Marguerite A. Grays
How Judge Grays rules, drawn from 35 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Grays
Marguerite A. Grays has served as a justice of the New York Supreme Court in Queens County since her 2002 election and has presided over its Commercial Division since 2005. She became Administrative Judge for Civil Matters of the Eleventh Judicial District in 2020 and was named co-chair of the Commercial Division Advisory Council in 2025.
Judge Grays's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Grays, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Contacting chambers
Email stipulations of discontinuance to the Part as well as uploading them to NYSCEF.
“All stipulations of discontinuance should be uploaded to NYSCEF and emailed to [email protected].”
Motions
The first motion adjournment is granted as of right but cannot exceed four weeks.
“Applications for an adjournment on motions will be granted as a matter of right for the first time. Said adjournment shall not exceed four (4) weeks.”
Conferences
Motions, conferences, and trials require court approval before adjournment.
“All adjournments1 (motions, conferences, trials) require prior court approval.”
How Judge Grays decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Pennymac Corp. v. Erneste, Judge Grays granted the borrower's dismissal motion in a foreclosure action after applying the six-year limitations period to an accelerated mortgage debt under the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act.
“In New York, ‘once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and the Statute of Limitations begins to run on the entire debt’ ... Under FAPA, ‘[e]ven if the mortgage is payable in installments, once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and payable, and the statute of limitations begins to run on the entire debt’”
In Tyz v. First St. Holding Co., Grays granted summary judgment dismissing a restaurant fall claim involving a single step riser the plaintiff had crossed earlier without incident; the Appellate Division affirmed.
“the plaintiff had traversed the riser, without incident, approximately two hours earlier, when she first entered the booth where she ate her meal”
In Alam v. Uddin, the Appellate Division affirmed her denial of a motion to compel arbitration, though on different grounds: the defendant's forgery claim about the partnership agreement was a threshold issue for the court.
“the defendant alleged that his signature on the purported partnership agreement was a forgery and thus no valid agreement was made ... the question of forgery is a threshold question for the court and not an arbitrator to determine”
Procedural preferences
In JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Luxama, she granted dismissal of the complaint against Cassandre Luxama under CPLR 3211(a)(4) because the lender had already brought an action seeking the same relief.
“the plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the defendant Cassandre Luxama ... the defendant cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her on the ground that the plaintiff had commenced a prior action in 2011, wherein it sought the same relief. The Supreme Court granted the defendant's cross motion”
In P.J. 37 Food Corp. v. George Doulaveris & Son, Inc., the Appellate Division upheld her denial of the owner's further summary-judgment and renewal requests because the owner had not shown that its evidence was unavailable on its earlier motions.
“the owner failed to establish that the evidence it submitted in support of those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment was not available to it when it previously moved for summary judgment on two occasions and could not have been submitted on the prior motions”
In Follors v. TI Ozone Park Storage, LLC, Judge Grays denied vacatur of a default because the plaintiff did not show a potentially meritorious opposition, even assuming her excuse for the default was reasonable.
“the plaintiff argued that she had a reasonable excuse for her default ... even though the order to show cause by which that motion was brought did not contain a provision staying the proceedings. The Supreme Court properly determined that, even if the plaintiff had demonstrated a reasonable excuse for her default ... she failed to establish that she had a potentially meritorious opposition”
Cautions
In Lola Roberts Beauty Salon, Inc. v. Able Motor Cars Corp., the Appellate Division reversed Judge Grays's abandonment dismissal because the 60-day order-submission rule did not apply without an explicit direction to settle or submit an order.
“By order dated November 15, 2019, the court granted the motion. ... 'Proposed orders . . . with proof of service on all parties where the order is directed to be settled or submitted on notice, must be submitted for signature ... within 60 days' ... These provisions are not applicable where the decision does not explicitly direct that the proposed judgment or order be settled or submitted”
In Glaubach v. Slifkin, Grays denied dismissal of a shareholder derivative claim for failure to make a board demand. On reargument, the Appellate Division reversed because the plaintiff's own minutes, letters, and emails conclusively showed he had not demanded that the board bring suit.
“the board meeting minutes, letters, and emails that the plaintiff submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss conclusively demonstrated that he did not demand that the board take any specific action, such as by filing suit”
She has twice denied a homeowner's motion to vacate a mortgage foreclosure default judgment on essentially the same grounds already rejected in an earlier, unappealed motion, treating the second application as barred rather than reopening the merits.
“that motion was premised on grounds asserted in her prior motion pursuant to CPLR 317 and 5015 (a) to vacate the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale, which had been denied in the January 2023 order, from which she did not appeal, and no grounds were asserted in that motion that were not apparent at the time she made the prior motion”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), dated March 29, 2005, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), dated May 9, 2005, as denied their separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), dated February 23, 2006, which, among other things, denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), dated January 5, 2010, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), dated August 7, 2012, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Lizardos Engineering Associates, P.C., which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging tortious interference with contract insofar as asserted against it.”
“upon an order of the same court entered August 24, 2015, granting the plaintiff's motion to confirm a referee's report and for leave to enter a default judgement of foreclosure and sale, and denying that defendant's cross motion, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3) and (4) to vacate an order of reference”
“The order dated December 2, 2015, insofar as appealed from by the defendants David Slifkin and Trudy Balk, granted that branch of the plaintiff's cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025 for leave to amend the complaint.”
“The order dated December 7, 2015, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the motion of the defendants David Slifkin and Trudy Balk which were, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the first through fourth causes of action in the amended complaint”
“The order dated July 22, 2016, insofar as appealed from, upon reargument, adhered to the determination in the order dated December 7, 2015, denying those branches of the motion of the defendants David Slifkin and Trudy Balk which were, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the first through fourth causes of action in the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them”
“upon the granting of those branches of the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of evidence, which were to dismiss the defendant's second and third counterclaims, and upon a decision of the same court dated July 17, 2015, made after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the plaintiff”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Marguerite A. Grays, J.), dated August 25, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the defendant's cross motion which were to compel arbitration and stay all proceedings in the action pending arbitration”
“or, in the alternative, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. ... We affirm insofar as appealed from, albeit on grounds different from those relied upon by the Supreme Court.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Marguerite A. Grays, J.), entered March 7, 2017. The order granted the cross motion of the defendant Cassandre Luxama pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her and denied, as academic, the plaintiff's motion”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Marguerite A. Grays, J.), entered September 6, 2017. The order denied that proposed intervenor's motion for leave to intervene in the action”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Marguerite A. Grays, J.), entered September 28, 2017. The order granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Bond Realty, Inc., Bon Realty Corp., Ryan Tessier, Diane Schreiber, Jennifer Abruzzi, Susan Abruzzi, Theresa Abruzzi, and Joseph Abruzzi which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them”
“granted the separate motion of the defendant GC Cross Bay Realty, LLC, inter alia, to cancel the notice of pendency”
“granted the separate motion of the defendant Domenica Majorie Centrone pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her.”
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