David Lynn Russell
How Judge Russell decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Applies the plausibility (Twombly/Iqbal) pleading standard strictly to conclusory bad-faith and fraud allegations in insurance disputes -- naming a party's alleged wrongdoing is not enough without allegations connecting the defendant's conduct to a specific standard of care or a detrimental-reliance chain.
“The Court concurs with Defendant that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support her bad faith claim. ... the paragraphs contain mere formulaic recitals of various manners in which an insurer may commit bad faith, without any specific factual allegations arising from this particular relationship.”
On a trade-secrets motion to dismiss, distinguishes plausible allegations of acquisition/use of confidential material (which he lets proceed) from merely 'guilt by association' theories against a lower-level co-defendant (which he dismisses), even in the same case and against the same broad category of claims.
“Liability by association is not enough, nor is 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'”
Procedural preferences
Treats a motion to reconsider as a high bar: he will not revisit a summary-judgment or dismissal ruling absent clear error or manifest injustice, and expects the same standard of review the court already applied to control.
“The Court thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint, her arguments and the relevant law and concluded that the operative pleading failed to state a claim for bad faith. The Court finds no basis for reversing its prior decision.”
Cautions
On Section 1983 municipal-liability claims against school districts, he requires the plaintiff to identify when the district received notice sufficient to trigger a duty to retrain or increase supervision. Without a clear timeline showing that later misconduct occurred after that notice, the plaintiff cannot create a triable issue on summary judgment.
“The Court finds an absence of admissible evidence from which a jury could find that J.N.'s constitutional rights were violated after the District received notice of alleged abuse, premised largely on the murky timeline of events.”
In ADA 'essential functions' disputes, will not accept an employer's own written job description as conclusive where the plaintiff's own deposition testimony and the practical performance of the job conflict with it -- a genuine factual dispute over what the job actually requires defeats summary judgment.
“In this case Defendant relies on a job description and the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician to conclude that Plaintiff cannot perform the essential functions of his job, although Defendant does not attempt to address the elements set forth above.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff's bad faith claim. ... the Court finds these allegations too conclusory to meet Plaintiff's pleading burden. ... Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.”
“In short, the Court finds that it made no error in its Order granting Defendant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, her Motion to Reconsider is hereby DENIED.”
“Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part with respect to all claims against Defendant Johnson and DENIED with respect to all claims against Defendants Coleman, Morris, and Rock Creek.”
“Defendant District's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claim and as to the negligent investigation claim. The motion is denied as to the respondeat superior claim premised on Ms. Morris's actions and granted as to the claims under the state constitution.”
“For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant Morris's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 847 days (N = 8).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 24 days (N = 1).
The sample reflects a high-volume general civil and criminal docket, including employment-discrimination and civil-rights suits, diversity personal-injury and insurance matters, commercial and trade-secret disputes, and pro se habeas and § 2255 petitions, many resolved through adopted magistrate recommendations.
Put Judge Russell's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Russell actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Russell's own signed orders and cites them.