputes, will not accept an employer's own written job description as conclusive where the plaintiff's own deposition testimony and the practical performance of the job conflict with it: a genuine factual dispute over what the job actually requires defeats summary judgment.
“In this case Defendant relies on a job description and the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician to conclude that Plaintiff cannot perform the essential functions of his job, although Defendant does not attempt to address the elements set forth above.”
On a motion to dismiss, Russell confines the analysis to the operative pleading; factual assertions introduced only in the response cannot repair an otherwise conclusory complaint.
“When ruling on a motion to dismiss, however, the Court must only address whether the Petition contains enough ‘facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff's bad faith claim. ... the Court finds these allegations too conclusory to meet Plaintiff's pleading burden. ... Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.”
“In short, the Court finds that it made no error in its Order granting Defendant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, her Motion to Reconsider is hereby DENIED.”
“Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part with respect to all claims against Defendant Johnson and DENIED with respect to all claims against Defendants Coleman, Morris, and Rock Creek.”
“Defendant District's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claim and as to the negligent investigation claim. The motion is denied as to the respondeat superior claim premised on Ms. Morris's actions and granted as to the claims under the state constitution.”
“For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant Morris's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED.”
“As set out above, the motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants Williams [Doc. No. 119]; OCCJA [Doc. No. 111], and Okongor [Doc. No. 129] are denied.”
“The motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants BOCC [Doc. No. 118], Kallos [Doc. No. 115], Anderson [Doc. No. 113], Turn Key [Doc. No. 122], Cooper [Doc. No. 127], Irvin [Doc. No. 126], and Misty Williams [Doc. No. 128] are granted.”
“The motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Eastman, Hallock, Horn, and Merriott [Doc. No. 124] is denied as moot and these defendants are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2).”
“Last, in accordance with the Stipulation of Dismissal [Doc. No. 142] dismissing the claims against Defendants Carter, Mulanax, Harvey, Anderson-Depee, and Dean without prejudice, the motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 117] filed by these defendants is denied as moot.”
“Accordingly, Defendant Pepper’s Partial Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED—to the extent Plaintiff asserts claims against Pepper in his official capacity, such claims are DISMISSED.”
“Defendant City’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 9] is DENIED.”
“The Petition is therefore GRANTED in part and Respondents are directed to provide Petitioner with a prompt, individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).”
“Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [Doc. No. 12] is GRANTED and State Farm’s Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery [Doc. No. 15] is DENIED.”
“the Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim is subject to dismissal and the School District's motion is GRANTED IN ITS ENTIRETY. If, however, Plaintiffs can amend the Petition to state a substantive due process claim consistent with this Order, Plaintiffs are granted leave to do so within 14 days of the date of this order.”
“Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 19] is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ proposed Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 19-1] is deemed filed instanter;”
“Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 12], treated as directed to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part”
“Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on the individual Plaintiffs claims under their supplemental cancer policy relating to ‘actual charges’ and/or ‘actual expenses’ [Doc. No. 40] is GRANTED”
“Plaintiff Donald Stangl’s cross motion for partial summary judgment on the specific claims related to ‘actual expenses’ [Doc. No. 43] is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 847 days (N = 8).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 24 days (N = 1).
The sample reflects a high-volume general civil and criminal docket, including employment-discrimination and civil-rights suits, diversity personal-injury and insurance matters, commercial and trade-secret disputes, and pro se habeas and § 2255 petitions, many resolved through adopted magistrate recommendations.
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