Claire V. Eagan
How Judge Eagan rules, drawn from 18 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Eagan
Claire Eagan is a judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. Appointed by President George W. Bush, Judge Eagan received a commission on October 24, 2001. Judge Eagan assumed senior status on October 1, 2022.
Judge Eagan's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Eagan, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Trial
Mark trial exhibits before the court session; courtroom time may not be used for that task.
“Court time may not be used for marking exhibits. This must be done in advance of the court session.”
Trial
Stand when addressing the court or questioning witnesses, except where the trial rules provide an exception.
“Please stand whenever you address the Court or interrogate witnesses.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge Eagan decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In an ERISA disability-benefits dispute, the judge found it decisive that the insurer's own employer-client had an internal policy barring pharmacists from working while on any narcotics, and treated that industry reality as effectively dispositive even though the insurer argued no bright-line Oklahoma rule existed: common sense and the employer's own stated safety policy outweighed a technical argument that the claimant could theoretically work as a pharmacist somewhere else in the national economy.
“Although Oklahoma does not have a bright line rule against working as a pharmacist while on narcotics, it has a reasonableness test that specifically mentions the use of narcotics... common sense dictates that a pharmacist working with any narcotics in her system is not practicing with reasonable skill or safety.”
In the cattle ranch tax dispute, Eagan considered the taxpayer’s substantial work and investment among the evidence from which a jury could find a profit motive.
“he has expended very substantial amounts of time, energy, and money in turning what was essentially empty land into a two hundred and sixty acre ranch with one hundred and twenty cows and multiple facilities”
In a products-liability air-crash suit, the judge held that testing which merely showed a component exceeded a manufacturer's specification was not, standing alone, evidence of a design defect or causation: the plaintiffs needed to connect the deviation to how the accident actually happened, not simply flag a number out of range.
“the mere fact that the pull force in plaintiffs' experts' test results exceeded 64 pounds does not by itself show that the aircraft was defective or that excessive pull-force caused the landing gear not to deploy.”
Procedural preferences
In a removal dispute, Eagan applied the text of § 1441(b) despite arguments based on an inferred purpose of the forum defendant rule.
“The Court cannot contradict the plain language § 1441(b) on the basis of congressional intentions that have been inferred by courts but never actually expressed by the law’s drafters.”
In Ipock, Eagan held that Oklahoma’s presuit expert-affidavit requirement was displaced by the federal pleading rules in a diversity negligence suit. She reasoned that the requirement changed when supporting allegations had to be supplied without changing the claim’s elements or remedies.
“Section 19.1 does not alter the scope of a negligence claim, nor does it change the remedies available to a plaintiff with a negligence claim... the effect of Section 19.1 is to require certain plaintiffs to present a more detailed set of allegations supported by expert testimony earlier in a case than they would have absent Section 19.1.”
Cautions
On remand from the defendants' direct criminal appeal in United States v. Makkar, Eagan held that the Tenth Circuit's finding of no evidence of the required knowledge barred retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Although the appellate court had not decided double jeopardy expressly, she entered judgments of acquittal based on its evidentiary finding.
“This Court is bound by the Tenth Circuit's finding that there was no evidence presented that would establish that defendants knew the chemical structure of the substance they sold... The Court will enter of a judgment of acquittal.”
In Mills v. CSAA General Insurance Co., Eagan granted judgment on the pleadings because the homeowner policy's unambiguous liability provisions covered third-party claims against the insured, not the insured's own injury. She rejected the plaintiff's subjective expectation of broader coverage.
“No reasonable person could have understood that the policy provided coverage for his own injuries, and plaintiff’s claim for his own bodily injury is not covered under the subject insurance policy.”
On remand in a habeas case, the court treated alleged serious mistakes by counsel as insufficient to excuse the petitioner’s failure to develop a conflict-of-interest claim in state court, because he had an opportunity to seek state relief and had not shown complete abandonment.
“he bears the risk of attorney error in failing to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Motion of First Trinity Financial Corporation and Gregg Zahn for Summary Judgment Against State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (Dkt. #30) and Pettigrew's joinder therein (Dkt. #34)... are denied”
“Pettigrew's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #52) is denied”
“the Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief of Plaintiff State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (Dkt. # 35) is granted”
“Defendant Dresser-Rand Company's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support (Dkt. # 26) is granted.”
“plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Supporting Brief (Dkt. # 19) is denied.”
“Defendants' Motion for Determination of Law (Dkt. # 89) is denied.”
“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum (Dkt. # 94) is granted. A separate judgment is entered herewith.”
“Defendant Sehgal's Motion to Dismiss with Brief (Dkt. #213) and Defendant Makkar's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment with Prejudice in Accordance with the Double Jeopardy Clause (Dkt. #214) are granted. A judgment of acquittal shall be entered.”
“plaintiffs' motion to strike evidence (Dkt. # 36) is denied”
“defendant's motion to exclude the report and testimony of A.L. Hutson (Dkt. # 45) is granted in part and denied in part”
“defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. # 29) is denied”
“The motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 86) is denied.”
“Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 72) is granted in part and denied in part; it is granted to the extent that it seeks a determination that Oklahoma law governs all aspects of the guaranties and is denied in all other respects.”
“Plaintiff Empire Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 76) is granted in part and denied in part; it is granted to the extent that it seeks a determination that any deficiency owed is calculated by subtracting the proceeds of the foreclosure sales from the balance owed under the guaranties and is denied in all other respects.”
“defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. # 34) is hereby granted. A separate judgment is entered herewith.”
“defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. # 86) is granted and plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. # 87) is denied.”
“plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. # 87) is denied”
“defendant's decision to terminate plaintiff's LTD benefits is reversed and remanded. A separate judgment is entered herewith.”
“defendant's motion to dismiss (Dkt. #10) is denied.”
“defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stay these proceedings (Dkt. # 8) is granted in part and denied in part: it is granted as to plaintiff's negligence claim and denied as to plaintiff's wrongful death claim.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
- Her docket spans general civil litigation (insurance coverage and bad-faith disputes, employment discrimination, FLSA wage claims, contract and commercial disputes), Social Security appeals, prisoner and immigration habeas corpus petitions, Section 1983 civil-rights suits, and ERISA benefits litigation, drawn primarily from the Tulsa division.
- As a senior judge since October 2022 she continues to receive new civil-case assignments, including as recently as mid-2026.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 1 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 2 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 1 | 2 |
| Sep 2025 | 1 | 2 |
| Mar 2025 | 1 | 4 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 1 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 1 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2022 | 1 | 1 |
| Mar 2022 | 10 | 2 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 1 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2020 | 3 | 1 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, not for Judge Eagan: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 525 | 7 months |
| Closed with no court action | 112 | 5.5 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 401 | 7.3 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 9 | not reported |
| Closed during trial | 3 | not reported |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 525 | 7 months |
| Sep 2024 | 491 | 7.5 months |
| Sep 2023 | 487 | 9.4 months |
| Sep 2022 | 526 | 13.4 months |
| Sep 2021 | 481 | 11.3 months |
| Sep 2020 | 563 | 10.8 months |
| Sep 2019 | 544 | 9.8 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
Draft for Judge Eagan with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Eagan, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
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