Robert R. Reed
How Judge Reed decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He gives real weight to a statute's plain 'notwithstanding' language over an agency's own contrary regulation, holding that where an administrative rule inserts an exception the legislature itself never enacted, the regulation is entitled to no deference and the plain text controls.
“The very fact that HPD found it necessary to insert that exception into the legislature's language merely emphasizes the fact that no such exception was enacted by the legislature.”
In privilege disputes he does not take a blanket claim of privilege at face value -- he will conduct an in-camera review and separate genuinely privileged legal advice from administrative details like retention letters and invoices, ordering only the latter disclosed.
“plaintiff's motion to compel is granted, only to the extent that defendants must disclose DLA retention and engagement letters and DLA invoices. The motion is otherwise denied.”
On contract-formation disputes over term sheets and letters of intent, he holds parties to their own express disclaimers of binding effect, and will not let a due-diligence obligation alone supply the mutuality needed to make a standalone exclusivity clause independently enforceable.
“Where, as here, a term sheet is expressly conditioned on the completion of the lender's due diligence, further satisfactory negotiation by the parties, and the acceptance of the loan documents, the document is not binding.”
Procedural preferences
He treats civil contempt as a last resort for discovery disputes that have not yet gone through ordinary motion practice, declining to punish noncompliance with a stipulation where no preliminary conference or discovery demands have even been issued yet.
“plaintiffs seek relief that is more appropriately addressed through ordinary discovery ... the court will schedule a conference pursuant to Part 43 -- Practice Rules and Procedures 7(d) and Commercial Division Rule 14.”
He enforces the procedural sequencing rules of summary judgment strictly -- a motion made before issue is joined is denied outright as premature, without regard to the apparent strength of the underlying claim.
“Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is premature and must be denied. According to CPLR 3212 (a), a 'party may move for summary judgment in any action after issue has been joined'”
On attorney-withdrawal applications he insists on strict compliance with the notice-to-client requirement, denying a renewed motion where counsel filed proof that service had failed rather than proof that it had succeeded, without further attempts at alternate service.
“Counsel's affidavit of service is inadequate -- as it does not comply with this court's directives and does not comply with the CPLR 321 requirement that his withdrawal be made upon notice to counsel's client.”
He is comfortable referring discrete valuation and fact-finding disputes -- share valuation in a shareholder-oppression suit, rent-overcharge calculations in a rent-stabilization case -- to a Judicial Hearing Officer or Special Referee rather than resolving them himself on the papers.
“a Judicial Hearing Officer ("JHO") or Special Referee shall be designated to hear and report to this court on the following individual issues of fact ... determining the fair value of plaintiffs' shares”
Cautions
His discretionary discovery rulings do not always survive appeal -- the Appellate Division, First Department reversed his denial of estate-valuation discovery in the Trump family litigation as an improvident exercise of discretion, so a denied discovery motion in a case with a live affirmative defense is a live appellate target.
“Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying defendant's motion. ... These principles entitle defendant to the requested discovery material to establish her affirmative defense.”
He will dismiss a party's claims with prejudice and award statutory attorneys' fees where a suit implicates First Amendment newsgathering activity, applying New York's anti-SLAPP statute even outside the classic defamation context.
“the newly amended anti-SLAPP law mandates that plaintiff pay defendants' attorneys' fees and costs because plaintiff's claims plainly constitute a strategic lawsuit against public participation”
He holds litigants to a hard line once a companion case has already resolved the same theory against them: continuing to press virtually identical claims after a related dismissal is affirmed on appeal is frivolous conduct warranting a fee award, even absent bad faith at the outset.
“Plaintiff's failure to withdraw its claims, following notice of dismissal of virtually identical claims in the related action, constitutes frivolous conduct.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Ordered that the motion of defendants B.C.R.E.-90 West Street, LLC and Lee Rosen for summary judgment is denied, except to the extent that it is hereby Ordered that the motion of defendant Lee Rosen for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint herein as against him is granted”
“Ordered that the motion of plaintiffs ... for partial summary judgment is granted to the extent that it is hereby Declared that plaintiffs' respective leases are governed by rent stabilization”
“ORDERED that The Times defendants' motion (sequence number 003) to dismiss the complaint as against them is granted; ... ORDERED that the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action are hereby dismissed with prejudice”
“Because plaintiff's claims are barred by releases, both motions are granted and the complaint is dismissed.”
“ORDERED that ... plaintiff shall fully respond to defendant's request for interrogatory responses and provide an itemization of all special damages alleged ...; and it is further ORDERED that defendant's request for estate valuation materials from the plaintiff is denied”
“Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the motion for default judgment is denied”
“ORDERED that plaintiff's request for supplementation of defendants' response to post deposition demands is denied, and plaintiff's request for defendant's client list and tax records for the period of 2019-2023 is denied”
“ORDERED that the motion of Leo Jacobs, Esq. to be relieved as counsel for defendant Abe Cohen (mot. seq. no. 002) is granted, upon filing of proof of compliance with the following conditions”
“that portion of Apax's motion seeking reasonable fees and costs pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 is granted, without opposition, and the remainder of Apax's motion (mot. seq. no. 014) is denied as moot”
“ORDERED that the motion of plaintiff Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. for an extension of time to serve the summons and complaint upon defendant Cavello Bay Reinsurance Limited (motion sequence no. 006) is granted”
“ORDERED that the portion of plaintiff Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.'s motion (motion sequence no. 008) seeking renewal of motion sequence number 005, is denied”
“ORDERED, that the motion of Mark T. Doerr, Esq. and Michael S. Marron, Esq., to withdraw as counsel for defendants Federico & Company d/b/a M&W Suppliers and Wallace Shimabukuro (motion seq. no. 005), is denied, without prejudice”
“ORDERED that defendant's order to show cause is denied, with leave to re-file.”
“ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to discontinue this action (motion seq. no. 006) is granted, and this action is hereby discontinued, without prejudice”
Put Judge Reed's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Reed actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Reed's own signed orders and cites them.