Marguerite A. Grays
How Judge Grays decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In residential mortgage foreclosure cases she applies the statute of limitations rigorously once a debt has been accelerated, including recognizing that the 2022 Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) bars a lender from unilaterally 'de-accelerating' a debt through a letter or a voluntary discontinuance to reset the six-year clock.
“In New York, "once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and the Statute of Limitations begins to run on the entire debt" ... Under FAPA, "[e]ven if the mortgage is payable in installments, once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and payable, and the statute of limitations begins to run on the entire debt"”
On summary judgment in premises-liability cases, she readily grants dismissal where a plaintiff has already safely encountered the same condition (a step, a nosing) shortly before the accident, treating that as strong evidence the condition was open, obvious, and not inherently dangerous.
“the plaintiff had traversed the riser, without incident, approximately two hours earlier, when she first entered the booth where she ate her meal”
In arbitration disputes she treats a party's own claim that its signature on the governing contract was forged as a threshold question for the court, not the arbitrator, to resolve first -- even when that same party is simultaneously invoking the contract's arbitration clause in the alternative.
“the defendant alleged that his signature on the purported partnership agreement was a forgery and thus no valid agreement was made ... the question of forgery is a threshold question for the court and not an arbitrator to determine”
Procedural preferences
She enforces the prior-pending-action doctrine (CPLR 3211[a][4]) to dismiss a second suit that substantially duplicates an already-pending action between substantially the same parties seeking substantially the same relief, rather than letting duplicative litigation proceed on parallel tracks.
“the plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the defendant Cassandre Luxama ... the defendant cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her on the ground that the plaintiff had commenced a prior action in 2011, wherein it sought the same relief. The Supreme Court granted the defendant's cross motion”
She denies successive summary-judgment motions and renewal applications that simply repackage arguments or evidence a party could have raised the first time, holding parties to a single, complete summary-judgment presentation absent genuinely new evidence.
“the owner failed to establish that the evidence it submitted in support of those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment was not available to it when it previously moved for summary judgment on two occasions and could not have been submitted on the prior motions”
On motions to vacate a default, she requires the defaulting party to show both a genuinely reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious position, and will deny vacatur where a party's own litigation strategy (such as assuming an unrelated motion imposed an automatic stay) caused the default, even where the excuse is offered in good faith.
“the plaintiff argued that she had a reasonable excuse for her default ... even though the order to show cause by which that motion was brought did not contain a provision staying the proceedings. The Supreme Court properly determined that, even if the plaintiff had demonstrated a reasonable excuse for her default ... she failed to establish that she had a potentially meritorious opposition”
Cautions
She will grant a motion to dismiss a claim as abandoned under the court rule requiring a proposed order to be settled or submitted within 60 days of a decision, even where the underlying decision itself did not clearly identify which party was obligated to settle the judgment -- a ruling the Appellate Division found too strict, since the rule does not apply at all unless the decision explicitly directs that an order be settled or submitted.
“By order dated November 15, 2019, the court granted the motion. ... 'Proposed orders . . . with proof of service on all parties where the order is directed to be settled or submitted on notice, must be submitted for signature ... within 60 days' ... These provisions are not applicable where the decision does not explicitly direct that the proposed judgment or order be settled or submitted”
In shareholder derivative suits she has denied a motion to dismiss for failure to satisfy the pre-suit board-demand requirement even where the plaintiff's own contemporaneous board-meeting minutes, letters, and emails arguably showed he never actually demanded that the board sue -- a ruling the Appellate Division reversed on reargument as conclusively refuted by documentary evidence.
“the board meeting minutes, letters, and emails that the plaintiff submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss conclusively demonstrated that he did not demand that the board take any specific action, such as by filing suit”
She has twice denied a homeowner's motion to vacate a mortgage foreclosure default judgment on essentially the same grounds already rejected in an earlier, unappealed motion, treating the second application as barred rather than reopening the merits.
“that motion was premised on grounds asserted in her prior motion pursuant to CPLR 317 and 5015 (a) to vacate the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale, which had been denied in the January 2023 order, from which she did not appeal, and no grounds were asserted in that motion that were not apparent at the time she made the prior motion”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), dated March 29, 2005, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), dated May 9, 2005, as denied their separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), dated February 23, 2006, which, among other things, denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), dated January 5, 2010, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Grays, J.), dated August 7, 2012, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Lizardos Engineering Associates, P.C., which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging tortious interference with contract insofar as asserted against it.”
“upon an order of the same court entered August 24, 2015, granting the plaintiff's motion to confirm a referee's report and for leave to enter a default judgement of foreclosure and sale, and denying that defendant's cross motion, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3) and (4) to vacate an order of reference”
“The order dated December 2, 2015, insofar as appealed from by the defendants David Slifkin and Trudy Balk, granted that branch of the plaintiff's cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025 for leave to amend the complaint.”
“The order dated December 7, 2015, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the motion of the defendants David Slifkin and Trudy Balk which were, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the first through fourth causes of action in the amended complaint”
“upon reargument, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the motion of Slifkin and Balk which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the first through fourth causes of action”
“upon the granting of those branches of the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of evidence, which were to dismiss the defendant's second and third counterclaims, and upon a decision of the same court dated July 17, 2015, made after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the plaintiff”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Marguerite A. Grays, J.), dated August 25, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the defendant's cross motion which were to compel arbitration and stay all proceedings in the action pending arbitration”
“or, in the alternative, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. ... We affirm insofar as appealed from, albeit on grounds different from those relied upon by the Supreme Court.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Marguerite A. Grays, J.), entered March 7, 2017. The order granted the cross motion of the defendant Cassandre Luxama pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her and denied, as academic, the plaintiff's motion”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Marguerite A. Grays, J.), entered September 6, 2017. The order denied that proposed intervenor's motion for leave to intervene in the action”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Marguerite A. Grays, J.), entered September 28, 2017. The order granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Bond Realty, Inc., Bon Realty Corp., Ryan Tessier, Diane Schreiber, Jennifer Abruzzi, Susan Abruzzi, Theresa Abruzzi, and Joseph Abruzzi which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them”
“granted the separate motion of the defendant GC Cross Bay Realty, LLC, inter alia, to cancel the notice of pendency”
“granted the separate motion of the defendant Domenica Majorie Centrone pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her.”
Put Judge Grays's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Grays actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Grays's own signed orders and cites them.