Terence C. Kern
Judge Kern no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Kern decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In the marriage-equality ruling, the judge treated the fact that a law's own legislative history and public advocacy centered on moral disapproval of a group -- rather than any independent, non-moral state interest -- as itself close to dispositive under rational-basis review, rather than accepting after-the-fact secular justifications offered in litigation.
“The Court holds that Oklahoma's constitutional amendment limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”
In an insurance-coverage declaratory-judgment action, the judge will decline to resolve a discrete but case-dispositive coverage question -- even when it is ripe and undisputed as a legal matter -- if resolving it now would pressure the parties on how to plead a still-pending underlying state-court suit; he prefers to let the parties control their own litigation strategy and revisit coverage once the underlying case concludes.
“Patients, and not FAIRCO, should dictate how they will prosecute their State Court Actions ... The Court simply finds that the question of whether Patients actually 'allege' sexual misconduct by Stewart in the State Court Actions is best decided after Patients attempt to prosecute such actions in the limited manner they propose.”
On a Rule 23 class-certification standing challenge, the judge holds a named plaintiff to essentially a summary-judgment-level evidentiary showing rather than accepting the complaint's allegations at face value, once discovery reveals the pleaded facts (that a favored competitor actually paid a lower price) were simply wrong.
“It is undisputed, at this point in the proceedings, that no Favored Distributor was charged or ultimately paid the formula price at either terminal from which Stephenson lifted gasoline during the class period... Stephenson lacks standing to assert this... breach of contract claim.”
Procedural preferences
On removal, the judge requires the removing defendant to actually perform an economic analysis tying the complaint's specific allegations to a dollar figure -- a bare assertion that a statute's maximum penalty exceeds the jurisdictional threshold, without more, does not carry the defendant's burden.
“Defendant has failed to provide any economic analysis that would assist the Court in estimating the potential value of the punitive damages claim.”
Liberally construes EEOC charges filed by employees without counsel: language that only obliquely suggests a theory (e.g., mentioning past accommodation requests and being 'rotated through' positions) is enough to put an investigator on notice, so long as it is not a bare box-check with no supporting narrative at all.
“Construed liberally, the Court finds the 2016 Charge to be sufficient to reasonably prompt an investigation into whether Defendant failed to accommodate a request for an accommodation.”
Cautions
In a pro se plaintiff's civil-rights suit against opposing counsel in a state eviction case, the judge is unreceptive to attempts to use Section 1983 to collaterally attack a state-court judgment through the opposing lawyer, and treats attorney conduct performed purely in a representative capacity as categorically outside 'state action.'
“[I]t is well established that mere recourse to state or local court procedures does not by itself constitute 'joint activity' with the state sufficient to subject a private party to liability under section 1983.”
A grant of summary judgment resting on qualified immunity and a 'no underlying constitutional violation' theory is not the last word: the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded his 2021 grant of summary judgment for a city and its officers in an excessive-force case, and on remand the case proceeded to an agreed judgment for the plaintiff -- a reminder that his qualified-immunity analysis of body-camera video is not immune from appellate second-guessing.
“DECISION from Circuit Court reversing and remanding the Decision of the District Court”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 197) is GRANTED as to Part A of the Oklahoma Constitutional Amendment and otherwise DENIED.”
“Defendant Sally Howe Smith's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 216) is DENIED as to Part A of the Oklahoma Constitutional Amendment, and GRANTED as to Part B based on the Barton couple's lack of standing.”
“It is granted as to Parents' constitutional claim, which was asserted against School District and Alexander in his individual capacity.”
“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 37) is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. It is denied as to Parents' negligence claim, which was asserted only against School District.”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) is DENIED.”
“Patients' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) is DENIED.”
“FAIRCO's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 58) is GRANTED as to the four declaratory judgments set forth above; DENIED as to the excess coverage issue; and STAYED as to application of Exclusion K and/or the SMS to Patients' medical negligence claims.”
“Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. 11) is GRANTED. The Court Clerk is directed to REMAND the case to the District Court for Tulsa County.”
“The petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Dkt.# 1), as amended and supplemented (Dkt.# 8), is denied.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification ("Motion for Certification") (Doc. 152) is DENIED based on Stephenson's lack of standing.”
“Defendant's Motion to Strike Testimony of Plaintiff's Proposed Expert Regarding Injury (Doc. 215) is DENIED.”
“Defendant's Motion to Strike Declaration of Alvin Smith (Doc. 199) is DENIED as premature.”
“The United States' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) is GRANTED... This matter is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. 8) is DENIED.”
“Plaintiff ConocoPhillips Company's Motion and Brief in Support of Request for Permanent Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Doc. 93) and Intervenors ... Motion and Brief in Support of Request for Permanent Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (Doc. 94) are hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.”
“Defendants' Objections to Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss Temporary Restraining Order (Docs. 91 and 92) are hereby DENIED.”
“Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on all remaining claims (Doc. 95). For reasons explained below, the motion is granted.”
“TU's Motion for Contempt (Doc. 311) is GRANTED. TU shall file a motion for attorneys' fees and costs with supporting time records no later than two weeks from the date of this Order.”
“Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 22) of Defendants ... For reasons set forth below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.”
“Defendants' Motion in Limine (Doc. 31) is DENIED AS MOOT.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
His sampled docket spans general civil litigation (insurance coverage, consumer and employment disputes, personal injury and products liability), Section 1983 civil-rights suits, Social Security appeals, and Section 2254/2241 state-prisoner habeas petitions, drawn primarily from the Tulsa division. He was assigned an unusually broad range of case types over his three decades on the bench, including a multidistrict-style state-court removal in the national opioid litigation (City of Broken Arrow v. Purdue Pharma) and a long-running excessive-force suit against the City of Tulsa that went up to the Tenth Circuit and back. He announced his retirement to inactive senior status in mid-2023, effective by the end of that year, and received no new case assignments in this dataset after January 2024.
A historical record
Judge Kern no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.