Ralph Emerson Campbell
Judge Campbell no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Campbell decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He relied on the practical incompatibility between a proposed public street and necessary railroad switching operations.
“No question is made, nor can be made, that this ladder track and the switch stands are necessary adjuncts to the railroad facilities for the handling of its business. The railroad company had a perfect right to place them where they are novr, the matter of determining their location within the limits of the right of way is within the province of the proper officers of the company, in the exercise of their judgment as to where they will best serve the interest of the company in handling the business of its patrons, and presumably they were so located in the exercise of such judgment. _ _ In view of the foregoing facts developed at the hearing in this case, I am clearly of the opinion that the public use, to which the portion of the railway company’s property involved in this case is sought to be devoted by the city of Tulsa, is inconsistent with the public use for which it was acquired by the railway company and to which it is now devoted. The temporary injunction prayed will therefore be granted, with injunction bond fixed in the sum of $5,000.”
He treated the absence of fraud and established recognition of conditional-sale contracts as decisive in bankruptcy.
“There is no charge of fraud in connection with the contract involved here. The validity of such contracts, in the absence of fraud, is well established. Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663, 7 Sup. Ct. 51, 30 L. Ed. 285; Bierce v. Hutchins, 205 U. S. 347, 27 Sup. Ct. 524, 51 L. Ed. 828; Bryant v. Swofford Bros., supra. It follows that the order of the referee, disallowing the petition, must be overruled, and an order will be entered, directing the trustee to pay to petitioner the sum of £1,857, now held by him in lieu of tlie goods sought to be recovered.”
Cautions
He would not infer authority for a guardian's timber sale merely from a judge's approval when the required petition and court order were absent.
“The guardian had no authority to sell the standing timber or any other portion of the realty of his minor wards, except upon order of court, based upon a petition, and showing, which the statute requires. The mere approval by the judge adds no validity to the instruments.”
He construed penal grand-jury requirements strictly in favor of the accused when the issue was raised before judgment and sentence.
“all penal statutes must be construed strictly. * * * No person is to be made subject to them by implication, and all doubts concerning their interpretation are to preponderate in favor of the accused. '* * * All indictments must be found and presented by a lawful grand jury.” The defendant now raises the objection to the grand jury by motion in arrest of judgment. This is a matter of law arising on the record, and is therefore properly raised on such motion. United States v. McKnight (D. C.) 112 Fed. 982. After careful consideration it is my opinion that the indictment of the defendant by a grand jury of 21 men instead of 16, the number constituting the grand jury when the offense charged is- alleged to have been committed, was more than a mere irregularity which he waived by entering his plea and going to trial. Had the objection not been raised until after judgment and sentence, the result might have been different. That I do not now decide. But having raised it on motion in arrest of judgment, I conclude that the objection is well taken, and the motion will be sustained.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The order will therefore be annulled and set aside. It is so ordered.”
“It follows that decree must enter against the plaintiff and in favor of the several defendants found to have an interest in the property. If counsel can agree upon form of decree, the same may be prepared and presented for signing and entry. If counsel do not so agree before Monday, July 10th next, the court will on that date, at 10 o’clock a. m., at Muskogee, hear counsel and determine the form of decree to be entered herein.”
“It follows that the order of the referee, disallowing the petition, must be overruled, and an order will be entered, directing the trustee to pay to petitioner the sum of £1,857, now held by him in lieu of tlie goods sought to be recovered.”
“Upon consideration of the pleadings and proof offered at the hearing, I conclude that the temporary injunction should be granted.’ Order may enter accordingly, to become effective upon the execution by the plaintiff to the defendants of a good and sufficient bond appropriately conditioned, to be approved by the clerk, in the sum of $10,000.”
“The act of April 21, 1904, therefore, removed the restrictions from the land involved in this case, and judgment must be rendered for the defendants.”
“Other assignments of error are urged; but this opinion will not be prolonged by their consideration, as the case must be reversed for the errors already considered. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is ordered placed upon the trial docket of this court for new trial.”
“These conditions existed in favor of Allan J. Wilson, when said allottee died, and the defendants are therefore entitled un-, der their conveyances from him to the possession of the land in controversy during his lifetime. Judgment will therefore be entered for defendants”
“After careful consideration it is my opinion that the indictment of the defendant by a grand jury of 21 men instead of 16, the number constituting the grand jury when the offense charged is- alleged to have been committed, was more than a mere irregularity which he waived by entering his plea and going to trial. Had the objection not been raised until after judgment and sentence, the result might have been different. That I do not now decide. But having raised it on motion in arrest of judgment, I conclude that the objection is well taken, and the motion will be sustained.”
“It follows that the conveyances from the heirs of Stephen David, under which the plaintiffs claim, were valid so far as concerns the right of such heirs to alienate the lands in controversy free from restrictions. Decree may therefore enter for the plaintiffs.”
“So I conclude that, when the Legislature authorized the guardian to lease the ward’s property for oil and gas purposes with the! *502approval of the county court, without specifically limiting the time for which such lease might be made to the period of minority, it intended to leave'the matter to the judgment of the court in the light of what might appear to be for the best interest of the minor’s estate, and that where such interest, in the judgment of the court, would be best subserved by a lease for a term extending beyond minority, a lease for such a term made by the guardian and approved by the court is valid. And of course, when the county court, by approving such a lease, has manifested his finding that such lease is for the best interests of the estate of the minor, that finding is impervious to collateral attack. The demurrer in this case will be sustained.”
“As it appears that the defendant Earsen was such officer and the defendant Hubbard such deputy, and that the acts committed were in the exercise of their respective duties as such officer and deputy, after having reason to suspect that there were upon said premises intoxicating liquors which had been unlawfully introduced into this district, it follows that they were acting within their official authority and the temporary injunction will, therefore, be denied. Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204, 24 L. Ed. 471. It is so ordered.”
“I conclude that the automobile is subject to forfeiture, notwithstanding any special interest King may have in it by virtue of his mortgage. By the terms of his mortgage he intrusted the possession of.the automobile to his mortgagor, Tatta. Had he been the owner, and so intrusted it to Tatta’s possession and control, whereby he might devote it to unlawful traffic, he could not, when Tatta had done so, *967assert bis ownership as a defense to such forfeiture proceeding. Neither does the special interest or lien he claims by virtue of his mortgage place him in any more favorable position. The demurrer will be sustained.”
A historical record
Judge Campbell no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.