Franklin Elmore Kennamer
Judge Kennamer no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Kennamer decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He gave priority to a surety that completed the contractor's obligations and paid protected claims.
“The surety company completed the performance by paying claims remaining unpaid, and therefore is entitled to the rights the construction company had against the city. The doctrine of subrogation is an equitable one; it arises the moment the surety’s risk arises, which generally is the time the suretyship relation springs up. It was recently held by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit, in the case of London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America v. Endres, 290 F. 98, that where a contractor for government work became bankrupt, and it did not appear that other creditors were of the class protected by his bond as contractor, the surety on such bond, which was required to pay claims for labor and material furnished, was entitled by subrogation to an equitable lien on a fund paid by the government as compensation for extra expense incurred beyond the contract price, in completing the work. The doctrine of subrogation is one of long standing; a collection of the authorities sustaining such a doctrine is inapropos. Such a doctrine of subrogation is announce^ in the ease of Henningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra. For the reasons and upon the grounds set forth, I am of the opinion that the surety company is entitled to the 10 per cent, of the total estimate retained by the city of Bristow under its contract with the construction company, and, since the city has paid this sum to the defendant the American National Bank, the plaintiff, surety company, may reach the funds in the hands of the bank, because, as between the surety company and the bank, the surety company has a prior right to the funds. It is so ordered.”
He found federal control of restricted Indian land displaced contrary state inheritance-tax rules.
“Restricted Indian lands do not become subject to the operation of the laws of the state until all restrictions from the right of the allottee to alienate have been removed and relinquished by the Congress. Sperry Oil & Gas Co. v. Chisholm, supra; In re Pigeon’s Estate, 81 Okl. 180, 198 Pac. 309. The plaintiffs in this action being restricted Quapaw Indians, and the estate inherited by them from See-Sah Qua-paw being held in trust for them by the government, is not subject to the inheritance tax law of the state of Oklahoma, and the injunction as prayed for by the plaintiffs is granted.”
Cautions
He required a claimant to trace trust money into the receiver's hands rather than rely only on the wrongful character of its earlier dissipation.
“no matter how wrongful the misappropriation may have been, it is not apparent that any trust fund came ino the hands of the bank through the transactions.” That is the case here. The proceeds of the draft on Buffalo, N. Y., had been dissipated on February 20th by paying debts which the State National Bank owed to the Commerce Trust Company and to the First National Bank of Fort Worth, and when the receiver took charge of the bank on February 25th none of the trust funds came into his possession. In view of the conclusion herein reached, judgment is entered in favor of the defendant.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Since it is held that there was want of jurisdiction in the county commissioners in the creation of the said district, because of the failure of the petition to conform to the requirements of the statute, the estoppel argument is of little importance. It is the desire of federal courts to follow the state courts in construing state statutes whenever possible. Por this reason, and for the reason that the construction placed upon the statute in question by the Oklahoma courts meets with the construction I should place upon the statute, to wit, that the filing of the petition in conformity with the requirements of the statute is essential to the acquiring of jurisdiction, I am of the opinion, therefore, that judgment should be entered for the defendants; and it is accordingly so ordered.”
“That is the case here. The proceeds of the draft on Buffalo, N. Y., had been dissipated on February 20th by paying debts which the State National Bank owed to the Commerce Trust Company and to the First National Bank of Fort Worth, and when the receiver took charge of the bank on February 25th none of the trust funds came into his possession. In view of the conclusion herein reached, judgment is entered in favor of the defendant.”
“Therefore the court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the two policies of insurance, and in granting to the plaintiff the relief for which she prays, it will be upon the condition that she return to the trustee in bankruptcy of the Curtis Brown Company the amount of the premiums paid by the company, together with 6 per cent, interest, and that the cost of this action be taxed equally to the plaintiff and to the trustee in bankruptcy of the Curtis Brown Company. It is ordered that the decree be entered accordingly.”
“The plaintiffs in this action being restricted Quapaw Indians, and the estate inherited by them from See-Sah Qua-paw being held in trust for them by the government, is not subject to the inheritance tax law of the state of Oklahoma, and the injunction as prayed for by the plaintiffs is granted.”
“For the reasons and upon the grounds set forth, I am of the opinion that the surety company is entitled to the 10 per cent, of the total estimate retained by the city of Bristow under its contract with the construction company, and, since the city has paid this sum to the defendant the American National Bank, the plaintiff, surety company, may reach the funds in the hands of the bank, because, as between the surety company and the bank, the surety company has a prior right to the funds. It is so ordered.”
“The plaintiff should prevail in this case, and judgment should be rendered for . the amount of the award made by the Interstate Commerce Commission, with interest and costs, which should include a reasonable attorney’s fee, but the actual taxing of the costs should not be made until the judgment becomes final. This is suggested by plaintiff’s brief, and he states there is a case of the Circuit Court of Appeals of this circuit so holding, but which he has been unable to locate. The case he had in mind is probably that of Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. C. E. Ferguson Sawmill Co., 235 F. 474, loc. cit. 483, 149 C. C. A. 20, 29. Paragraph 7 of the syllabus is as follows: ‘The reasonable attorney’s fee authorized to be allowed in favor of the plaintiff in an action to enforce an award of damages made by the Interstate Commerce Commission, to be taxed as a part of the eosts “if the petitioner shall finally prevail,” should not be taxed, when error proceedings are taken, until they are determined.’ Let decree be entered for plaintiff.”
“This rule having been established, the motion to dismiss bill is sustained for the reason the hill of complaint fails to state a cause of action.”
A historical record
Judge Kennamer no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.