Reginald A. Boddie
How Judge Boddie decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In commercial-lease disputes he reads a governing document's plain, negotiated terms strictly against reformation or open-ended interpretation unless the moving party shows clear and convincing evidence of an actual drafting error, cross-checked against the parties' own prior agreements and course of dealing.
“Read in light of the prior agreements and the commercial context, that substitution is plainly a drafting error. The documentary record thus demonstrates that the 2017 Agreement, as written, does not accurately reflect the parties' actual intent.”
He is comfortable denying a preliminary injunction that would functionally grant the ultimate relief sought before the merits are decided, even where the moving party alleges ongoing self-dealing or diversion of revenue by the other side, if the underlying claim of entitlement (e.g., whether a lease actually terminated) is itself the disputed question.
“The determination of whether to enjoin defendants from exercising their rights under the prime lease necessarily entails the determination of plaintiff's third cause of action, which is not before the Court on this motion and the Court declines to make such determination sua sponte.”
On motions to dismiss for lack of standing based on a collateral assignment (e.g., a lease assigned to a mortgage lender as security), he applies New York's 'lien theory' rule narrowly, requiring the movant to affirmatively show the assignee's rights actually superseded the assignor's rather than merely existing as security.
“Defendants failed to demonstrate the lender's right to collect rents extended past satisfaction of the loan or that lender could, at its discretion, make use of the funds collected as rent other than to pay down the mortgage.”
Procedural preferences
He holds parties to strict timeliness on pre-answer motions after a scheduling order sets a firm deadline, treating an untimely motion to dismiss as forfeited and the unfiled answer as waived rather than granting further extensions.
“Wythe Berry and Weiss did not file an answer. Rather, they filed MS 4, a pre-answer motion to dismiss, on October 5, 2021, which was untimely. Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied in its entirety and defendants' answer is deemed waived.”
On summary judgment involving a factual dispute over reasonable reliance (a common element in fraud and fraudulent-inducement claims), he treats the reasonableness question as inherently unsuitable for summary disposition even when a signed writing appears to contradict the claimed oral misrepresentation.
“The issue of reasonable reliance is an essential element of a fraud claim and is not subject to summary disposition.”
Cautions
In his earlier Civil Court/Supreme Court personal-injury and no-fault practice, several of his orders denying vacatur of a party's default were later reversed on appeal where the Second Department found a reasonable excuse or a jurisdictional defect the trial record did not adequately address -- a reminder that credibility calls on 'law office failure' excuses and service disputes from this judge have drawn a non-trivial reversal rate on this specific issue.
“the defendants demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the default ... the defendants' motion to vacate the judgment is granted”
He enforces enforceable non-compete clauses only to the extent they carry an actual, stated temporal limit, severing an unlimited-duration non-compete from an otherwise-valid, time-limited non-solicitation clause in the same agreement rather than voiding the entire restrictive-covenant scheme.
“As the non-compete clause is unlimited in duration, it is unenforceable. ... Lerner fails to establish that such claim must be dismissed [as to the non-solicitation clause].”
In multi-motion commercial disputes he is comfortable resolving several distinct pending motions (a plaintiff's motion, a defendant's cross-motion, and requests to dismiss affirmative defenses or counterclaims) in a single omnibus decision, splitting the outcome motion-by-motion rather than resolving the case wholesale in one direction.
“plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety. Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment is granted to the extent that the 2017 Agreement is reformed ... plaintiff's affirmative defenses are dismissed ... The remainder of defendants' cross-motion is denied.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the petition is granted to the extent petitioner shall receive a refund in the amount of all interest, billed for and paid, for the period of July 1, 2008 through May 10, 2010, and continuing to February 19, 2016. Respondents' cross-motion is denied.”
“Respondents' cross-motion is denied.”
“defendant shall pay plaintiff U & O, pursuant to the lease, semi-annually in the amount of $7.5 million, with the next payment due on or before February 1, 2022, plus additional rent, on the grounds that such order accommodates the competing interests of the parties”
“plaintiff's order to show cause for a preliminary injunction (MS 3) is denied”
“defendants' motion to dismiss is denied in its entirety and defendants' answer is deemed waived”
“plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaims is granted only to the extent that Siegel's counterclaims are dismissed”
“Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint is granted only to the extent that the complaint is dismissed against Siegel. The remainder of the parties' motions is denied.”
“defendants failed to conclusively establish that they did not fraudulently induce plaintiffs into entering the contacts by misrepresenting to them that the mortgage would only be recorded against one property”
“the issue of reasonable reliance is an essential element of a fraud claim and is not subject to summary disposition. Therefore, plaintiffs' summary judgment motion is also denied.”
“defendant Lerner's motion to dismiss the complaint is granted to the extent that plaintiff's breach of contract claim premised on the Agreement's non-compete and unfair competition cause of action are dismissed. The motion is otherwise denied.”
“defendants fail to establish that plaintiff lacks standing to sue. ... Movant Defendants' motion (MS 3) is denied.”
“plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on his claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement (First Cause of Action) against Movant Defendants and Softstone Development and Management Group LLC ... Plaintiff's motion (MS 4) is granted to the extent granted herein but otherwise denied.”
“plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety.”
“the branch of defendants' motion seeking reformation of the 2017 Agreement is granted, and the Agreement is reformed to substitute "Lessor" for "Lessee" in the subject termination provision.”
“the branch of defendants' motion seeking dismissal of plaintiff's affirmative defenses is granted, and plaintiff's affirmative defenses are hereby dismissed.”
“The order denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. ... Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.”
“The order denied the plaintiff's motion ... pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate a prior order of the same court dated June 22, 2018, granting the defendants' unopposed motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. ... Ordered that the order dated September 14, 2018, is affirmed, with costs.”
“upon granting the plaintiff's second motion for leave to renew and reargue, adhered to so much of the determination in the order dated June 22, 2015, as denied the plaintiff's prior motion, in effect, for leave to enter a default judgment and for an order of reference ... The order dated August 2, 2017, is reversed insofar as appealed from”
“in effect, granted leave to reargue and, upon reargument, adhered to its prior determination denying that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for leave to serve a late notice of claim on the nonparty City of New York. ... the amended order dated July 26, 2018, is affirmed insofar as appealed from”
“The first order dated May 25, 2018, denied that defendant's motion (a), in effect, for leave to reargue, (b), in effect, to vacate the determinations in the order dated March 16, 2018 ... and (c) to dismiss the complaint ... for lack of personal jurisdiction. ... the first order dated May 25, 2018, is reversed insofar as reviewed”
Put Judge Boddie's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Boddie actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Boddie's own signed orders and cites them.