Timothy S. Driscoll
How Judge Driscoll rules, drawn from 28 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Driscoll
Timothy S. Driscoll has served as a New York Supreme Court justice in Nassau County since 2008 and has been assigned to its Commercial Division since 2009. He became presiding justice of the Appellate Term for the Ninth and Tenth Judicial Districts in 2025. He graduated from Hofstra University and Harvard Law School and previously served as a federal prosecutor in the Eastern District of New York.
Judge Driscoll's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Driscoll's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
How Judge Driscoll decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Chananya v. Spolan, Judge Driscoll enforced the parties' July 2018 stipulation after finding that the open-court transcript showed their intent to settle the matter fully.
“The record is abundantly clear that the July 2018 Stipulation is a binding and enforceable settlement agreement. Indeed, a plain reading of the transcript reveals that the parties were unequivocal in their intention that the July 2018 Stipulation placed on the record by Mr. Cardello was a full and complete settlement of this matter.”
In Matter of RF Development & Construction Corp. v. 61 Jericho Holdings, LLC, Judge Driscoll left a disputed release defense for the arbitrator to decide under the parties' arbitration agreement.
“Petitioners' claim that Respondent released Petitioners from any claims under the Agreement, which Respondent disputes, does not alter the Court's analysis as it is for the arbitrator to make the determination regarding that issue, as well as all other issues relevant to the arbitration.”
In BP Air Conditioning Corp. v. Lasorsa, he held that affiliates who sought to benefit from a compensation plan's restrictive covenants were bound by its arbitration clause, even though they had not signed the plan.
“The Court holds that Petitioners BPAC, BP Mechanical, Losey and Barbera, by virtue of their efforts to benefit from the restrictive covenants in the 1999 Plan, which survived the 2005 Amendment, are bound by the arbitration agreement in the 1999 Plan, notwithstanding the fact that they are not signatories to that agreement.”
In BACM 2005-6 Carle Place Office LLC v. HLP Old Country TIC LLC, he appointed a receiver under the mortgage's receivership provision after finding the requested relief appropriate and considering a related receivership decision.
“Plaintiff has demonstrated its entitlement to the requested relief, pursuant to the applicable provision in the Mortgage and, the Court, in its discretion, determines that the requested relief is appropriate. ... The Court has also considered Justice Kornreich's decision in the Motor Parkway case, and her conclusion that a receivership was appropriate in that matter which involved a principal who is also involved in the matter sub judice.”
Procedural preferences
In U.S. Bank N.A. v. Rosen, he denied the bank's summary-judgment motion and granted the homeowners' cross-motion because the bank failed to show that its law firm had authority to commence the foreclosure action when it was filed.
“Plaintiff failed to comply with the express directive of the Court and has failed to establish that SPS had the authority to act on its behalf at the time it allegedly authorized LOGS to commence a foreclosure action. ... Accordingly, since Plaintiff has failed to establish that LOGS had authority to commence this action, the Rosens are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.”
In Nick v. Schneider, he denied renewal because the plaintiffs had already offered their purportedly new evidence on the prior motion and it would not change his decision. He also denied reargument because they identified no overlooked fact or law.
“The Court concludes that the purportedly new evidence on which Plaintiffs rely in support of the instant motion to renew was presented in opposition to the Prior Motion. Moreover, a consideration of that evidence would not change the Prior Decision and, accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion to renew.”
In Levine v. Cohen, he struck defense counsel's opposition affirmation because it extensively argued case law, which belonged in a brief rather than a factual affirmation.
“the Court strikes Defendant's counsel's affirmation in opposition based on its extensive discussion of case law. See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 202.8(c) (‘[a]ffidavits shall be for a statement of the relevant facts, and briefs shall be for a statement of the relevant law’); see also Commercial Division Rule 17 (setting word limitation for briefs, memoranda of law, affidavits, and affirmations).”
In Martinez v. Jerome Medical, PLLC, he denied reargument because the plaintiff advanced a legal theory she had not raised in her underlying amendment motion.
“Plaintiff's motion to reargue is denied. Plaintiff's motion is a conspicuous attempt to advance a new legal theory. Indeed, Plaintiff did not so much as cite Wieder v. Skala, a 1992 Court of Appeals decision, in her underlying Motion to Amend.”
Cautions
In Pandolfi Organization, Inc. v. Capital Stack Fund II LLC, he denied a preliminary injunction after a corporate resolution signed by the movant undercut his account of who owned the shares and weakened his showing of likely success.
“The February 5, 2009 Corporate Resolution, however, supports the conclusion that Robert in fact owned 100% of the Stock in the Corporation, and significantly weakens Robert's claim that he signed the Loan documents without knowledge of their content.”
In Rakhnyansky v. Gotlibovsky, he rejected the defendant's business-judgment justification for tax prepayments after the defendant acknowledged making the decision unilaterally and moving funds to an account the plaintiff could not access.
“Even assuming arguendo the accuracy of Defendant's contentions regarding the financial benefits of pre-paying the taxes, Defendant concedes that he made that decision unilaterally and opened a Corporate account to which Plaintiff had no access when Plaintiff disputed the appropriateness of that decision. To countenance that conduct would potentially create a 'slippery slope'”
In City of Philadelphia Board of Pensions & Retirement v Winters, Driscoll dismissed a shareholder derivative suit for lack of standing. He applied English substantive law to the English companies and held that shared directorships and employment ties did not establish the majority voting control needed for the plaintiff’s double derivative claim.
“The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants maintain control over a majority of SCH's stock with voting rights.”
In Ippolito v. TJC Development, LLC, he distinguished defendants who had performed extensive work from a contractor in Hollowell who had disappeared without doing the contracted work, and considered the parties' earlier arbitration award.
“The defendant in Hollowell never performed any of the work contracted for and essentially disappeared with the complainant's money. Defendants in the matter sub judice on the other hand, performed extensive work. Moreover, they disputed the claim which was addressed at the arbitration and resulted in an award to Plaintiffs, albeit for less than they demanded.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“This matter is before the Court on defendants Pauline Spolan (‘Pauline’), Mindy Spolan (‘Mindy’), MJB Holding Corporation, Audley Street Realty LLC, and Baron Spolan Realty LLC's ... motion to compel enforcement of the settlement agreement placed on the record on July 31, 2018. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted.”
“ORDERED, that Plaintiff Nala Management Corp. have judgment against Defendant Worldwide Fibers LLC in the principal amount of $200,000, plus interest and costs to be determined at an inquest”
“The Court concludes that the purportedly new evidence on which Plaintiffs rely in support of the instant motion to renew was presented in opposition to the Prior Motion. Moreover, a consideration of that evidence would not change the Prior Decision and, accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion to renew.”
“The Court also denies the motion to reargue. Plaintiffs have not established that the Court overlooked or misapprehended matters of fact or law in determining the Prior Motion.”
“the Court grants Plaintiffs' application to preclude Defendants from producing testimony, documents, or other evidence relating to communications between Plaintiffs and Defendants, but denies Plaintiffs' application to draw an adverse inference against Defendants with respect to that testimony/documents other evidence”
“the Court dismisses the second, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action in the Complaint, and holds that, with respect to the first cause of action alleging breach of the Agreement, Plaintiff's claim for damages is limited, pursuant to the Agreement's limitation of liability clause, to what AA was actually paid under the Agreement, and otherwise denies the motion”
“The Court grants the motion by Defendant Kalb and dismisses the Complaint as asserted against him. Plaintiff has not asserted a viable basis for holding Kalb personally liable for the conduct in the Complaint”
“The Court grants Plaintiff's application. Plaintiff has demonstrated its entitlement to the requested relief, pursuant to the applicable provision in the Mortgage and the Court, in its discretion, determines that the requested relief is appropriate.”
“The Court denies the motion of T&G, and directs T&G to comply with the Subpoena on or before February 2, 2011.”
“ORDERED, that Plaintiff have judgment by default against Corporate Defendants CI Lumen Industries, LLC and CI Displays, LLC for the relief demanded in the Complaint”
“The Court grants Defendants' motion and amended motion and directs Defendants to submit a new judgment on ten (10) days notice against all Defendants other than Picklyk and Stewart.”
“The Court denies Plaintiffs' Order to Show Cause in its entirety based on the Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. ... The Court therefore denies Plaintiffs' Order to Show Cause in its entirety, and vacates the TRO.”
“the Court denies the Order to Show Cause in its entirety and directs the parties to proceed to arbitration regarding the issues raised in the arbitration demand filed by Respondent. The Court further directs that this action is stayed, pending the completion of arbitration”
“the Court ... compels Respondent Shelley Rossoff Olsen (‘Olsen’) to arbitrate all claims and disputes arising under or concerning the parties' Retainer Agreement, including but not limited to, the disputes and/or controversies set forth in the Demand for Arbitration and Notice of Intent to Arbitrate”
“the Court grants Petitioner's application for injunctive relief to the extent that the Court 1) directs that the TRO shall remain in effect, and directs Petitioner to post a bond in the sum of $10,000 ... 2) compels Respondent to arbitrate ... The Court denies Petitioner's application for an Order enjoining Respondent from litigating any arbitrable claims or disputes”
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