Linda S. Jamieson
How Judge Jamieson decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On motions to dismiss family or closely-held-business disputes, she takes seriously whether a claim genuinely belongs to an individual or to the entity, but will not let a joinder or necessary-party argument defeat a case where the omitted person's interests are not actually at stake in the litigation.
“Defendants have not established that Ivana will be 'inequitably affected' by a judgment herein ... because if plaintiffs prevail, Ivana will receive a potential benefit as a partial owner of the plaintiff entities, and if plaintiffs do not prevail, Ivana's rights as an owner thereof are not affected.”
She reads restrictive covenants and arbitration/valuation-selection clauses by their precise contractual mechanics rather than their apparent purpose -- a valuation expert hired outside the exact mutual-selection procedure the contract specified cannot be the operative valuation, no matter how competently done.
“the Andersen valuation cannot be used to value plaintiff's interests ... because the Andersen valuation simply cannot be the operative valuation, as it was not obtained in accordance with Section 10.6(c) of the Operating Agreement.”
In mechanic's-lien disputes she applies the Lien Law's liberal-construction mandate broadly, favoring correction of a lien's technical property description over its invalidation, especially where an owner sat on the alleged defect during a lengthy mediation.
“affording the Lien Law its appropriately liberal construction to protect the beneficial interests of lienors, the misidentification of the lots in the various liens is correctable.”
Procedural preferences
She excuses late defaults attributable to law-office failure during genuinely demanding litigation (a lengthy mediation, an unreliable mail-forwarding situation) where the defaulting party shows no intent to abandon the case, favoring resolution on the merits.
“given the history of these matters; the number of conferences the Court has held with the parties ... OPRA's obvious intent not to abandon the litigation; and the 'strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits,' OPRA's default in failing to answer J. Suss' cross-claims should be excused.”
She will allow a late amendment to a bill of particulars -- even a theory not originally pleaded -- where the opposing party was effectively on notice of it through deposition testimony and no trial date is imminent, treating mere lateness as insufficient without real prejudice.
“Mere lateness is not a barrier to the amendment. It must be lateness coupled with significant prejudice to the other side, the very elements of the laches doctrine.”
She enforces the finality of stipulated settlements and prior judgments strictly against later attempts to reopen them, particularly where a party was represented by counsel at the time and any new argument is time-barred.
“there is no legal basis for the Court to reopen this long-disposed foreclosure action.”
Reviewing courts have affirmed her application of strict timeliness rules to post-judgment renewal motions, holding a change-in-law argument does not excuse a renewal motion brought years after a final foreclosure judgment and the expired appeal window.
“The defendant failed to timely appeal from the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale and did not move for leave to renew until almost three years later.”
Cautions
She holds attorneys to a high standard of good faith in discovery and motion practice, and will find counsel's refusal to accept adequate proof and to withdraw a claim against a plainly uninvolved party sanctionable in substance, even when she stops short of actually imposing sanctions in that instance.
“The Court determines that plaintiff's counsel's refusal to dismiss White Castle from the action was undertaken primarily to harass or maliciously injure White Castle. ... This was unjustifiable, harassing, malicious and sanctionable.”
She requires admissible, foundationally-supported proof before granting relief even in default and foreclosure contexts, and will credit a defaulting party's meritorious defense and reasonable excuse over a plaintiff's own record of procedural lapses.
“The problems with Ms. O'Leary's assertions are that, among other things, she has no factual support for her assertions.”
A reviewing appellate panel has affirmed her grant of summary judgment dismissing a premises-liability claim on trivial-defect grounds where the moving party's photographic and deposition proof went unrebutted.
“the evidence submitted by the defendants ... was sufficient to establish, prima facie, that the height differential of the walkway flag was physically insignificant.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Court agrees with plaintiffs that complete relief can be afforded among the parties herein without joining Ivana”
“defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to CPLR SS 3211(a)(1), (7) and/or (10) is granted to the extent that the sixth cause of action is dismissed pursuant to CPLR S 3211(a)(7), and the motion is otherwise denied.”
“the Court denies the motions to dismiss in their entirety.”
“plaintiff's motion to dismiss the Counterclaims pursuant to CPLR SS 3211(a)(1) and (7) is denied in its entirety.”
“Plaintiff filed the summons and complaint back in 2023. It is thus too late for it to serve the correct defendant in this matter. CPLR S 306-b. Accordingly, the action is dismissed, without prejudice.”
“this action must be dismissed, as it is based on a valuation that was not procedurally proper. This dismissal is without prejudice, so that plaintiff may assert his claims again, if he wishes, once a procedurally proper valuation is obtained.”
“The Court thus denies the motion to dismiss for abandonment.”
“the Court grants the motion to the extent that it vacates the Judgment. ... The Court also grants defendant 10 business days ... for defendant to file its answer and counterclaims.”
“Accordingly, the motion is denied in its entirety.”
“Accordingly, the Court denies the motion in its entirety.”
“there is no legal basis for the Court to reopen this long-disposed foreclosure action. Accordingly, the Court denies each and every element of all of the motions filed by Ms. O'Leary.”
“the Court denies each and every element of all of the motions filed by Ms. O'Leary.”
“the Court declines to award any sanctions against Ms. O'Leary. While she has not prevailed, the Court does not believe that she filed any of these motions maliciously.”
“the Court (1) denies OPRA's motions in their entirety (except as set forth below)”
“With respect to the three parties that have defaulted, Bath, Countrywide and Norberto, OPRA's motions are granted. These parties have not appeared, so there is no reason to allow them to maintain (or revise) their liens.”
“allows all lienholders to amend their liens to reflect the appropriate units, and deems any answers, complaints or other claims relying on such liens to be so amended”
“J. Suss' motion is denied in its entirety, and OPRA's motion is granted to the extent that the Court grants OPRA permission to file a late answer.”
“OPRA's motion is granted to the extent that the Court grants OPRA permission to file a late answer.”
“the Court denies this motion.”
“the Court declines to dismiss the breach of contract cause of action at this preliminary stage of the action.”
Put Judge Jamieson's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Jamieson actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Jamieson's own signed orders and cites them.