Richard M. Platkin
How Judge Platkin decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On motions to seal commercial records, he requires more than generic, boilerplate attestations of competitive harm -- the same conclusory claims that could be made in nearly any Commercial Division dispute -- and treats sealing as the exception rather than the rule, denying it outright rather than crafting a narrower order when the movant's own showing does not distinguish its situation from any other litigant's.
“Precisely the same boilerplate invocations of competitive harm and damage to customer relationships could be made in many of the disputes litigated in the Commercial Division, yet sealing is the exception and not the rule, reserved only for the most compelling circumstances.”
In FOIL trade-secret disputes, he will credit an agency's and a private vendor's claim of trade-secret protection over a requester's argument that partial public disclosures elsewhere undermine the exemption, so long as the specific withheld material -- here, the inner workings of a parole risk-assessment algorithm -- has not itself been shown to be publicly known.
“[T]he court concludes that the technology underlying COMPAS-NY is a bona fide trade secret belonging to equivant, and agency records containing such material are exempt from disclosure under Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (d). Any change to this rule based on the "uniquely important public interest" of parole oversight ... must come from the State Legislature.”
In first-filed/prior-action disputes between the same parties, he looks past pure filing-date chronology and instead asks which forum has the more genuine, logical tie to the dispute, especially when both sides can be accused of racing to the courthouse.
“There is no question that New York County is a proper and logical forum for the parties' insurance coverage dispute, as it is the county in which defendant-insurer maintains its principal place of business ... By contrast, [plaintiff] is Delaware company headquartered in Colorado that is not registered or licensed to do business in New York.”
Procedural preferences
He insists that a post-answer motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be decided on the pleadings themselves, not on the movant's own evidentiary submissions, and will deny such a motion outright -- pointing the movant instead to a properly-noticed summary-judgment motion -- rather than treat the fact-based defense as if it had been raised the right way.
“[A] court resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim cannot base the determination upon submissions by the defendant, no matter how compelling claims made in such submissions may appear.”
He enforces arbitration deadlines the parties themselves negotiate, and will vacate an award issued after the parties jointly terminated an arbitrator's authority for missing an agreed decision deadline, even where the delay in issuing the eventual award was measured only in weeks.
“[B]ased on the Arbitrator's persistent and unexplained delays in rendering an award, the parties lost confidence in whether the Arbitrator could provide them a "full opinion explaining the reasoning for any award" within an acceptable timeframe... After that deadline came and went ... the Arbitrator "exceeded his power" by purporting to render a decision.”
He treats a party's election to disaffirm a contract on an equitable rescission theory as carrying real procedural consequences -- specifically, waiver of a jury trial -- rather than letting a party pursue both an equitable defense and a legal damages theory on the same facts without a downside.
“The Court therefore concludes that Rodeo waived its right to a jury trial by interposing a defense and counterclaim of an equitable nature arising from the same transaction as REW's claim of anticipatory repudiation.”
Cautions
In litigation where the State of New York itself is a party seeking to recover pandemic-era procurement losses, he engages closely with contract-formation and election-of-remedies technicalities on their merits and is willing to rule against the State on summary judgment where the record does not support its damages theory, indicating he does not extend the State any thumb on the scale simply because it is the movant.
“The Court therefore concludes that election-of-remedies principles bar the State from maintaining a claim of total breach based on the lack of pre-shipment inspections. ... ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted; and it is further ORDERED that plaintiff's cross motion is denied.”
In SEQRA challenges to significant state agency rulemaking, he will annul a regulation in its entirety for lack of a reasoned environmental-impact elaboration even where doing so leaves substantive vagueness and scope challenges unaddressed, favoring the cleanest procedural ground for relief over reaching every argument raised.
“[T]he Court concludes that the subject action -- the promulgation of the new Part 664 regulations -- must be annulled for noncompliance with SEQRA... Given the Court's determination that Part 664 must be annulled for non-compliance with SEQRA, the Court need not reach this purely regulatory challenge.”
In multi-motion commercial disputes he frequently narrows claims rather than resolving them wholesale in either direction, dismissing some causes of action or counterclaims while expressly preserving others for discovery or trial, and pairing that narrowing with practical case-management directives (preliminary conferences, ADR conferral, discovery scheduling).
“ORDERED that Downstate at LICH's motion to dismiss the counterclaims alleged against it by Fortis and/or Coble Hill is granted to the extent of dismissing all such counterclaims, except for Counts I and III... a remote preliminary conference shall be scheduled, and the parties shall confer in advance of such conference as to (1) their willingness to proceed to early mediation or other form of alternative dispute resolution.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“ORDERED that plaintiff's motions are denied in all respects.”
“ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action is granted; ... ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the fourth cause of action is granted as to liability only; and it is further ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants' defenses is granted”
“ORDERED that the motions of defendants and the Corporations to dismiss the Complaint are granted to the extent of dismissing the fifth and sixth causes of action, and the motions are denied in all other respects”
“ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss is granted to the extent that the third, fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action are dismissed, and the motion is denied as to the first and seventh causes of action”
“ORDERED that the motions of fourth-party defendants Hanson Aggregates New York, LLC and Barrett Paving Materials, Inc. to dismiss the Fourth-Party Complaint and/or for summary judgment are granted to the extent indicated herein and are otherwise denied”
“ORDERED that the branch of defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied”
“ORDERED that the branch of defendant's motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (4) is granted; and finally it is ORDERED that this action is dismissed.”
“ORDERED and ADJUDGED that petitioners' application to confirm the arbitration award is denied and the Petition is dismissed”
“ORDERED and ADJUDGED that respondents' Cross Petition to vacate the arbitration award is granted; and it is further ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the arbitration award ... is vacated in all respects”
“ORDERED that the complaints in Action Nos. 1 and 2 are dismissed.”
“ORDERED that plaintiff's motion is granted, and the Jury Demand is hereby stricken”
“it is ordered that defendants' motion is denied; and it is further ordered that the parties shall confer regarding a schedule for the expeditious completion of all remaining fact discovery”
“ORDERED that WCCA's first cause of action, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, is dismissed to the limited extent indicated ...; and it is further ORDERED that WCCA's second cause of action ... is dismissed to the extent indicated ...; and it is further ORDERED that WCCA's fifth cause of action, alleging constructive trust, is dismissed in all respects”
“Supreme Court partially granted the petition by ordering the release of the video footage.”
“Supreme Court denied petitioner's request for counsel fees and costs, finding that respondent had a reasonable basis for denying access given the novelty of the video recording issues and the important interests at stake.”
Put Judge Platkin's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Platkin actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Platkin's own signed orders and cites them.