Sharon M.J. Gianelli
How Judge Gianelli decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In COVID-19 business-interruption insurance disputes, she follows the consistent line of New York federal and state authority holding that 'direct physical loss of or damage to' property requires real, tangible property damage, not merely the risk or presence of a virus, and will dismiss on the pleadings without engaging further with a virus-exclusion endorsement once that threshold requirement is unmet.
“In this matter, there is no new or different evidence or argument made that would cause this Court to deviate from the clearly established binding precedent that presently exists in numerous identical cases. Accordingly, without any allegation of real, tangible damage to or loss of property, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
On a pre-answer motion to dismiss resting on documentary evidence, she requires the evidence to affirmatively address the specific factual questions raised by the complaint, not merely gesture at an unrelated ownership record, and will deny dismissal where the movant submits no supporting affidavit from anyone with personal knowledge.
“Furthermore, Defendant County of Nassau has not submitted a single affidavit of any individual with personal knowledge in support of its motion for an Order dismissing Plaintiff's Summons and Verified Complaint”
Procedural preferences
She will deny a default-judgment motion, even against a defendant who was arguably served and slow to respond, where the defendant answers during the pendency of the motion and the record shows active, ongoing participation (e.g., stipulated briefing extensions) that negates any prejudice to the moving party.
“not only has Defendant WESCO answered during the pendency of the motion, Plaintiff has entered into two (2) separate stipulations to extend the briefing schedules of the underlying pending motions, demonstrating that Defendant WESCO has been actively participating in this action and that Plaintiff will suffer no prejudice.”
In a long-running discovery-noncompliance dispute, she will escalate to striking a pleading and precluding evidence under CPLR 3126 only after documenting a sustained pattern of willful, dilatory, and obstructionist conduct across multiple prior orders and warnings, and will not accept a thin personal excuse (e.g., a scheduling conflict) as a reasonable excuse for a resulting default once that pattern is established.
“Defendant George Menexas offers babysitting delays as his excuse for failing to appear in Court as directed -- this following a history of non-compliance and dilatory and evasive conduct on his part throughout the discovery phase of this litigation. The excuse is insufficient to establish it as a reasonable excuse for his default.”
On a motion to renew and reargue premised on a criminal investigation's declination to prosecute, she distinguishes the civil and criminal burdens of proof and will not treat a declination to prosecute as clearing civil culpability or as a basis to reverse a civil injunction that rested on ample non-criminal evidence.
“the burden of proof in a criminal matter is significantly higher than that in a civil matter and the decision to decline to criminally prosecute Defendant Hester is not tantamount to clearance of civil culpability, nor a bar to civil prosecution.”
Cautions
In partnership/LLC-expulsion disputes governed by a no-cause expulsion clause, she (and the Appellate Division affirming her) will enforce the clause as written and will not find bad faith absent a showing of undue penalty or unjust forfeiture, even where the expelled partner alleges the expulsion followed his opposition to a proposed private-equity transaction.
“Lane failed to demonstrate the existence of bad faith, as he failed to establish that there was any undue penalty or unjust forfeiture that resulted from his expulsion”
On oral promises to convey real property or make a testamentary gift, her orders denying dismissal have been reversed on appeal where the claim runs into the statute of frauds and EPTL 13-2.1's writing requirement without sufficiently 'unequivocally referable' part performance -- a reminder that this is an area where her rulings have not uniformly held up on appeal.
“the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint is granted ... [claims] barred by the statute of frauds ... and ... EPTL 13-2.1(a)(2)”
In premises-liability motions involving an out-of-possession landlord's snow/ice removal obligations, at least one denial of summary judgment for the defendant was reversed on appeal where the lease squarely placed the removal duty on the plaintiff-tenant himself and no statute or course of conduct shifted that duty to the landlord.
“the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendant County of Nassau has failed to meet its burden of establishing a prima facie case of entitlement to summary judgment. Further, Defendant has failed to submit any evidence whatsoever regarding the paving work being performed at the subject area in question.”
“the Court uses its discretion and finds that the sought relief is appropriate in the instant action based on the facts and arguments presented. Accordingly ... Plaintiff TAILORED FUND CAP LLC d/b/a BUSINESS FUNDING SOURCE's application for a Preliminary Injunction pursuant to CPLR 6301 restraining the funds ... by up to the sum of $98,710.75 pending the resolution of the action, is Granted”
“The Court has considered the parties' contentions and concludes that the movant fails to eliminate all triable issues of facts with respect to the conflicting claims and allegations which have been advanced. Accordingly, It is ORDERED, that Defendant Jeffrey H. Fox, D.D.S's motion for an Order of the Court granting movant summary judgment ... is Denied.”
“Petitioner's application is unopposed, was brought within the requisite one year period, and there is no evidence of the award having been vacated or modified. As such, this Court hereby confirms the arbitrator's award. Accordingly ... ORDERED, that Petitioner's request to confirm the February 11, 2021 arbitration award in the amount of $37,020.09, is Granted”
“In this matter, not only has Defendant WESCO answered during the pendency of the motion, Plaintiff has entered into two (2) separate stipulations to extend the briefing schedules of the underlying pending motions, demonstrating that Defendant WESCO has been actively participating in this action and that Plaintiff will suffer no prejudice. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for a judgment on default, against WESCO is denied.”
“In this matter, there is no new or different evidence or argument made that would cause this Court to deviate from the clearly established binding precedent that presently exists in numerous identical cases. Accordingly, without any allegation of real, tangible damage to or loss of property, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
“ORDERED, that Defendant WESCO INSURANCE COMPANY's motion for an Order dismissing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, is Granted.”
“The order granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and denied the motion of the defendants ... inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them ... ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs. ... Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court's decision to grant the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was not an improvident exercise of discretion.”
“the MCRM defendants failed to demonstrate that the prior action remained pending at the time the plaintiff commenced the instant action, and therefore the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the MCRM defendants' motion which was to dismiss the complaint ... on this ground. ... the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the MCRM defendants' motion which sought dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), since the MCRM defendants failed to meet their burden”
“Notwithstanding the numerous warnings and Orders, Defendant George Menexas has repeatedly refused to comply with Plaintiffs' lawful discovery demands, as well as the Court's Decisions and Orders ... ORDERED, that Plaintiffs' motion (Mot. Seq. No. 019) for an Order of the Court striking Defendant George Menexas' Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3126, is Granted”
“ORDERED, that Plaintiffs' motion (Mot. Seq. No. 019) for an Order of the Court prohibiting Defendant George Menexas from introducing evidence at trial related to the claims in this action, is Granted”
“ORDERED, that awarding Plaintiffs' motion (Mot. Seq. No. 019) for an Order of the Court awarding Plaintiffs costs and attorneys' fees associated with the motion, is Granted”
“In his Affidavit in Support of the motion to vacate ... Defendant George Menexas offers babysitting delays as his excuse for failing to appear in Court as directed ... The excuse is insufficient to establish it as a reasonable excuse for his default. ... Defendant George Menexas has failed to demonstrate that vacatur of the default is warranted.”
“ORDERED, that Defendant George Menexas' motion by way of Order to Show Cause (Mot. Seq. No. 020) for an Order of the Court granting Defendant George Menexas leave to file opposition to Plaintiffs' Mot. Seq. 019; vacating the judgment entered against Defendant George Menexas on November 5, 2024 ... is Denied in its entirety.”
“the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Sharon M.J. Gianelli, J.), entered September 23, 2019. The order granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint ... the complaint failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for private nuisance”
“The order granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the complaint and denied, as academic, the defendant's cross-motion for leave to amend his answer. ... The Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the complaint because they demonstrated, prima facie, that the contract fails for lack of consideration”
“the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's cross-motion for leave to amend his answer ... the outcome of the proposed counterclaims, including those alleging unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, would have had no effect on the present controversy, and therefore, the court properly determined that the defendant's cross-motion was academic.”
“the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Sharon M.J. Gianelli, J.), dated June 26, 2020. The order denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint. ... the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint.”
“the defendant Stephen Slavin appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Sharon M.J. Gianelli, J.), dated April 12, 2021. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint ... Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from ... the defendant failed to establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law”
“the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Sharon M.J. Gianelli, J.), dated December 14, 2023. The order denied the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint. ... ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint is granted.”
Put Judge Gianelli's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Gianelli actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Gianelli's own signed orders and cites them.